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Preface
Since the end of World War II, leaders across the globe tried to reduce barriers to live in
peace and to increase welfare in their countries. International institutions, such as NATO,
the European Union and the World Trade Organization were founded to promote demo-
cratic ideals, promote multilateralism, increase international trade and build coalitions
to deconstruct nationalism. However, in the last decade surges of rising protectionism
increased, questioning the existence of these institutions. Moreover, the uprising of the
largest pandemic ever experienced by the modern world posits additional challenges to
the existing globalized world (Antras et al., 2020). Globalization has a significant impact
on growth across and within countries. It fosters fast-paced changes in technology and
increases mobility of goods, services, capital and labor. It facilitated vast opportuni-
ties of growth and contributed to a dramatic increase in the world’s GDP (Grossman
and Helpman (2015), Antràs and Chor (2018), Caliendo and Parro (2015), David et al.
(2013), ). Yet, these trends were accompanied with uncertainty and sometimes presented
an uneven distribution of the costs and benefits (Acemoglu and Yared (2010)). People
and nations started to question whether they were among the winners or the losers from
globalization. “To ensure that globalization can be leveraged to support inclusive economic
growth and sustainable development, it is essential to analyze the current system as well
as emerging trends to devise policy solutions addressing them,” said Liu Zhenmin, UN
DESA’s Under-Secretary-General. It is crucial to understand the economic implications
of integrating or disintegrating nations. This thesis provides answers how recent trends
affect economies in a globalized world.
The first two chapters analyze how the COVID-19 pandemic affects welfare and inequality
across the globe and specifically across European regions. The third chapter discusses the
economic consequences of Brexit, the predominant example of rising nationalism. The
last two chapters scrutinize the effects of increased multilateralism on two examples: The
formation of the European Monetary Union and the implementation of the EU-Japan
Economic Partnership Agreement.
PREFACE 2
Chapter 1. The first chapter studies the role of global production linkages in the
transmission of the COVID-19 pandemic shock across countries. "The seismic shock
of the coronavirus pandemic has revealed the fragility of an interconnected world" (The
Economist, 2020). The first half of the year 2020 was filled with headlines and discussions
about the role of globalization in the diffusion of the negative effects of COVID-19. The
COVID-19 pandemic is possibly the biggest production disruption in the recent world his-
tory. With 11.648.268 cases, 538.828 deaths and millions of people in quarantine around
the world as of 7th of July 2020, the spread of COVID-19 disease is the largest pandemic
ever experienced in the globalized world. Globalization allows firms to source interme-
diate inputs and sell final goods in many different countries, so the economic effects of
a global pandemic crucially depend on the extent to which countries are connected in
global production networks.
This chapter studies the effects of the COVID-19 induced lockdowns on economies and the
role of the diffusion of the shock through global value chains. To perform a counterfactual
simulation, this chapter extends a multi-country, multi-sector type Ricardian trade model.
The derived general equilibrium effects are decomposed into a direct effect from the
production shock induced by the COVID-19 shock and an indirect effect coming from the
global shock affecting other countries. Both exercises are performed in an open economy
with the actual tariff and trade cost levels and in a closer economy, where trade costs are
increased by 100 percentage points in each sector-country. The COVID-19 shock has a
considerable impact on most economies in the world. Most of the countries experience
a drop in real income up to 18%, with the highest drops for Slovenia and Poland. The
observed heterogeneity in the sectoral drop in value-added is partially driven by the
geography of production in each country combined with the regional diffusion of the
shock - regional variation in lockdown policies - and by the inter-sectoral linkages across
countries, but also by the heterogeneity in the degree of teleworkability across sectors.
The decomposition of the results into a direct effect of production and an indirect effect
through global value chains substantiates the role of the global production linkages in
magnifying the effect of the production. The trade linkages between countries account
for a substantial share of the total income drop observed. The degree of trade openness
of a country is a key element in explaining the observed heterogeneity. The findings
highlight the importance of inter-sectoral linkages in the transmission of the shock: a
higher degree of integration in the global production network implies that a shock in one
country directly diffuses though the trade linkages to other countries. Trade smooths the
effect of the shock by allowing consumers to purchase and consume goods they wouldn’t
otherwise be able to consume in a world with production barriers in lockdown. Yet, the
COVID-19 shock increases production costs of intermediate inputs that are used at home
PREFACE 3
and abroad. This Chapter is currently published as a working paper and contributed to
political debates in Germany and the EU (see Sforza and Steininger (2020)).
Chapter 2. The European Union was faced with various challenges threatening its in-
tegrity over the last decades. The diffusion of the COVID-19 virus disease posits an
additional severe threat to the resilience of the European Union. Alongside populism,
one of the main issues is the increase in inequality. "Regional inequality is proving too
politically dangerous to ignore." (The Economist, 2016). Chapter 2 studies the diffusion
of the economic shock induced by the COVID-19 pandemic to understand how inequality
is distributed across European regions. Understanding these patterns is crucial for precise
policy measures in the EU.
We propose a methodology to redistribute the general equilibrium changes in value-added
by country-sector across European regions. We find that the distributional effects of the
COVID-19 pandemic disease are extremely heterogeneous across European regions, exac-
erbating the "core-periphery" divide and the inequality across the European area. Chapter
2 provides evidence that the COVID-19 shock has a stronger impact on the peripheral re-
gions of Eastern and Southern Europe, together with most of the Mediterranean regions.
On the contrary, the central European regions experience a much milder effect of the pan-
demic on their economic structure. The enormous difference in the size of the economic
effect of the COVID-19 shock across European regions emphasizes the importance of
policy responses that target the reduction of inequality across regions as a primary goal.
The observed heterogeneity is driven by two major components. First, the COVID-19
shock had a heterogeneous impact across countries, and the policy response of lock-down
varied substantially across countries, regions and sectors. Second, the geographical distri-
bution of economic activity is extremely polarized, with very concentrated cities and core
regions, and poor peripheries. A shock to production that hits disproportionately more
labor-intensive sectors that rely on external inputs, happens to have a stronger impact
in the peripheral areas of Europe.
Chapter 3. The third chapter analyzes the effects of one of the most predominant ex-
amples of protectionism of the last decade, namely Brexit. Only a few years prior to the
uprising of the largest pandemic in the recent world history, the United Kingdom voted
to leave the European Union in June 2016. 51.9 percent of voters made the momentous
choice to leave the EU in the referendum. On the 1st of February 2020, the two parties,
UK and EU, agreed upon a Withdrawal Agreement, which ends on the 31st of December
2020.
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The UK will no longer be part of the single market and customs union from the 1st of
January 2021. The chapter quantifies the general equilibrium trade, welfare and value-
added effects of a counterfactual world in which the United Kingdom is no longer part of
the European Union. In the first part, trade cost changes of the integration processes of
joining the European Union single market and the customs union are estimated. Since
Brexit is not observable in the data yet, the estimated trade cost reductions of the EU in-
tegration process are inverted and used as proxy for the negative consequences of Brexit.
Several counterfactual scenarios analyzing the consequences of different Brexit types are
simulated in a multi-country, multi-sector Ricardian trade model.
The ex-post evaluation of EU integration steps shows a successful decrease in trade costs
between the EU member states. The EU integration boosted goods exports of the UK
to the other EU countries by 24% and increased other EU members’ exports to the UK
by as much as 76%. The EU membership increased UK’s services exports to EU27 by
64%, while bilateral services exports of other EU27 countries to the UK almost doubled.
The general equilibrium effects are heterogeneous across the EU27 members. A hard
Brexit reduces real consumption in Ireland, Luxembourg and Malta more than in the
UK. The core EU economies France, Germany, and Italy face slightly smaller losses. A
soft Brexit, namely concluding on a EU27-UK free trade agreement such as the EU-Korea
FTA, would avoid three quarters of the losses from Brexit in the EU27 countries and two
thirds in the UK compared to the hard Brexit scenario. Yet, instead of staying in the
single market and customs union, UK could also try to sign free trade agreements with
the non-EU countries (i.e. Korea, Japan, Canada, USA). However, this strategy yields
less advantages for UK than staying in the customs union with the EU27. Chapter 3 is
published as a working paper and substantially contributed to the public debates in UK
and EU27 member states (see Felbermayr et al. (2018c)).
Chapter 4. About twenty years ago, the European Monetary Union was created; a time
in which the European Union was in the middle of the process to lower barriers instead
of building walls between each other. The objective was to foster intra-European eco-
nomic exchange, in particular trade, by eliminating currency related transaction costs,
such as insurances for exchange rate fluctuations, or reduced-price transparency. Chapter
4 revisits the trade cost effects of the introduction of the Euro. It quantifies the general
equilibrium effects for EU member states and specifically Germany if the European Mon-
etary Union was dissolved. The exercise informs the reader about the trade and welfare
effects of having a common currency in the EU. A deeper understanding about these pat-
terns is crucial for anti-Euro and in general anti-Europe movements because it provides
a deeper understanding of the general equilibrium welfare effects. Using sectoral trade
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data from 1995 to 2014 and applying structural gravity modelling, the chapter conducts
an ex post evaluation of the European Monetary Union.
The Euro led to a significant average trade effect for goods of almost 8 percent, but a
much smaller effect for services trade. The Euro had heterogeneous effects across sectors
and member states. Singling out Germany, and embedding the estimation results into
a quantitative general equilibrium model of world trade, the chapter shows that EMU
has increased real incomes in all member states. The German real GDP would have
been 0.6% lower if the Euro had not existed in 2014. Among the large EMU members,
this is the largest effect. Only the service intensive members, Belgium and Luxembourg,
benefited more (1.4% and 2.1%, respectively). German gross trade is by about 1.1%
to 1.5% higher with the Euro; within the other EMU members, the effect is even more
pronounced. The chapter is published as a research paper (Felbermayr and Steininger
(2019)).
Chapter 5. The last chapter concludes the thesis by structurally analyzing the effects of
trade liberalization on welfare and trade across countries and sectors. More specifically, it
provides a quantitative analysis of the new EU-Japan Economic Partnership Agreement
(EPA), the biggest bilateral deal that both the EU and Japan have concluded so far.
On 1 February 2019, the Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) between the EU and
Japan entered into force. As of today, it is the largest free trade area in the world. In the
times of growing protectionism and unilateralism, it is of strategic importance for both
the EU and Japan.
The chapter first employs a state-of-the-art sector level gravity model to ex-post estimate
the trade cost changes of a free trade agreement, which is similar in the scope, namely the
EU-Korea FTA. The estimated trade cost changes are used as a proxy for the potential
trade cost shocks between EU and Japan. Together with observable tariff reductions,
these trade cost changes are included as trade cost shocks to inform the CGE model,
which provides a data-driven ex-ante analysis of the potential effects of the EU-Japan
EPA. The counterfactual scenario of the EPA is simulated on three different baselines.
The first baseline is similar to the world as of today, without Brexit, TPP and other future
FTAs, such as CETA. The second baseline assumes an economy with Brexit, hence UK
left the European Union. The EU-Japan EPA is only implemented between the EU27
and Japan and excludes UK as an EPA partner. The third baseline includes Transpacific
Partnership (TPP) agreement in the baseline. This first scenario yields long-run welfare
effects for Japan of about 18 bn USD per year (0.31% of GDP) and of about 15 bn USD
(0.10%) for the EU. A welfare decomposition shows that 14% of the welfare gains inside
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the EPA stem from tariffs, the remaining 86% from NTB reforms. The services sectors
account for more than half of the non-tariff barrier reductions. In the EU, value-added
in the agri-food sector increases the most, while in Japan the manufacturing and services
sectors gain the most. Japan and the EU experience very similar welfare gains in absolute
terms. In relative terms, Japan’s gains are three times as large as the EU’s. The EPA
leads to trade diversion in Japan towards Europe, especially Eastern Europe and away
from former ASEAN countries. The welfare gains are substantially smaller for Japan
if UK is not a member of the EU anymore. The third counterfactual scenario includes
the Transpacific Partnership (TPP) agreement in the baseline. It has little importance
for the effects of the EU-Japan EPA. The chapter is published as a research paper (see
Felbermayr et al. (2019)).
Chapter 1
Globalization in The Time of COVID-19
The economic effects of a pandemic crucially depend on the extent to which countries
are connected in global production networks. In this paper we incorporate production
barriers induced by COVID-19 shock into a Ricardian model with sectoral linkages, trade
in intermediate goods and sectoral heterogeneity in production. We use the model to
quantify the welfare effect of the disruption in production that started in China and
quickly spread across the world. We find that the COVID-19 shock has a considerable
impact on most economies in the world, especially when a share of the labor force is
quarantined. Moreover, we show that global production linkages have a clear role in
magnifying the effect of the production shock. Finally, we show that the economic effects
of the COVID-19 shock are heterogeneous across sectors, regions and countries, depending
on the geographic distribution of industries in each region and country and their degree
of integration in the global production network.
1.1 Introduction
Globalization allows firms to source intermediate inputs and sell final goods in many
different countries. The diffusion of a local shock through input-output linkages and
global value chains has been extensively studied (see for example Carvalho et al. (2016))
but little is known on how a pandemic affects global production along with its diffusion.1
1 Huang (2019) studies how diversification in global sourcing improves firm resilience to supply chain
disruptions during the SARS epidemics in China. We complement his analysis by studying the effect
of an epidemic shock that is not geographically confined to a specific region, but it spreads fast in the
entire world
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In this paper we study the role of global production linkages in the transmission of a
pandemic shock across countries. We exploit an unprecedented disruption in production
in the recent world history, namely the global spread of COVID-19 virus disease, to
instruct a multi-country, multi-sector Ricardian model with interactions across tradable
and non-tradable sectors observed in the input-output tables. We use the model to
quantify the trade and welfare effects of a disruption in production that started in China
and then quickly spread across the world. The spread of COVID-19 disease provides a
unique set-up to understand and study the diffusion of a global production shock along
the global value chains for three main reasons. First, it is possibly the biggest production
disruption in the recent world history. With around 11.648.268 cases, 538.828 deaths
and millions of people in quarantine around the world to date2, the spread of COVID-19
disease is the largest pandemic ever experienced in the globalized world.3 Second, the
COVID-19 shock is not an economic shock in its nature, hence its origin and diffusion
is independent from the fundamentals of the economy. Third, differently from any other
non-economic shock experienced before, it is a global shock. Indeed, while the majority
of natural disasters or epidemics have a local dimension, the spread of the COVID-19
disease has been confined to the Chinese province of Hubei only for a few weeks, to then
spread across the entire world.
Understanding the effects of a global production disruption induced by a pandemic is
complex. We build on the work by Caliendo and Parro (2015) who develop a tractable
and simple model that allows to decompose and quantify the role that intermediate goods
and sectoral linkages have in amplifying or reducing the impact of a change in tariffs.4
We extend their framework and introduce a role for policy intervention in deterring
production. In our set-up, the policy maker can use the instrument of lockdown as a policy
response to deter the COVID-19 virus diffusion; moreover, we account for the geographic
distribution of industries in each region and country and for the labor intensity of each
sector of production to have a complete picture of the distribution of the shock across
regions and sectors. The policy intervention of lockdown translates into a production
barrier that increases the production costs for intermediates and final goods produced
for the internal market as well as for the exporting market. We construct a measure
of lockdown using three different pillars: first, we use a country level measure for the
stringency of the policy intervention of lockdown from Hale et al. (2020). Second, we
allow the lockdown to heterogeneously affect each sector in each country using the share
2 as of 7th of July 2020
3 See Maffioli (2020) for a comparison of COVID-19 with other pandemics in the recent history.
4 Other papers that have used the framework of Caliendo and Parro (2015) include papers, such as
Aichele et al. (2016).
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of work in a sector that can be performed at home (henceforth teleworkability) from
Dingel and Neiman (2020).5 Third, we account for the average duration of lockdown in
each region and sector using the information in the CoronaNet database. Crucially, in
a model with interrelated sectors the cost of the input bundle depends on wages and on
the price of all the composite intermediate goods in the economy, both non-tradable and
tradable. In our framework, the policy intervention has a direct effect on the cost of
each input as well as an indirect effect via the sectoral linkages.6 Moreover, our modeling
choice for the shock allows the spread of COVID-19 disease to also have a direct effect
on the cost of non-tradable goods in each economy, hence on domestic trade.
We follow Dekle et al. (2008a) and Caliendo and Parro (2015) and solve the model in
relative changes to identify the welfare effect of the COVID-19 shock. We perform two
different exercises: (i) we include the COVID-19 shock in the model and we estimate a
scenario based on the lockdown policies implemented in each country-region, (ii) we de-
compose the effect into a direct effect from the production shock induced by the COVID-
19 shock and an indirect effect coming from the global shock affecting other countries.
We perform the two exercises both in an open economy with the actual tariff and trade
cost levels and in a closer economy, where we increase the trade costs by 100 percent-
age points in each sector-country. The quantitative exercise requires data on bilateral
trade flows, production, tariffs, sectoral trade elasticities, employment shares by sector
and region and the number of COVID-19 cases in each region or country. We calibrate
a 40 countries 50 sectors economy and incorporate the COVID-19 shock to evaluate the
welfare effects for each country both in aggregate and at the sectoral level.
We find that the COVID-19 shock has a considerable impact on most economies in the
world. With lockdown, most of the countries experience a drop in real income up to
5 It is crucial to note that the sectoral heterogeneity in labor intensity as well as teleworkability are
time invariant in our set-up, while the number of COVID-19 cases as well as the restrictiveness and
duration of the implemented policy measures are in continuous evolution, hence the point estimates
of the counterfactual scenarios might change as the spread of the COVID-19 disease affects more
countries and more people. Even if the size of the shock changes, the sensitivity and the comparisons
across sectors and countries as well as the decomposition of the effects will remain similar. The focus
of this paper is to highlight the importance of global production networks in the diffusion of a global
shock and on how to use a simple theoretical framework to provide insights on the heterogeneous
effects of the COVID-19 shock across countries and across sector under different scenarios, rather than
providing the absolute numbers of the drop in real income due to the COVID-19 shock. We will
constantly update the results of the paper to account for the new cases as well as for the number of
countries in lockdown. The results presented in this version are supposed to provide a first snap-shot
of the economic effect of the COVID-19 shock. A more complete picture will be available when the
full information of COVID-19 cases, lockdown-countries and share of people in lockdown is available.
6 This feature of the model is a key difference compared to one-sector models or multi-sector models
without interrelated sectors, as highlighted by Caliendo and Parro (2015).
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18%, with the most pronounced drops for Slovenia and Poland. Accounting for regional
variation in the duration of the restrictions as well as for the geographic location of sectors
across regions in a country is key to obtain a realistic picture of the impact of the COVID-
19 shock. We further decompose the economic impact of the COVID-19 shock by sectors
and find that the income drop is widespread across all sectors. Indeed, contrary to drops
in tariffs that affect only a subset of sectors, the COVID-19 shock is a production barrier
that affects both home and export production in all sectors of the economy. The observed
heterogeneity in the sectoral drop in value added is partially driven by the geography of
production in each country combined with the regional diffusion of the shock–regional
variation in lockdown policies– and by the inter-sectoral linkages across countries, but
also by the heterogeneity in the degree of teleworkability across sectors.
The role of the global production linkages in magnifying the effect of the production
shock is clear when we decompose the total income change into a direct component due
to a domestic production shock and an indirect component due to global linkages. We
show that linkages between countries account for a substantial share of the total income
drop observed. Moreover, we estimate a simple econometric model to better understand
the determinants of the observed heterogeneity in the income drop accounted for by the
direct and the indirect effect. We find that the degree of trade openness of a country is
a key element in explaining the observed heterogeneity.
Finally, to deeper understand the importance of global production networks in the dif-
fusion of the shock, we investigate what would have been the impact of the COVID-19
shock in a less integrated world. To answer this question, we quantify the real income
effect of the COVID-19 shock in a less integrated world scenario, where we increase the
current trade barriers in each country and sector by 100 percentage points. First and
unsurprisingly, a less integrated world itself implies enormous income losses for the great
majority of countries in our sample. Focusing on the economic impact of the COVID-19
shock in a less integrated world compared to a world as of today, we find some interesting
results. Indeed, when raising trade costs in all countries, the indirect component is lower
than in an open economy, but it still accounts for a relevant share of the drop in the
income due to the COVID-19 shock. In our counterfactual exercise, the increase in trade
cost mimics a world with higher trade barriers, but not a complete autarky scenario;
countries would still trade, use intermediates from abroad and sell final goods in foreign
countries. This finding highlights the importance of inter-sectoral linkages in the trans-
mission of the shock: a higher degree of integration in the global production network
implies that a shock in one country directly diffuses though the trade linkages to other
countries. Trade has two different effects in our model: on the one hand, it smooths the
effect of the shock by allowing consumers to purchase and consume goods they wouldn’t
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otherwise be able to consume in a world with production barriers in lockdown. On the
other hand, the COVID-19 shock increases production costs of intermediate inputs that
are used at home and abroad. Our counterfactual exercise clearly shows that an increase
in trade costs would not significantly decrease the impact of the COVID-19 shock across
countries. However, increasing trade barriers would imply an additional drop in real
income between 14% and 33% across countries.
Our paper is closely related to a growing literature that study the importance of trade in
intermediate inputs and global value chains. For example, Altomonte and Vicard (2012),
Antràs and Chor (2013), Antràs and Chor (2018), Antràs and de Gortari (Forthcom-
ing), Alfaro et al. (2019), Antràs (Forthcoming), Bénassy-Quéré and Khoudour-Casteras
(2009), Gortari (2019), Eaton and Romalis (2016), Hummels and Yi (2001), Goldberg
and Topalova (2010), Gopinath and Neiman (2013), Halpern et al. (2015)). Our paper
is especially close to a branch of this literature that extends the Ricardian trade model
of Eaton and Kortum (2002) to multiple sectors, allowing for linkages between tradable
sectors and between tradable and non-tradable.7 Indeed, our paper is based on the work
of Caliendo and Parro (2015) and adds an additional channel through which a policy
intervention could affect welfare at home and in other countries, namely a production
barrier induced by the spread of the virus. We use an unprecedented shock affecting
simultaneously most of the countries across the world to understand the response of the
economy under different production barrier scenarios in free trade and a less integrated
world. Moreover, we use the rich structure of the model to show the distribution of the
effects of the shock across regions and sectors.
Finally, our paper contributes to the literature evaluating the impact of natural disasters
or epidemics on economic activities (see for example the papers by Barrot and Sauvagnat
(2016), Boehm et al. (2019), Carvalho et al. (2016), Young (2005) and Huang (2019)).
Similar to Boehm et al. (2019), Barrot and Sauvagnat (2016) and Carvalho et al. (2016)
and Huang (2019) we also study how a natural disaster or an epidemic affects the economy
through the input channels. We add to their work by using a shock that is unprecedented
both in its nature and in its effect. Indeed, while a natural disaster is a geographically
localized shock that can destroy production plants and affects the rest of the economy and
other countries only through input linkages, in our set-up the shock induced by COVID-
19 is modelled as a policy intervention that constraints production simultaneously in
almost all countries in the world. Indeed, in our paper each country is hit by a local
7 See for example Dekle et al. (2008a), Arkolakis et al. (2012)
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shock induced by the spread of the virus at home, and by a foreign shock through the
input linkages induced by the spread of corona abroad.8
The paper is structured as follows. In section 1.2 we describe the COVID-19 shock and
motivate the rationale of our modeling choice. In section 2.2.2 we present the model used
for the quantitative exercise. In section 1.4 we describe the data used for the quantitative
exercise and we present the results. In section 1.5 we conclude.
1.2 COVID-19 - A Production Barrier Shock
The new coronavirus (the 2019 novel coronavirus disease COVID-19) was first identified
in Wuhan city, Hubei Province, China, on December 8, 2019 and then reported to the
public on December 31, 2019 (Maffioli (2020)). As of July 7, 2020, the virus has affected
11.648.268 people in the world, causing 538.828 deaths and forcing millions of people
in lockdown for several weeks around the world. The exponential contagion rate of the
COVID-19 virus has led many governments to implement a drastic lockdown policy,
forcing large shares of the population into quarantine. Because of forced quarantine,
there is wide consensus that the economic costs of the pandemic will be considerable,
as factories, businesses, schools and country boarders have been closed and are going to
be closed for several weeks. Moreover, the spread of the COVID-19 disease has followed
unpredictable paths, with a marked heterogeneity in the contagion rates across countries
and across regions within the same country.
We propose a simple measure that quantifies the intensity of the economic shock, lever-
aging on the diffusion of COVID-19 across space, the geographical distribution of sectors
in each country and the sectoral labor intensity. The shock vji can be expressed as












ψjir = IndexClosurei ∗ (1− TW j) ∗Duration
j
ir (1.2)
8 A growing literature in economics extends the SIER model to study the economic consequences of
the diffusion of the pandemic under different policy scenarios (see for example Atkeson (2020), Berger
et al. (2020), Eichenbaum et al. (2020))
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where ljir is the total employment of sector j in region r of country i,
∑R
r=1 lirj is the sum
of employed individuals in a sector j across all regions r of country i and ψji is a measure
of the restrictiveness of the lockdown, comprising three different elements.
IndexClosurei is an index of restrictiveness of government responses ranging from 0 to
100 (see Hale et al. (2020) for a detailed description of the index), where 100 indicates
full restrictions. The index is meant to capture the extent of work, school, transportation
and public event restrictions in each country. The second term of equation 2.2, (1−TW j)
contains a key parameter, namely the degree of teleworkability of each occupation. Fol-
lowing Dingel and Neiman (2020) we use the information contained in the Occupational
Information Network (O*NET) surveys to construct a measure of feasibility of working
from home for each sector. Moreover, we allow essential sectors to have a higher degree
of teleworkability. Finally, to account for the average duration of lockdown in each re-
gion and sector, we use the information in the CoronaNet database. We use detailed
information on the duration of lockdown in each country, region and sector contained in
the CoronaNet database and map the lockdown policies implemented in all regions and
sectors of our sample. 9
The first part of the formula ψjir, returns a measure of lockdown for each country, region
and sector in our dataset. In fact, it takes into account the extent of the policy restrictions
in each country as well as the possibility to work remotely in presence of restrictions for
each sector of the economy. Crucially, we exploit the richness of information in the
CoronaNet dataset (see Cheng and Messerschmidt (2020)) to construct a measure of the





is a measure of the geographic distribution of production across regions
in the country, measuring how much each sector is concentrated in a region compared to
the rest of the country. The regional dimension in the duration of the restrictions and in
the distribution of production in each country allow us to have a complete and precise
picture of the impact of the lockdown measures in each country across space.
It is important to highlight that the COVID-19 shock substantially differs from a natural
disaster. A natural disaster is a geographically localized shock that can lead to the
destruction of production plants, to the loss of human lives and to a lockdown of many
economic activities in a country or region. These types of shocks affect the rest of the
economy and foreign countries through input linkages (see Carvalho et al. (2016)). In our
set-up, the shock induced by COVID-19 virus is modelled as a shock to the production cost
of both domestic goods and goods for foreign markets. Moreover, the global nature of the
9 A detailed description of the dataset can be found in Cheng and Messerschmidt (2020). In section 1.4
we provide details on the construction of each dataset used to create the variable ψjir
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shock implies that most countries are simultaneously affected by the shock both directly
– through an increase in the production cost of the goods for domestic consumption – and
indirectly – through an increase in the cost of intermediates from abroad and through
a decrease in demand of goods produced for the foreign markets. Our set-up crucially
allows us to quantify both channels and highlights the importance of the direct effect
of the shock on domestic production vis a vis the indirect effect coming from the global
production linkages.
To conclude, an economic assessment of the COVID-19 shock should take into account
the lockdown policies implemented in each country, the degree of integration among coun-
tries through trade in intermediate goods and the heterogeneity in countries’ production
structure. In the next section we describe the framework used for the analysis and the
mechanisms at work.
1.3 Theoretical Framework
The quantitative model presented in this section follows the theoretical framework of
Caliendo and Parro (2015) and we refer to their paper for a more detailed description of
the framework and the model solution. We modify the model allowing for the role of a
policy intervention that leads to a production barrier of the form described in section 1.2.
There are N countries, indexed by i and n, and J sectors, indexed by j and k. Sectors
are either tradable or non-tradable and labor is the only factor of production. Labor
is mobile across sectors and not mobile across countries and all markets are perfectly
competitive.
Households. In each country the representative households maximize utility over final
goods consumption Cn, which gives rise to the Cobb-Douglas utility function u(Cn) of










Income In is generated through wages wn and lump-sum transfers (i.e. tariffs).
Intermediate Goods. A continuum of intermediates can be used for production of each
ωj and producers differ in the efficiency zjn(ωj) to produce output. The production
technology of a good ωj is



















with labor ljn (ωj) and composite intermediate goods mk,jn (ωj) from sector k used in the
production of the intermediate good ωj. γk,jn ≥ 0 are the share of materials form sector
k used in the production of the intermediate good ωj. The intermediate goods shares∑J
k=1 γ
k,j
n = 1− γjn and γjn ≥ 0, which is the share of value added vary across sectors and
countries.

















Production Barriers and Trade Costs. Trade can be costly due to tariffs τ̃ jin and non-
tariff barriers djni (i.e. FTA, bureaucratic hurdles, requirements for standards, or other
discriminatory measures). Combined, they can be represented as trade costs κjni when
selling a product of sector j from country i to n










where tjin ≥ 0 denotes ad-valorem tariffs, Din is bilateral distance, and Zin is a vector
collecting trade cost shifters.10
Additionally, intermediate and final goods are now subject to barriers arising from do-
mestic policy interventions, vji that can potentially deter production. As described in
section 1.2, COVID-19 is modeled as a barrier to production in the affected areas. The
key difference when compared to trade costs is that the latter one only directly affects
tradable goods, while production barriers can also directly affect non-tradable goods.
Under perfect competition and constant returns to scale, an intermediate or final product
(trade and non-tradable) is provided at unit prices, which are subject to vji , κ
j
ni and
depend on the efficiency parameter zji (ωj).
10 Iceberg type trade cost in the formulation of Samuelson (1954) are captured by the term Zin
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Note that vi is independent of the destination country and thus will also have effects on
non-tradeable and domestic sales. In the non-tradable sector, with kjin =∞, the price of
an intermediate good is pjn (ωj) = cjnvjn/z
j
i (ωj).
Composite intermediate product price. The price for a composite intermediate good
is given by















where Aj = Γ [1 + θj(1− ηj)]
1
1−ηj is a constant. Following Eaton and Kortum (2002),
Ricardian motives to trade are introduced in the model and allow productivity to differ
by country and sector.11 Productivity of intermediate goods producers follows a Fréchet
distribution with a location parameter λjn ≥ 0 that varies by country and sector (a
measure of absolute advantage) and shape parameter θj that varies by sector and captures
comparative advantage.12. Equation B.4 also provides the price index of non-tradable
goods and goods confronted with production barriers, which can affect tradable and non-







Firm’s output price. Due to the interrelation of the sectors across countries, the ex-
istence of production barriers vji has also an indirect effect on the other sectors across









11 see Caliendo and Parro (2015) for more details.
12 Convergence requires 1 + θj > ηj .
13 cji is the minimum cost of an input bundle (see equation 1.5), where Υ
j
i is a constant, wi is the wage
rate in country i, pki is the price of a composite intermediate good from sector k, which can be affected
by production barriers. γji ≥ 0 is the value added share in sector j in country i, the same parameter
we use in equation 2.1 when defining the shock vji . γ
k,j
i denotes the cost share of source sector k in
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Consumption prices. Under Cobb-Douglas preferences, the consumers can purchase
goods at the consumption prices Pn, which are also dependent on production barriers vji .
In fact, with perfect competition and constant-returns to scale, an increase in the costs









Expenditure Shares. The total expenditure on goods of sector j from country n is





























The bilateral trade shares are affected by the production barriers vji both directly and
indirectly through the input bundle cji from equation B.2, which contains all information
from the IO-tables.
Total expenditure and Trade Balance. Total expenditure on a good j in country n,










(1 + τ kin)
+ αji Ii (1.11)
To close the model, the value of total imports, trade surplus and domestic demand need













(1 + τ jin)
Xji (1.12)
14 The national income is a function of labor income, tariff rebates Ri and the trade surplus Di, hence








a imports of country n in sector j good from a country i. More details can be found in Caliendo and
Parro (2015).
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Given the trade surplus Dn, labor ln, the measure of absolute advantage λjn and the trade
costs djni, the equilibirum under the domestic production barriers is a wage vector, as in
Caliendo and Parro (2015).
Equilibrium in relative changes. We follow Caliendo and Parro (2015) and Dekle et al.
(2008a) and define the equilibrium in relative changes, which has the advantage of an
exact mapping of the model to the data, and allows to identify the outcomes from the
change in the above defined policy intervention, the production barrier v̂ji . 15
This provides an equilibrium under the change of policy interventions as inCaliendo and
Parro (2015). ĉjn are the cost changes, which are dependent on the wage changes, ŵn
and the prices changes P̂ kγk,jnn . These changes directly affect the sectoral price index P jn,
and translate into changes of the unit costs (see equation B.12). Xjn are the sectoral




n (1− F j
′
n )− Sn,





. Ln is a country n’s labor force, and Dn depicts the trade surplus.
The trade shares (see equation B.13) then respond to changes in the production costs,
unit costs, and prices. The productivity dispersion parameter θj determines the intensity
of the reaction. Equation B.14 ensures that the goods’ market is clear and trade is
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Xj′i (1.17)
(1.18)
15 The interested reader can go to the work of Caliendo and Parro (2015), which provide a complete
explanation of the hat algebra.
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1.4 Quantifying the Effects of COVID-19
In this section we evaluate the welfare effects from the increase in the production barrier
caused by the spread of COVID-19. We use data from different sources to calibrate the
model to our base year. To provide a realistic picture of the effect of COVID-19, we
maximize the number of countries covered in our sample conditional on having reliable
information on tariffs, production and trade flows. Our quantification exercise requires a
large number of data, which we gather combining different sources.16
First, we use the World Input-Output Database (WIOD). It contains information on
sectoral production, value added, bilateral trade in final and intermediate goods by sector
for 43 countries and a constructed rest of the world (ROW). WIOD allows us to extract
bilateral input-output tables and expenditure levels for 56 sectors, which we aggregate
into 50 industries. This aggregation concerns mostly services; we keep the sectoral detail
in the manufacturing and agricultural industries. Data on bilateral preferential and MFN
tariffs stem from the World Integrated Trade Solutions (WITS-TRAINS) and the WTO’s
Integrated Database (IDB).
Second, a crucial element for the quantification exercise is to measure the intensity of
the COVID-19 shock across countries, regions and sectors. Indeed, our measure of the
shock as detailed in equation and 2.1 requires information on employment by country-
region and sector. This data is crucial to account for the geographical distribution of
sectors across each country and region. We combine different sources: for all countries
in the EU we use the information contained in Eurostat, for the US we use IPUMScps
to construct employment by state(region) and sector of activity, while for Canada we
use official data from the statistical office.17 The construction of employment by sector
and province in China required two different data sources: first, we use the information
from the National Bureau of Statistic of China for the year 2018 on employment by
region and sector18. However, the information for manufacturing and services provided
by the National Bureau of Statistic of China is not disaggregated into sub-sectors. We
complement this information with the employment shares by region and sector from
the 2000 census to retrieve the employment level of manufacturing and services19. This
16 A more detailed description of the different data sources can be found in Appendix A.1.
17 More information on the construction of the employment matrices is detailed in the appendix.
18 See http://www.stats.gov.cn/english/ for a general overview of the data collected by the NBSC, and
http://data.stats.gov.cn/english/ for employment data at regional level.
19 We thank Matilde Bombardini for kindly providing us the employment shares by region and industry
from the 2000 Chinese Census used in the paper Bombardini and Li (2016). More details on the
construction of the region-sector employment shares for China is provided in the appendix.
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procedure returns employment shares by region and sector for 50 sectors and each province
in China in 2018.20.
Third, constructing the lockdown index ψji requires information on the degree of restric-
tion for each country (IndexClosurei), on the degree of teleworkability of each occupation
and on the duration of the lockdown in each region. We use the index on government
responses to the COVID-19 diffusion of the University of Oxford (https://www.bsg.ox.ac.
uk/research/research-projects/coronavirus-government-response-tracker), where IndexClo-
surei is an index of restrictiveness of government responses ranging from 0 to 100 (see
Hale et al. (2020) for a detailed description of the index), where 100 indicates full re-
strictions. The index is meant to capture the extent of work, school, transportation and
public event restrictions in each country. Moreover, we follow Dingel and Neiman (2020)
and construct a measure of the degree of teleworkability of each occupation. We use
the information contained in the Occupational Information Network (O*NET) surveys
to construct a measure of feasibility of working from home for each sector.21 Finally,
we account for the duration of lockdown in each region and sector using the information
in the CoronaNet database. We use detailed information on the duration of lockdown
in each country, region and sector contained in the CoronaNet database and map the
lockdown policies implemented in all regions and sectors in the sample. 22
We use this extensive set of data to construct a measure for the COVID-19 shock as
detailed in equation 2.1 that accounts for the regional variation in the duration as well as
the restrictiveness of the lockdown policies implemented, for the degree of teleworkability
of each occupation and for the geographic distribution of production across regions in
the country. Intuitively, the COVID-19 shock described in equation 2.1 has a similar
interpretation of an iceberg type trade cost. In fact, the shock vji equals 1 when there is
no restriction in place, hence it does not increase the cost of producing a good. On the
contrary, vji increases in the degree of the restriction and the duration of the lockdown,
while it decreases in the degree of teleworkability of each occupation.
20 Data on employment at sector-region level are not available for some countries in our sample. In this
case, the formula does not capture the geographical distribution of sectors in the country, but accounts
for the sectoral distribution of employment and for their labor intensity. This is the case for Australia,
Brazil, Canada, India, Indonesia, Japan, Korea, Mexico, Russia, Taiwan, RoW.
21 Some sensitive sectors of the economy are excluded by each government from the restrictive measures.
We account for sensitive sectors by increasing the share of employment that can be teleworkable to 0.8
in each of the sensitive sectors. The list of sensitive sectors includes (ISIC rev 3 sectoral classification):
Agriculture (sector 1), Fishing (sector 3), Electricity and gas (sector 23), Water supply (sector 24),
Sewage and Waste (sector 25), Postal and courier (sector 34), Human health and social work (sector
49).
22 A detailed description of the dataset can be found in Cheng and Messerschmidt (2020).
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The constructed shock vji and the extensive set of data are used to instruct the model
to perform counterfactual analysis. As described in section 2.2.2, we follow Dekle et al.
(2008a) and Caliendo and Parro (2015) and solve the model in relative changes to identify
the welfare effect of the COVID-19 shock. We perform two different exercises: (i) we
include the COVID-19 shock in the model and we estimate a scenario based on the
lockdown policies implemented in each country-region, (ii) we decompose the effect into
a direct effect from the production shock induced by the COVID-19 shock vji and an
indirect effect coming from the global shock affecting other countries. We perform the
two exercises both in an open economy with the actual tariff and trade cost levels and
in a closer economy, where we increase the trade costs by 100 percentage points in each
sector-country.
1.4.1 Open Economy
In this section, we present the results of the change in welfare, sectoral value added and







where Ŵn is the change in welfare of country n, În is the change in nominal income of
country n and ∏Jj=1 (p̂jn)αjn is the change in the price index for country n in each sector
j. The aggregated welfare results are presented in table 1.1. Countries have heteroge-
neous treatments depending on the restrictiveness of the policy measures, on the share
of workforce employed in each sector of the economy and on the degree of teleworkability
of each sector. Results in table 1.1 show that most countries experience a drop in real
income above 10%, with few exceptions, among which Sweden. Indeed, Sweden it’s the
only European country that did not implement any coercive and generalized restriction
to the workforce.
In tables 1.2, we further investigate the sectoral distribution of the economic impact of
the COVID-19 shock. We find that the drop in the value added (in billion US dollars)
is widespread across all sectors, but it is especially pronounced for services, intermediate
resource manufacturing and wholesale and retail trade across all countries. In absolute
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Table 1.1: Change of Real Income Across Countries (in %) - Open Economy
Country ∆ Country ∆
in % in %
Australia -12.76 Ireland -9.27
Austria -18.11 Italy -17.15
Belgium -13.20 Japan -10.64
Bulgaria -6.96 Korea -14.34
Brazil -13.23 Latvia -7.84
Canada -11.04 Lithuania -14.10
Switzerland -18.05 Luxembourg -12.01
China -3.95 Malta -14.59
Cyprus -13.56 Mexico -13.76
Czech R. -17.27 Netherlands -7.16
Germany -9.11 Norway -11.77
Denmark -10.84 Poland -18.40
Spain -17.76 Portugal -16.86
Estonia -7.28 ROW -15.27
Finland -14.67 Romania -17.27
France -13.93 Russia -15.25
UK -11.43 Slovakia -16.24
Greece -9.61 Slovenia -18.45
Croatia -16.72 Sweden -3.61
Hungary -15.73 Taiwan -9.17
Indonesia -15.32 Turkey -8.54
India -15.95 USA -11.05
Note: The table presents the aggregated real in-
come changes in % for every country.
terms, the strongest drops in value added are experienced in the services sectors, which
include services, such as accommodation and food, real estate, and also public services.23
The impact of the COVID-19 shock on countries’ trade is presented in tables 1.3. For the
case of Italy, we observe a severe decline in exports in billion US Dollars in intermediate
resource manufacturing, machinery equipment and textiles. Germany faces a decrease in
exports especially pronounced in the motor vehicle industry, as well as in the intermediate
23 Table 1.2 provides the results for aggregated sectors. See table A3 for the aggregation of the 50 WIOD-
sectors. All results for the sectoral value added changes for each of the sectors in all countries can be
retrieved from the authors.
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Table 1.2: Change in Value Added in bn USD - Open Economy
Sector Italy Germany USA China EU28 Rest of World
bn USD bn USD bn USD bn USD bn USD bn USD
Agriculture -7.47 -2.23 -23.86 -33.42 -38.69 -267.85
Food, Beverages, Tabacco -5.80 -5.44 -26.78 -15.46 -46.74 -91.30
Mining, Quarrying -1.51 -0.43 -50.23 -19.60 -14.33 -327.96
Textiles -5.89 -0.62 -3.00 -5.20 -14.18 -36.99
Electrical Equipment -4.89 -7.72 -36.26 -6.73 -32.21 -86.12
Machinery, Equipment -9.11 -14.77 -19.33 -13.10 -51.03 -43.49
Motor Vehicles -2.30 -15.66 -15.66 -11.67 -32.49 -49.60
Intm. Resources Manufacturing -17.69 -18.61 -69.89 -36.82 -103.38 -212.13
Manufacturing, nec. -3.77 -4.99 -26.54 -8.65 -25.64 -37.65
Pharmaceuticals -1.97 -3.60 -10.76 -3.65 -18.60 -19.77
Chemicals -3.10 -3.82 -29.48 -6.56 -22.27 -46.55
Electricity, Water, Gas -8.98 -9.34 -35.91 -8.36 -64.36 -136.60
Construction -16.82 -14.86 -73.54 -27.57 -120.10 -265.33
Wholesale, Retail Trade -37.97 -28.92 -233.13 -29.84 -241.07 -542.96
Transport -19.14 -13.20 -49.80 -15.02 -105.96 -219.82
Accommodation and Food -12.24 -4.87 -53.85 -7.52 -68.51 -86.96
Real Estate -47.06 -35.52 -227.43 -21.90 -242.61 -296.87
Public Services -33.75 -35.89 -325.71 -18.09 -232.70 -381.68
Social Services -21.73 -25.12 -135.61 -7.38 -158.88 -147.36
Services, nec. -84.19 -77.39 -473.31 -67.34 -561.44 -803.48
Note: The table presents the sectoral value added changes, in bn USD for selected countries, Italy, Germany, USA, and
China. Column 6 reports the value added results for EU28, which are weighted by the initial value added by country.
Column 7 shows the value added weighted results for all remaining countries. Further, sectors are aggregated into
broader categories (see table A3 in the Appendix).
resource manufacturing sector and machinery and equipment. The US has a severe drop
in exports in the service sector, followed by the intermediate resource manufacturing and
wholesale trade while China experiences the biggest drop in exports in the sectors of
electrical equipment, intermediate resource manufacturing and textiles.
All results in tables 1.2 and 1.3 present a clear picture of the structure of comparative
advantages of each economy, highlighting the importance of accounting for sectoral pro-
duction linkages and inter-sectoral trade when studying the economic impact of a global
shock. Moreover, these results suggest that the production structure of each economy,
as well as their centrality in the global value chains might have heterogeneous roles in
explaining the size of the observed income drops across the countries.
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Decomposition of the Effects
What is the share of the real income drop due to COVID-19 shock that comes from
the disruption of production in each country? What is the share that comes from a
decrease in trade through global production networks? To decompose the real income
changes observed in table 1.1 we use the structural model and perform two counterfactual
exercises: one in which we shock each country individually and one in which we shock all
countries but one. This allows us to isolate the direct production effect of the COVID-19
shock on each country from the indirect effect that each other country experience through
the shock to the global production network. We perform the following decomposition:
∀i 6= j : Ŵi =
(
















where ŴDi (vi) is the direct (D) change in real income of country i when only country i is




i (vj) is the sum of the indirect (I) real income
changes in country i when any other country j is treated with the COVID-19 shocks
(vj) but not country i, Ŵi(vALL) is the total change in real income of country i when all
countries are affected by the COVID-19 shock (vALL), and Ŵi is the sum of the three
different components from the decomposition.
Suppose, for example, that Germany is the only country hit by the COVID-19 virus
disease; in this case, the real income of Germany would drop because of the disruption in
production that the COVID-19 shock provokes to the German economy, what we call the
direct effect in our decomposition. Suppose now that Italy is the only country affected by
the COVID-19 shock. In this case, we would observe a drop in real income for Germany
as well, which is driven by the decrease in trade between Germany and Italy, as well as
by the increase in the cost of intermediates that Germany buys from Italy. This is what
we call the indirect effect. Summing over the indirect effects for Germany will provide
us the total indirect effect, namely the drop in real income that Germany faces when all
other countries but Germany are shocked.
The third term of our decomposition is the difference between the sum of the direct and
the indirect effects for Germany from the decomposition and the drop in real income
observed for Germany in the counterfactual exercise in which we shock all the countries
at same time. We call this component the global adjustment. Indeed, when we shock
all the countries at the same time, the observed income drop differs from the sum of the
direct and the indirect effect from the decomposition. This points to the importance of
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using a GE framework with input-output linkages and trade when studying the effect of
a global shock to local economies. In fact, when shocked all together, each country keeps
the relative importance in the world trade networks, hence the structure of comparative
advantages remains the same and the total effect of the shock is smaller for each of them.
On the contrary, when only one country is hit by the COVID-19 shock, that country faces
an increase in the production costs of the goods produced for the domestic and for the
foreign markets and loses its role in the global production networks, thus experiencing
an additional drop in income.
Figure 1.1 and table 1.4 show the results of the decomposition in open economy. In this
case, each country is hit by a shock that accounts for the restrictiveness of the policy
implemented as explained in section 1.2. It is straightforward to notice the heterogeneity
in the relative importance of the direct as well as the indirect components of the shock
across countries. Moreover, the share of the total drop in real income accounted for by the
indirect effect is systematically higher for European countries than for the other countries
in our sample, with the exceptions of Korea and Taiwan.
Figure 1.1: Decomposition of Real Income changes - Open Economy
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Note: The figures shows the decomposition of the real income changes in percent for all countries of the sample. The dark
gray bars illustrate the real income changes that stem from the direct effect, the light gray bars the real income changes
from the indirect effect, the blue bars show the additional GE feedback effects. All effects are described in more detail in
the main body of the text.
1.4. QUANTIFYING THE EFFECTS OF COVID-19 26
To better understand the heterogeneities observed in figure 1.1 and table 1.4, we construct
a simple measure of trade openness as the sum of imports and exports over total income
of the country (Xi+Mi
Ii
). Using the data from the baseline economy and the results of
counterfactual economy, we investigate if our measure of openness is correlated with a
higher indirect effect. We estimate the following model:
J∑
j=1
Ŵ Ii (vj) = β0 + β1
Xi +Mi
Ii
+ β2Ŵi + β3HHI_M + β4HHI_output+ Ii + εi (1.20)
where HHI_M = ∑Nn=1 ( Mni∑N
n=1 Mni
)2
∀i 6= n is an Herfindahl index of diversification in
trade partners. The fraction shows the imports of country i, Mni from origin country
n, over the sum of all Imports of country i; the higher the number of trading partners








∀i 6= n is an index of specialization in production.
The fraction within the brackets presents the output in sector j, in country i, over the
total output of country i. The higher the HHI of specialization, the lower is the degree
of specialization in the country.24
Table 1.5 presents the results of this exercise. Indeed, countries with a higher degree of
trade openness experience a bigger indirect effect (columns 1 to 3 in table 1.5). This simple
exercise confirms that openness is correlated with a higher global production network
shock. In fact, countries that rely more on international partners both for intermediate
supplies as well as for exporting their goods, experience a higher indirect shock. Looking
at the degree of specialization in production (log(specialization)), we find that a higher
degree of specialization is correlated with a bigger indirect effect of the shock.25 Countries
that specialize their production leverage more on their comparative advantages. At the
same time, a higher degree of specialization implies a higher dependence on other countries
both for the intermediaries as well as for exporting the final goods, but crucially it also
implies a higher dependence on trading partners to buy all other goods that are not
produced at home.
24 Similarly, we construct an index of diversification of exports. Results using the index of diversification
of exports are similar to the ones using the diversification in imports.
25 Note the dependent variable in the regression is log(| indirect |) and the HHI index for specialization
in production is higher for less specialized countries, while it is lower for more specialized countries.
The same applies for the HHI index of diversification in trade partners.
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In columns 4 to 6 of table 1.5, we show the regressions where the dependent variable is the
log(| direct |). First, both the degree of openness as well as the degree of specialization in
production play a smaller role. The direct effect is mainly driven by the direct production
shock that each country experiences due to the policy intervention of the lockdown. In
this case, openness smooths the direct effect of the COVID-19 shock, allowing countries
to source intermediates or consumption goods when home production is disrupted. On
the other hand, a higher degree of specialization in production is correlated with a smaller
direct effect. In this case, a higher degree of specialization implies that countries have a
higher comparative advantage in a specific sector, hence a lower price compared to their
competitors. In our model, the COVID-19 shock is a production barrier that imposes
lockdown to a share of the labor force and increases the production cost of the goods
produced in each country, proportionally to the share of employment in each sector of
activity. An increase in the production cost in a sector will prove to be less severe in a
country that has a higher comparative advantage in that specific sector.
It is important to clarify that this exercise compares countries with different degrees of
openness conditional on receiving the same drop in real income. However, it does not
allow us to answer the following counterfactual question: "What would have happened if
the world was less integrated? Would the total drop in real income due to the COVID-19
be smaller in a less integrated world? In the next section, we leverage on our model to
answer these questions.
1.4.2 Less Integrated World
In this section we quantify the real income effect of the COVID-19 shock in a less inte-
grated world scenario, where we increase the trade costs in each country and sector by
a 100 percentage points. First and unsurprisingly, a less integrated world itself implies
enormous income losses for all countries in our sample. Table 1.6 shows the real income
changes for all countries in the sample in a less integrated world. In both tables, column
2 and 7 present the real income losses stemming from the increase in trade costs by a
100 percentage points. Column 3 and 8 show the real income changes stemming from
the COVID-19 shocks in a less integrated economy, while columns 4 and 9 present the
welfare effects due to the COVID-19 shocks in the open economy (as in table 1.1). Fi-
nally, columns 5 and 10 (∆) present the difference between the real income drop due to
the COVID-19 shocks in a less integrated vs. open economy.
The COVID-19 shock is smaller for all countries in the less integrated economy than
in the open economy under both shocks. Indeed, in a less integrated world countries
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experience an enormous reduction in real income due to the increase in trade costs,
hence the additional effect of the global pandemic shock plays a relatively smaller role.
In our counterfactual exercise, the increase in trade cost mimics a world with higher
trade barriers, but not a complete autarky scenario; countries would still trade, use
intermediates from abroad and sell final goods in foreign countries.
This finding highlights the importance of inter-sectoral linkages in the transmission of
the shock: a higher degree of integration in the global production network implies that a
shock in one country directly diffuses though the trade linkages to other countries. Trade
has two different effects in our model: on the one hand, it smooths the effect of the
shock by allowing consumers to purchase and consume goods they wouldn’t otherwise be
able to consume in a world with production barriers in lockdown. On the other hand,
the COVID-19 shock increases production costs of intermediate inputs that are used at
home and abroad. Our counterfactual exercise clearly shows that an increase in trade
costs would not significantly decrease the impact of the COVID-19 shock across countries.
However, increasing trade barriers implies an additional drop in real income between 14%
and 33% across countries.
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Table 1.3: Change of Sectoral Trade, in bn USD - Open Economy
Panel A: Changes of Exports - Open Economy
Sector Italy Germany USA China EU28 Rest of World
bn USD bn USD bn USD bn USD bn USD bn USD
Agriculture -0.90 -1.94 -5.83 -2.07 -16.04 -29.47
Food, Beverages, Tobacco -2.82 -11.98 -8.76 -9.55 -50.14 -40.87
Mining, Quarrying -0.18 -1.70 -5.46 -1.85 -12.68 -186.58
Textiles -6.26 -4.21 -1.60 -45.14 -22.51 -41.80
Electrical Equipment -4.68 -23.13 -18.02 -107.89 -65.86 -101.04
Machinery, Equipment -4.72 -31.94 -13.32 -38.41 -66.04 -26.71
Motor Vehicles -2.29 -43.87 -11.58 -13.42 -77.53 -54.45
Intm. Resources Manufacturing -12.34 -38.80 -35.69 -56.59 -140.21 -160.39
Manufacturing, nec. -2.12 -13.74 -20.44 -30.22 -40.64 -33.67
Pharmaceuticals -1.83 -7.72 -5.94 -4.10 -30.65 -9.64
Chemicals -3.76 -19.07 -14.30 -13.01 -58.36 -52.01
Electricity, Water, Gas -0.47 -3.85 -2.59 -0.76 -14.04 -6.83
Construction -0.29 -0.42 -0.02 -2.53 -7.65 -3.48
Wholesale, Retail Trade -3.19 -12.43 -29.68 -30.95 -76.02 -58.54
Transport -2.17 -7.80 -15.25 -13.87 -57.80 -53.49
Accommodation and Food -0.01 -1.62 -0.22 -1.54 -6.20 -18.33
Real Estate -0.32 -0.36 -0.41 0.00 -1.90 -1.16
Public Services -1.44 -2.04 -8.69 -0.59 -27.38 -25.43
Social Services -0.18 -0.12 -0.27 -0.12 -1.71 -1.99
Services, nec. -4.04 -19.98 -45.63 -14.03 -132.57 -73.05
Panel B: Changes of Imports - Open Economy
Sector Italy Germany USA China EU28 Rest of World
bn USD bn USD bn USD bn USD bn USD bn USD
Agriculture -3.01 -3.08 -6.12 -2.04 -20.77 -27.28
Food, Beverages, Tabacco -7.03 -4.54 -9.15 1.00 -48.09 -60.87
Mining, Quarrying -7.26 -4.23 -26.56 -8.68 -50.28 -123.62
Textiles -6.33 -4.29 -18.34 0.01 -35.45 -64.53
Electrical Equipment -7.54 -12.58 -40.30 -6.48 -76.98 -175.68
Machinery, Equipment -6.39 -4.83 -15.47 4.21 -45.69 -90.43
Motor Vehicles -6.55 -6.16 -29.83 3.75 -57.37 -79.19
Intm. Resources Manufacturing -16.72 -17.81 -40.65 -2.68 -131.66 -228.40
Manufacturing, nec. -3.81 -4.85 -14.62 2.58 -36.45 -79.98
Pharmaceuticals -3.93 -1.90 -5.42 0.77 -24.29 -21.85
Chemicals -7.26 -7.89 -15.92 -4.10 -52.41 -68.99
Electricity, Water, Gas -1.95 -1.63 -1.76 -0.07 -13.44 -8.95
Construction -0.59 -0.91 -0.33 -0.06 -5.14 -8.16
Wholesale, Retail Trade -6.47 -6.77 -7.22 -0.99 -49.89 -137.10
Transport -4.30 -4.24 -5.28 -1.31 -37.32 -96.49
Accommodation and Food -0.76 -0.71 -0.75 -0.37 -6.91 -18.27
Real Estate -0.20 -0.05 -0.04 -0.00 -1.32 -2.11
Public Services -2.55 -1.50 -12.79 -0.26 -28.43 -20.60
Social Services -0.07 -0.07 -0.55 -0.04 -1.21 -2.30
Services, nec. -7.58 -12.51 -18.32 -2.31 -87.96 -156.70
Note: The table presents the sectoral export and import changes under shock 1 in an open economy. The upper part
of the table shows the changes in exports in bn USD for the selected countries and regions, while the lower part of
the table shows the sectoral import changes for the same countries and regions in the open economy.
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Table 1.4: Decomposition of Real Income Changes - Open Economy
Country Direct GVC GE Country Direct GVC GE
Effect Effect Effect Effect Effect Effect
in % in % in % in % in % in %
Australia -10.58 -2.45 -0.28 Korea -10.69 -4.15 -0.50
Austria -14.64 -4.07 -0.59 Latvia -3.56 -4.43 -0.16
Belgium -9.26 -4.34 -0.40 Lithuania -9.60 -4.99 -0.49
Brasil -11.60 -1.88 -0.24 Luxembourg -7.68 -4.68 -0.35
Bulgaria -1.86 -5.19 -0.10 Malta -10.12 -4.98 -0.51
Canada -8.49 -2.79 -0.24 Mexico -11.29 -2.80 -0.32
China -0.91 -3.07 -0.03 Netherlands -3.44 -3.85 -0.13
Croatia -12.63 -4.70 -0.61 Norway -9.34 -2.69 -0.26
Cyprus -9.68 -4.32 -0.43 Poland -14.87 -4.16 -0.63
Czech R. -12.55 -5.40 -0.67 Portugal -13.36 -4.07 -0.57
Denmark -7.55 -3.56 -0.28 ROW -12.77 -2.90 -0.39
Estonia -2.54 -4.86 -0.13 Romania -13.38 -4.51 -0.62
Finland -12.25 -2.76 -0.34 Russia -13.03 -2.58 -0.36
France -11.44 -2.83 -0.34 Slovakia -11.25 -5.60 -0.61
Germany -4.45 -4.91 -0.25 Slovenia -13.65 -5.56 -0.76
Greece -6.84 -2.99 -0.22 Spain -15.41 -2.79 -0.44
Hungary -11.06 -5.23 -0.56 Sweden 0.00 -3.61 0.00
India -14.31 -1.94 -0.30 Switzerland -14.83 -3.80 -0.59
Indonesia -12.67 -3.05 -0.40 Taiwan -4.79 -4.62 -0.24
Ireland -4.86 -4.64 -0.22 Turkey -5.39 -3.33 -0.18
Italy -14.56 -3.06 -0.47 UK -8.98 -2.69 -0.25
Japan -8.83 -1.99 -0.18 USA -9.76 -1.44 -0.16
Note: The table reports the real income changes decomposed into the direct production
effect (columns 2 and 6), the indirect global value chains effect (columns 3 and 7)and into
the additional GE effect that occurs due to the global nature of the shock and its feedback
general equilibirum effects (columns 4 and 8).
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Table 1.5: Openness, Trade Diversification and Specialization in Production
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES log(indirect) log(indirect) log(indirect) log(direct) log(direct) log(direct)
log(Openness) 0.639a 0.921a 0.902a -0.299a -0.383a -0.386a
(0.185) (0.118) (0.109) (0.070) (0.032) (0.031)
log(Specialization) -8.380a -7.903a 2.661a 2.733a
(1.220) (1.157) (0.429) (0.384)
log(Diversification) -0.446 -0.070
(0.434) (0.136)
Constant 1.155b 1.192a 1.140a -0.913a -1.036a -1.038a
(0.561) (0.377) (0.368) (0.275) (0.229) (0.228)
Controls x x x x x x
Observations 44 44 44 43 43 43
Adjusted R2 0.697 0.839 0.841 0.924 0.958 0.957
Notes: The table reports the regression of the log(| direct |) and the log(| indirect |) change in real income for all the 44
countries in our sample. In columns from 4 to 6, the number of observation is 43 because Sweden did not implement any
policy restriction that imposed quarantine to the population, so it is not included in the regression. The explanatory variables
are log(openness) = log(Xi+MiIi ), log(diversification) = log(HHI_M), log(specialization) = HHI_output. Note that an
increase in the HHI indexes implies a reduction in diversification(specialization). Controls include log(initial− income) and
log(total − income− change) Robust standard errors in parenthesis, a<0.01, b<0.05, c<0.10.
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Table 1.6: Real Income Changes (in %) - Less Integrated vs. Open Economy
Change of real income in % Change of real income in %
Country Less integrated Economy Open Economy ∆ Country Less integrated Economy Open Economy ∆
Trade Costs Shock Shock Trade Costs Shock Shock
Australia -18.36 -10.45 -12.76 2.31 Korea -21.77 -11.12 -14.34 3.22
Austria -22.59 -14.03 -18.11 4.08 Latvia -30.80 -5.54 -7.84 2.30
Belgium -27.05 -9.66 -13.20 3.54 Lithuania -30.00 -9.96 -14.10 4.14
Brasil -13.98 -11.41 -13.23 1.82 Luxembourg -29.65 -8.76 -12.01 3.25
Bulgaria -33.50 -4.78 -6.96 2.18 Malta -34.43 -9.56 -14.59 5.03
Canada -20.02 -8.85 -11.04 2.18 Mexico -17.38 -11.39 -13.76 2.37
China -17.12 -3.72 -3.95 0.23 Netherlands -19.99 -5.87 -7.16 1.29
Croatia -27.89 -12.05 -16.72 4.67 Norway -19.55 -9.56 -11.77 2.21
Cyprus -31.14 -9.35 -13.56 4.21 Poland -23.09 -14.13 -18.40 4.27
Czech R. -21.68 -13.70 -17.27 3.57 Portugal -24.12 -12.73 -16.86 4.13
Denmark -19.91 -8.80 -10.84 2.04 ROW -29.33 -10.72 -15.27 4.55
Estonia -31.87 -5.11 -7.28 2.17 Romania -27.35 -12.53 -17.27 4.74
Finland -22.12 -11.40 -14.67 3.27 Russia -20.91 -12.05 -15.25 3.20
France -18.87 -11.29 -13.93 2.64 Slovakia -25.90 -12.06 -16.24 4.18
Germany -19.44 -7.48 -9.11 1.63 Slovenia -26.58 -13.56 -18.45 4.89
Greece -24.02 -7.40 -9.61 2.20 Spain -18.31 -14.40 -17.76 3.35
Hungary -22.13 -12.40 -15.73 3.32 Sweden -22.61 -2.99 -3.61 0.62
India -13.84 -13.66 -15.95 2.29 Switzerland -19.72 -14.62 -18.05 3.42
Indonesia -18.60 -12.53 -15.32 2.79 Taiwan -24.39 -6.97 -9.17 2.20
Ireland -21.57 -7.46 -9.27 1.81 Turkey -18.55 -7.06 -8.54 1.48
Italy -16.61 -14.24 -17.15 2.91 UK -20.38 -9.14 -11.43 2.28
Japan -14.63 -9.12 -10.64 1.52 USA -13.06 -9.63 -11.05 1.41
Note: The table presents the aggregated real income changes in % for every country. Column 2 and 6 show the real income changes solely driven by
the increase in trade costs by 100 percentage points. Column 3 and 7 present the real income changes in % driven by the COVID-19 shock under a
Less integrated economy. Column 4 and 8 present the shock i under an open economy (similar to table 1.1). Column 5 and 9 present the difference
between the shock under an open vs. a Less integrated economy.
1.5. CONCLUSION 33
1.5 Conclusion
This study uses a general equilibrium framework to evaluate the economic impact of the
COVID-19 shock. We model the COVID-19 shock as a production barrier that deters
production for home consumption and for exports through a temporary drop in the labor
units available in each country. The spread of COVID-19 disease provides a unique set-up
to understand and study the diffusion of a global production shock along the global value
chains. However, understanding the effects of a global production disruption induced by
a pandemic is complex. In this paper, the modeling choice of the shock accounts for
the geography of the diffusion of the COVID-19 shock across regions and countries, the
geographical distribution of sectors in each country and the labor intensity of each sector
of production to return a reliable measure of the impact of the COVID-19 disease as a
production barrier. Crucially, in a model with interrelated sectors the cost of the input
bundle depends on wages and on the price of all the composite intermediate goods in
the economy, both non-tradable and tradable. In our framework, the COVID-19 shock
has a direct effect on the cost of each input as well as an indirect effect via the sectoral
linkages.
We perform three different exercises: (i) we include the COVID-19 shock in the model
and we estimate a scenario based on the lockdown policies implemented in each country-
region, (ii) we decompose the effect into a direct effect from the production shock induced
by the COVID-19 shock vji and an indirect effect coming from the global shock affecting
other countries. We perform the two exercises both in an open economy with the actual
tariff and trade cost levels and in a closer economy, where we increase the trade costs
by 100 percentage points in each sector-country. The quantitative exercise requires data
on bilateral trade flows, production, tariffs, sectoral trade elasticities, employment shares
by sector and region and the number of COVID-19 cases in each region or country.
We calibrate a 44 countries 50 sector economy and incorporate the COVID-19 shock to
evaluate the welfare effects for each country both in aggregate and at the sectoral level.
We show that the shock dramatically reduces real income for all countries in all counter-
factual scenarios and that sectoral interrelations and global trade linkages have a crucial
role in explaining the transmission of the shock across countries. COVID-19 shock is
a pandemic shock; hence it has a contemporaneous effect in many countries and to all
sectors of production. We use the model to perform a model-based identification of the
effect of COVID-19 shock and provide evidence on the importance of global trade link-
ages and inter-sectoral trade when studying the effect of a global shock to production on
the welfare of each country. We decompose the COVID-19 total income change into a
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direct component due to the domestic production shock and an indirect component due
to global linkages. We show that linkages between countries account for a substantial
share of the total income drop observed.
Certainly, this model abstracts from many other aspects related to the diffusion of the
COVID-19 disease which are the topic of study of epidemiologist, medical doctors and
statisticians. Moreover, we do not account for the health consequences of the pandemic
itself. We believe that understanding how the COVID-19 virus disease spreads across
regions is outside the scope of this paper. In our framework, the spread of COVID-
19 disease is modelled an exogenous shock that allows us to study the diffusion of the
production disruption along the global value chains and to highlight the importance of
modelling and including sectoral interrelations to quantify the economic impact of the
COVID-19 shock.
Chapter 2
Covid-19 Pandemic, Trade and Inequality
The European Union was faced with various challenges threatening its integrity over the
last decades. The diffusion of the COVID-19 virus disease posits an additional severe
threat to the resilience of the European Union. In this paper we study the diffusion of
the economic shock induced by the COVID-19 pandemic to understand how inequality
across European regions is distributed. We use a multi-country, multi-sector Ricardian
trade model to quantify the value-added effect of the disruption in production that spread
across the world. We propose a methodology to redistribute the counterfactual changes in
value-added by country-sector across European regions. The distributional effects of the
COVID-19 pandemic disease are heterogeneous across European regions, exacerbating the
"core-periphery" divide and the inequality across the European area. We find evidence
that the COVID pandemic-19 shock has a stronger impact on the peripheral regions of
Eastern and Southern Europe, together with most of the Mediterranean regions and the
Atlantic regions of Portugal and Spain. On the contrary, the central European regions
of the Netherlands and Germany, together with most Swedish regions experience a much
milder effect of the pandemic on their economic structure.
2.1 Introduction
In the European Union (EU), inequality among regions has turned sharply up in the last
two decades.1 In the words of The Economist of the 17th of December 2016 "Regional
inequality is proving too politically dangerous to ignore." The European Union is now
faced with an additional and unprecedented challenge, the diffusion of the COVID-19
1 See the report of the European commission on the topic, Widuto (2019).
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virus disease. Besides the enormous cost in terms of human lives, the economic crisis in-
duced by the COVID-19 pandemic posits a severe threat to the resilience of the European
Union.
In this paper we study how the diffusion of the economic shock induced by the COVID-
19 pandemic affects inequality across European regions. We exploit the heterogeneous
disruption in production across European regions induced by the COVID-19 pandemic to
instruct a multi-country, multi-sector Ricardian model with interactions across tradable
and non-tradable sectors observed in the input-output tables. We use the structural model
to retrieve the primitive for our exercise, namely the changes in value-added by country-
sector; we then use a back of the envelope calibration methodology to parsimoniously
redistribute the changes in value-added across European regions.
Economic activity is unevenly distributed across space (see Ellison and Glaeser (1997),
Ellison et al. (2010), Greenstone et al. (2010) or Oberfield et al. (2020)). Initial differences
in the allocation of resources and of sectors to space can be exacerbated or mitigated by
a negative global shock. However, understanding the effect of a global production shock
induced by the COVID-19 pandemic across regions is crucial to target effective policies
to mitigate the unequal impact of the shock across European areas. This exercise is
however extremely complex. Calibrating a structural general equilibrium model that
accounts for inter-sectoral linkages, domestic and foreign trade both in intermediates
and final goods at regional level requires information on input-output tables, bilateral
trade in intermediate and final goods, sectoral output and value-added, consumer and
producer prices for all regions and sectors in the economy. Moreover, one would need
information on productivity dispersion–the trade cost elasticity–at regional level. Having
all this data at hand, one could calibrate the model accounting for sector-region specific
specialization, productivity differences, trade openness, and value-added and solve it with
the methodology developed by Dekle et al. (2008a) to study counterfactual scenarios.
We propose a methodology to approximate the sector-region specific effects of the COVID-
19 pandemic for European regions, what we call back of the envelope calibration. We
leverage on a rich set of data that includes regional economic accounts from Eurostat,
which provides key information on employment and gross value-added for up to NUTS-3
regions in Europe from 1995 to 2018. The object of our analysis are regions, defined as
political entities with similar geographical and economical size.2 Using our methodology
2 Eurostat provides a disaggregation of the countries in Europe at NUTS-2 or NUTS-3 level. However,
a German state (say Bavaria) is defined as a NUTS-2 entity and it is comparable with an Italian
region, say Lombardy, which is however a NUTS-3 entity. We systematically check every country in
our sample to use the appropriate definition to have homogeneous objects (regions) in our exercise.
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we parsimoniously redistribute the country-sector specific general equilibrium changes in
value-added across regions within a country according to the composition and importance
of the sectoral activity of each region.3
We find that the distributional effects of the COVID-19 pandemic disease are extremely
heterogeneous across European regions even within a country, exacerbating the "core-
periphery" divide and the inequality across the European area. In fact, we present ev-
idence that the COVID-19 shock has a stronger impact on the peripheral regions in
Eastern and Southern Europe, together with most of the Mediterranean regions and the
Atlantic regions in Portugal and Spain. On the contrary, the central European regions
in the Netherlands and Germany, together with most Swedish regions experience a much
milder effect of the pandemic on their economic structure. The enormous difference in
the size of the economic effect of the COVID-19 shock – the economic effect is up to
eight time higher in east and south of Europe compared to the least affected regions in
Sweden – across European regions strongly emphasize the importance of policy responses
that target the reduction of inequality across regions as a primary goal. The observed
heterogeneity is driven by two major components. First, the COVID-19 shock had a
heterogeneous impact across countries, and the policy response of lock-down have been
extremely varied across countries, regions and sectors. Second, the geographical distribu-
tion of economic activity is extremely polarized, with very concentrated cities and core
regions, and very poor peripheries. A shock to production that hits disproportionately
more labor-intensive sectors that rely on external inputs, happens to have a stronger
impact in the peripheral regions and areas in Europe in our set-up.
This paper contributes to several strands of literature. First, we contribute to the liter-
ature on the economic impact of the COVID-19 shock by crucially adding the regional
dimension into the picture. Sforza and Steininger (2020) develop a general equilibrium
framework that allows the introduction of the COVID-19 shock in the form of a policy
response – lock-down – while Bonadio et al. (2020) builds the COVID-19 shock as a la-
bor shock into a network model of trade. Moreover, Dingel and Neiman (2020) allow the
lockdown to heterogeneously affect each sector in each country using the share of work
in a sector that can be performed at home. We complement this literature by providing
the first regional analysis of the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic disease. We allow
each country to have heterogeneous effects across regions depending on the geographical
distribution of economic activity in the country. Moreover, a growing literature in eco-
3 Sectoral activity can be measured in terms of regional value-added, employment, or income, depending
on the type of general equilibrium effect being analyzed. Through the paper, we use regional employ-
ment to distribute the effects across regions. We test the sensitivity of our estimation using all the
available measures to redistribute the shock across sectors and regions.
2.1. INTRODUCTION 38
nomics extends the SIER model to study the economic consequences of the diffusion of
the pandemic under different policy scenarios, also in the context of a general equilibrium
framework with trade across countries and sectors (see, for example, the recent work of
Antras et al. (2020).4 We depart from considerations on the endogenous diffusion of the
pandemic and focus on a different but equally crucial aspect: the (unequal) impact of a
global production shock across regions.
Second, we contribute to the literature that studies regional inequality across European
regions. Since the work of John Friedman (Friedmann (1966)) and later by Paul Krug-
man (Krugman (1991)), economists have given increasing attention to spatial inequality.5
The topic has been studied also more qualitatively by scholars in human and economic
geography. Iammarino et al. (2018) provide an insightful picture of the distribution of
income across European regions and propose some policy response to progressively reduce
the gap between core and periphery.6 We add to this literature by studying this topic
in a multi-country, multi-sector Ricardian model with interactions across tradable and
non-tradable sectors observed in the input-output tables. Moreover, we leverage on an
unprecedented shock – the COVID-19 pandemic – to have a clear picture of the impact
on inequality across regions in Europe.
Finally, our paper is closely related to a growing literature that study the importance of
trade in intermediate inputs and global value chains. For example, Altomonte and Vicard
(2012), Antràs and Chor (2013), Antràs and Chor (2018), Antràs and de Gortari (Forth-
coming), Alfaro et al. (2019), Antràs (Forthcoming), Bénassy-Quéré and Khoudour-
Casteras (2009), Gortari (2019), Eaton and Romalis (2016), Hummels and Yi (2001),
Goldberg and Topalova (2010), Gopinath and Neiman (2013), Halpern et al. (2015)). Our
paper is especially close to a branch of this literature that extends the Ricardian trade
model of Eaton and Kortum (2002) to multiple sectors, allowing for linkages between
tradable sectors and between tradable and non-tradable.7 Indeed, our paper is based on
the work of Caliendo and Parro (2015) and adds an additional channel through which
a policy intervention could affect value-added at home and in other countries, namely a
production barrier induced by the spread of the virus. We use an unprecedented shock af-
fecting simultaneously most of the countries across the world to understand the response
of the economy under different production barrier scenarios in free trade and a less inte-
4 Other studies include Atkeson (2020), Berger et al. (2020), Eichenbaum et al. (2020).
5 See, for example, Puga (1999), Ottaviano and Puga (1998), Puga and Venables (2001), Puga (2002),
Overman and Puga (2014) for additional evidence.
6 See also Charron (2016), Crescenzi and Rodríguez-Pose (2012) and Crescenzi and Iammarino (2017)
for additional evidence on the topic
7 See for example Dekle et al. (2008a), Arkolakis et al. (2012)
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grated world. Moreover, we use the rich structure of the model to show the distribution
of the effects of the shock across regions and sectors.
The reminder of the paper is the following. In section 2 we describe the methodology used
to include the COVID-19 shock into the model and to retrieve the regional effects across
regions. In section 3 we present the data and descriptive evidence. Section 4 presents the
results and section 5 concludes.
2.2 Methodology
In this section we present the methodology we use to include the COVID-19 shock into
the general equilibrium framework a la Caliendo and Parro (2015), a sketch of the model
we use to perform the counterfactual exercise and the methodology used to compute the
regional effects of the COVID-19 shock across European regions.
2.2.1 The COVID-19 Shock
The COVID-19 virus forced vast majorities of people across the globe into quarantine
and businesses were closed for several weeks. It lead to major sector-region specific policy
interventions across the globe. An economic assessment of such a shock should therefore
account for the lockdown policies implemented in each country, the interconnections of
countries through trade and the heterogeneity in countries’ sectors specific productivities,
specialization, competitiveness and production structures. This paper uses recent work
of Sforza and Steininger (2020) to construct a COVID-19 shock. The shock is a measure
to quantify the intensity of the economic shock across regions, countries and sectors. The
shock vji is given as












ψjir = IndexClosurei ∗ (1− TW j) ∗Duration
j
ir (2.2)
As described in detail in Sforza and Steininger (2020), ljiris the total employment of sector
j in region r of country i, ∑Rr=1 ljir is the sum of employed individuals in a sector j across
all regions r of country i.
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ψji is a sector-region and country specific measure of the restrictiveness of the lockdown,
which takes into account the extent of the policy restrictions in each country and the
possibility to work remotely. The IndexClosurei is an index of restrictiveness of gov-
ernment responses ranging from 0 to 100 (100 indicates full restrictions). The second
term of equation 2.2, (1− TW j) represents the degree of teleworkability of each occupa-
tion.8 The average duration of lockdown in each region and sector is constructed with
the CoronaNet database, which provides sector-region and country specific information







measures the geographic distribution of production across regions
in the country. The regional dimension in the duration of the restrictions and in the
distribution of production in each country allows a precise picture of the impact of the
lockdown measures in each country across the regions.
2.2.2 The Theoretical Framework
This section provides a brief summary of the theoretical framework of the general equi-
librium model underlying the counterfactual simulation of the Covid-19 triggered partial
shutdown of economic activities across countries and sectors. The quantitative model fol-
lows the theoretical framework of Caliendo and Parro (2015) and shows the modifications
of Sforza and Steininger (2020).
The production of an output uses two inputs, labor and intermediate goods in a Cobb-
Douglas type production setup. Labor is mobile across sectors, but immobile across
countries and all markets are perfectly competitive. While labor can only be sourced
domestically, intermediate products can be acquired from the domestic or foreign markets
across all sectors.
Due to perfect competition and constant returns to scale, firms price final and interme-
diate products at unit costs. Hence, the more efficiently a product can be produced,
the lower will be the price. Producers of a composite product in country n search for
the lowest cost supplier. But sourcing products from abroad is not only subject to the
unit costs of production. Trade can be costly in the form of trade costs (i.e. tariffs or
non-tariff barriers). So, the decision to buy an intermediate or final product from abroad
or domestically does not only consist of the production price (unit costs) of a product,
but also of the additional costs of trading.
8 This approach follows Dingel and Neiman (2020), which use information contained in the Occupational
Information Network (O*NET) surveys. More details about the construction of the teleworkability
index can be found in Sforza and Steininger (2020).
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The production barrier (the policy intervention due to COVID-19 pandemic), introduced
by Sforza and Steininger (2020) additionally influences the costs of production and hence
the price to sell the products. Different from trade costs, the production barriers also
affect the domestic market of within country tradeable and non-tradeable goods.9 If
the production barrier hits the domestic market in country n, it will increase the costs
and hence the price of production. It translates into higher prices for both the domestic
and the foreign market. Either, the quantity demanded decreases because the product
becomes too expensive, or the supply decreased due to higher production costs. This po-
tentially leads to trade diversion and change in global value chains patterns. The bilateral
trade shares are affected by the production barriers directly and indirectly through the
input bundle from equation B.2, which contains all information from the IO-tables (see
B.8).
Households consume at consumption prices, which are affected by a change in their income
sources, the wages and the prices. Wages decrease if the output in the respective sector
decreases, or less value-added is generated. The prices increase for goods and services,
which are directly and indirectly affected by the increase in production barriers. To close
the model, the demand for all goods and services is set equal to the supply of production
and trade is balanced by setting all imports, trade surplus and domestic demand equal
to the value of domestic sales and all exports see equations D.1 and D.2.
The model is solved with hat algera, thus the equilbirium is defined in relative changes
(Caliendo and Parro (2015) and Dekle et al. (2008a)). A change in the production
barrier translates into cost changes, which affect prices and wages. This will deter the
expenditure shares across countries and will affect each sectoral value-added, wages, and
income directly and indirectly.
To sum up, the introduced COVID-19 related shock translates into the model as a shock
to the production cost of both goods and services for domestic and foreign markets. It is
directly transmitted through an increase in the production cost of the goods for domestic
consumption and indirectly through an increase in the cost of intermediates from abroad
and through a decrease in demand of goods produced for the foreign markets. The set-up
allows to capture both of these channels.
The constructed policy intervention shock vji is then used to perform a counterfactual
analysis. As described in above and in the technical appendix 2.2.2, we follow Dekle
et al. (2008a) and Caliendo and Parro (2015) and solve the model in relative changes to
identify the value-added effect of the COVID-19 shock.
9 See Appendix B.2 for a more technical explanation. For more details, see Sforza and Steininger (2020).
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2.2.3 The Regional Effects of COVID-19
Understanding the effect of a global production shock induced by the COVID-19 pan-
demic across regions is crucial to target effective policies to mitigate the increase in in-
equality across European areas. This exercise is however extremely complex. Calibrating
a structural general equilibrium model that accounts for inter-sectoral linkages, domestic
and foreign trade both in intermediates and final goods at regional level requires infor-
mation on input-output tables, bilateral trade in intermediate and final goods, sectoral
output and value-added, consumer and producer prices for all regions and sectors in the
economy. Moreover, one would need information on productivity dispersion–the trade
cost elasticity–at regional level. Having all this data at hand, one could calibrate the
model accounting for sector-region specific specialization, productivity differences, trade
openness, and value-added and solve it with the methodology developed by Dekle et al.
(2008a) to study counterfactual scenarios.
Several authors extensively worked to create regional input output tables for selected
regions. Kronenberg (2009) constructs regional input-output tables for North Rhine–
Westphalia to study the problem of cross-hauling (the simultaneous exporting and im-
porting of one and the same type of product), Kronenberg (2010) constructs input-output
tables at regional level for Mecklenburg-Vorpommern, while Schröder and Zimmermann
(2014) performs the same exercise for the baltic sea region of Germany. However, none
of these studies accout for inter-regional trade across and within countries. Krebs (2020)
goes one step further and constructs an inter-regional input-output table for Germany,
which includes trade linkages between German counties. In his work, he builds a dataset
that accounts for spatial and sectoral production networks within Germany. Moreover,
Krebs and Pflüger (2018) use an earlier version of the dataset of Krebs (2020) to study
sector-region specific spillover effects of productivity shocks in Germany.10. However,
all the above cited papers construct input-output tables for one region or at most, one
country. Understanding the impact of a global shock to production that diffused through
global value chains requires the contemporaneous study of multiple counties within a
general equilibrium framework, even if one is interested in the regional dimension. Not
accounting for inter-country trade would indeed lead to misleading partial equilibrium
estimates of the effect of the policy.11
10 There are several other papers that use German RIOT data, such as Becker and Henkel (2020) and
Krebs and Pflüger (2019).
11 We are currently working on developing input-output tables at regional level for all regions (NUTS2) in
Europe, as well as intra and inter-regional trade to calibrate the framework with regional information.
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Due to the lack of data for multiple countries in Europe, we rely on a second-best strategy
to approximate the sector-region specific effects of the COVID-19 pandemic for European
regions. For this purpose, we developed a methodology that parsimoniously redistributes
the country-sector specific general equilibrium changes (i.e. sectoral value-added, trade,
real income, and real wages) across regions within a country according to the composition
and importance of the sectoral activity of each region. Sectoral activity can be measured
in terms of regional sectoral value-added, employment, or income, depending on the
type of general equilibrium effect being analyzed. Thorough the paper, we use regional
employment to distribute the effects across regions. We accurately test the sensitivity of
our estimation using all the available measures to redistribute the shock across sectors
and regions.
In the next section, we present our methodology and discuss the key assumptions.
2.2.3.1 Back of the Envelope Calibration
We assess the regional impact of the COVID-19 shock in Europe by proportionally redis-
tributing the country level effects coming from the structural general equilibrium frame-










where φ̂ji is the change in value-added in a country i and sector j, l
j
ir is the employment
level in country n, sector j and region r and lir is the employment level in country n,
region r. Intuitively, we apply the same criteria used in equation 2.2 and redistribute
the change in value-added obtained from the model φ̂ji proportionally according to the
employment shares in each sector-region. Indeed, we model the COVID-19 shock as
a production shock that induces countries to implement a lock-down policy and hits
sector-region pairs proportionally to their degree of labor intensiveness. The rationale
for the modelling choice for both the formulation of the shock in equation 2.2 and for
the redistribution of the effects across regions in equation 2.3 mainly stems from the
evidence presented by Sforza and Steininger (2020), as well as from the evidence on the
importance of accounting for the teleworkability of each sector presented in the paper
by Dingel and Neiman (2020): it is crucial to account for the geographic distribution of
sectoral production across regions as well as for the degree of teleworkability and for the
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labor intensiveness of each sector if one wants to correctly estimate the economic impact
of the COVID-19 shock in a structural general equilibrium framework.12
Redistributing the country-sector effects of COVID-19 across regions using equation 2.3
returns reliable estimates under two key assumptions: (i) the distribution of sectoral
productivity across sectors does not substantially vary across regions within a country
and (ii) the exposure to trade of each sector does not substantially vary across regions
within a country.
We directly test assumption (i) by constructing the distribution of sectoral productivity
for each region. We use a simple measure of productivity – value-added per worker – and
investigate if sectoral productivity varies substantially across regions within the same
country. Figure 2.1 plots the sectoral productivity differences across a group of European
countries. It is striking to notice that the dispersion of productivity across regions is
almost null for the great majority of sectors and countries. The real-estate sector and
the constructions sector systematically present a higher dispersion in productivity across
regions, mostly driven by the presence of big cities in some specific regions. 13 It is also
key to highlight that the set of countries in figure 2.1 presents the higher dispersion in
productivity across regions in our sample, as it is clear from figure 2.2 where we plot
the dispersion of sectoral productivity across regions for each country in our sample.
Strikingly, there are minimal differences thorough the countries in our sample which
makes us confident in the robustness of assumption (i).
Second, another key assumption is that the exposure to trade of each sector does not
substantially vary across regions within a country. We cannot directly test assumption
(ii) because that would require trade data at regional-sectoral level for each country in our
sample. However, this is a standard assumption in international trade: in fact, studies
that investigate the labor market effects of exposure to trade across regions, implicitly
assume that the exposure to trade varies at sector (or sector-firm) level, hence the labor
market effect of the exposure to trade crucially depend on the geographic distribution
12 Bonadio et al. (2020) use a structural model to estimate the effect of the COVID-19 shock in a
general equilibrium framework that accounts for the global networks of production across countries.
We depart from their study by accounting for the geographical distribution of the economic activity
across countries and crucially, across sectors. In fact, accounting for the granularity of production at
sector-region level allows to have a more precise picture of the economic effect of the pandemic.
13 Results holds if we exclude the real estate sector from our analysis.
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of sectors across regions. 14 In the next section we describe the data needed for this
exercise.
2.3 Data and Descriptive Evidence
In this section we present the data used to calibrate the model, to construct the COVID-
19 shock as well as to account for the regional distribution of the economic effects of the
shock.
2.3.1 Data
Our main source of data for the calibration of the model is the World Input-Output
database (WIOD). It contains information on bilateral intermediate and final trade, sec-
toral output and value-added information, consumer and producer prices (Timmer et al.,
2015). The most recent data is from 2014 and provides information for 43 countries, one
rest of the world aggregate and 56 sectors. Bilateral preferential and MFN tariffs stem
from the World Integrated Trade Solutions (WITS-TRAINS) and the WTO’s Integrated
Database (IDB). Productivity dispersion, the trade cost elasticity is taken from Caliendo
and Parro (2015). This paper uses a modelling version of the COVID-19 shock described
in Sforza and Steininger (2020) at regional level. The authors construct a rich dataset
that includes regional and sectoral information of COVID-19 specific policy interventions,
teleworkability across sectors, and duration of the shock. Cheng et al. (2020) is the main
data source for the information on over 15 thousand policy interventions in 195 coun-
tries. Furthermore, an index on government responses to the COVID-19 diffusion of the
University of Oxford is taken to proxy the severity of the government shutdowns, where
IndexClosurei is an index of restrictiveness of government responses ranging from 0 to
100 (see Hale et al. (2020) for a detailed description of the index), where 100 indicates
full restrictions. Sector-region-country specific employment data is used to account for
the geographical distribution of sectors across each country.15
14 See for instance the seminal paper by Autor et al. (2013a): they exploit the cross-market variation in
import exposure stemming from initial differences in industry specialisation and instrumenting for US
imports using changes in Chinese imports by other high-income countries. Intuitively, they leverage
on the geographic distribution of sectors in space and assume that the exposure of a sector to Chinese
competition is the same across space. See, for instance Autor et al. (2013b), Autor et al. (2014),
Dvorkin et al. (2015) as examples of research papers that rely on this assumption.
15 see Sforza and Steininger (2020) for more details about the data used to construct the COVID-19
shock.
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Note: The figures show the value-added (in mn. Euro) over the number of employees (in thousands) across regions of all
sectors. The figures highlight the region with the highest ratio (max), the region with lowest ratio (min) and the average.
The ratio, value-added over employment is a simple measure of productivity.
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Note: The figure shows the how total productivity is dispersed across regions within each countries. The max/min ratio
indicates the highest and lowest region within each country and the simple productivity mean within each country.
To perform the back of the envelope calculations one needs sector-region specific data to
distribute the country sector level shares across the regions. We use regional economic
accounts from Eurostat, which provides data on employment and gross value-added for
regions of the Nuts 0 to 3 classification in Europe from 1995 to 2018. The classification
of economic activities within the regions is based on the NACE Revision 2 classification.
As mentioned before, the counterfactual COVID-19 scenario is based on the World input
output database (WIOD), with the base year 2014. Therefore, the back of the envelope
calculations is based on the same year.
Missing data in both the employment dataset and the gross value-added dataset is in-
terpolated, based on the average growth trend within a sector and region. This exercise
retrieves accurate results for the year 2014. A cross validation exercise shows that the
correlation of the regional gross value-added Eurostat dataset and the WIOD data is
0.998. Interestingly, the deviations are mainly driven by the public services sectors. For
example, in Germany, the largest differences of the datasets in absolute terms are found
in the manufacturing and the public services sectors. In WIOD the value-added in the
manufacturing sector is equal to 623 mn. Euro, while in Eurostat the value-added in
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manufacturing for 2014 is equal to 592 mn. Euro, which makes a difference of less than
5%.
In the next section we present descriptive evidence on the distribution of economic activity
across European regions and we present the results of our analysis.
2.3.2 Descriptive Evidence
Since the work of John Friedman (Friedmann (1966)) and later by Paul Krugman (Krug-
man (1991)), economists have given increasing attention to spatial inequality.16 The
core-periphery model has become a tool to analyze the evolution of inequality across
geographical areas, allowing a country – or a broader geographic area, like the European
Union – to endogenously become differentiated into an industrialized "core" and an agri-
cultural "periphery". Due to the existence of transportation costs, manufacturing firms
tend to locate in the region with larger demand, but the location of demand itself de-
pends on the distribution of manufacturing. Emergence of a core-periphery pattern then
depends on transportation costs, economies of scale, and the share of manufacturing in
national income.
Since the very first days of its creation, the European Union has strategized to reduce the
income inequality across regions within the union. However, despite the enormous efforts,
the European Union is still challenged with this problem. Figure 2.3 presents a visual
representation of the distribution of value-added across European regions in 2014, the
baseline year for our quantitative exercise. It is straightforward to notice the existence
of a richer "core", including most of the areas of Germany, northern Italy, part of France
and the UK, and a lagging behind "periphery", which includes the Eastern European
countries as well as most of the Mediterranean regions of Europe.
The existence of the pattern shown in figure 2.3 is well documented and studied.17 The
economic activity is enormously dispersed across countries and regions, with sectoral
specialization arising in some specific areas in each country. A key question is whether a
global production shock induced by the COVID-19 pandemic would increase or decrease
the inequality across regions in the European Union. In the next section we present the
results of our analysis and we try to investigate whether the global production shock
16 See, for example, Puga (1999), Ottaviano and Puga (1998), Puga and Venables (2001), Puga (2002),
Overman and Puga (2014) for additional evidence.
17 See for instance the recent paper by Iammarino et al. (2018) for an extensive picture of the literature
on regional inequality across European regions.
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induced by the COVID-19 pandemic have a differential impact on "core" and "peripheral"
regions.










Note: The map shows the initial value-added in bn Euro for all European regions. The darker the shaded area, the higher
the is the value-added of the respective region. The scale indicates the size of the value-added.
2.4 Results
In this section we present three sets of results. First, we focus on the regional distribution
of the COVID-19 shock in Europe, providing evidence on the geographical heterogeneity
across countries. Second, we zoom in the sectoral composition of each region and we
provide a complete picture of the most and the least affected sectors across European
regions. Finally, we provide aggregate results at sector-country level to have a macroe-
conomic picture of the effect of the COVID-19 shock across the entire Europe.
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The regional distribution of the COVID-19 shock in Europe Figure 2.4 plots the change
in value-added in billions of Euro across European regions. In order to compute the
value-added changes at regional level, we follow a two-step procedure: (i) we perform
a counterfactual exercise in which we include the COVID-19 shock in the model (as in
Sforza and Steininger (2020) and we estimate a scenario based on the lockdown policies
implemented in each country-region, and (ii) we redistribute the changes in value-added
φ̂jn from the counterfactual exercise according to equation 2.3. This procedure returns
changes in value-added due to the COVID-19 shock for each region in Europe, as pictured
in figure 2.4.
Strikingly, figure 2.4 presents a clear picture of the impact of the COVID-19. Looking at
absolute changes in value-added as in figure 2.4 highlights an inverted "core-periphery"
pattern: regions at the core of Europe experience the higher absolute drops in value-
added, while peripheral regions – both eastern European countries as well as Mediter-
ranean areas – experience lower absolute drops in value-added in bn. Euros.








Note: The maps shows the value-added change (in bn. Euro) across Europe’s regions. The darker the shaded region, the
more it is affected by the COVID-19 shock.
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In table 2.1 we present the absolute contractions in value-added for the regions that are hit
the most (Top-10 affected Regions) and for the regions that are hit the least (Bottom-10
affected regions). The regions Ile de France, Lombardy (Italy), North Rhine-Westphalia,
Bavaria (Germany), London (UK), South East UK (UK), Baden-Wuerttemberg (Ger-
many), Cataluna (Spain), Vlaams Gewest (Belgium), and Lazio (Italy) experience the
highest overall losses, while mainly southern European regions populate the list of the
Bottom-10 affected regions.
The picture presented in figure 2.4 and table 2.1 would let the reader conclude that
the negative shock induced by the COVID-19 pandemic disease has a stronger negative
effect on richer regions, and a milder effect on peripheral poorer areas, hence leading to
a reduction of across-region income inequality in Europe.
However, to have a complete picture on the actual distribution of the economic impact
of the shock induced by the COVID-19 pandemic disease across regions, it is crucial to
analyze the drop of value-added relative to the regional income. In figure 2.4 we present
a map of the distribution of value-added change over regional income for the European
Union.18
It is immediate to notice a clear "core-periphery" pattern, with the central and northern
European regions experiencing relative drops in value-added up to 8 times smaller than
southern and eastern European areas. In fact, the highest drop in value-added relative
to a region’s income is observed in regions of Romania, Czech Republic and Slovakia,
followed by Poland, the Mediterranean regions of Italy and Spain and Portugal. On the
contrary, most regions in Germany, the Netherlands and Sweden are the least affected
in relative terms. In table 2.2 we present the Top-10 and Bottom-10 affected regions
when accounting for the change in value-added relative to the real income. Two patterns
clearly emerge from figure 2.4 and table 2.2: First, within a country, peripheral regions
experience the most severe drops in value-added compared to core regions. Second, across
Europe, the shock seems to amplify the inequality in the distribution of income, affecting
the peripheral regions of the east, the west and the south substantially more compared
to the core central and northern European areas.19
18 To better compare the ratios across all European regions, the ratios are normalized by using the
following procedure: The minimum ratio, of the value-added over the income across all sectors within
a region, (Oestra Sverige area, Sweden) is set equal to one. All other values are normalized relative to
the minimum ratio.
19 Focusing on Germany, the region hit the least in terms of value-added change over income in Germany
is Bremen, Hamburg, and Baden-Wuerttemberg. The regions hit the most are Saxony, Mecklenburg-
Vorpommern and Berlin. In Italy, the regions hit the most in terms of value-added change over income
are Abruzzo, Lazio and Umbria. The least affected are the Northern regions Bolzano, Alto Adige, and
Trentino.
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Table 2.1: Change of Value Added - Top 10 and Bottom 10 Regions in EU28 in mn Euro
Country Region Change of
Value Added
iso-code in mn. Euro
Top-10 affected EU28 Regions





GBR South East (UK) -34848
DEU BadenWuerttemberg -34331
ESP Cataluna -32183
BEL Vlaams Gewest -30622
ITA Lazio -29367
Bottom-10 affected EU28 Regions
GRC Peloponnisos -577
FRA Guyane -509
ITA Valle d’Aosta/Vallee d’Aoste -495
GRC Notio Aigaio -439
GRC Ipeiros -345
GRC Dytiki Makedonia -289
GRC Ionia Nisia -235
ESP Ciudad Autonoma de Ceuta (ES) -202
GRC Voreio Aigaio -202
FRA Mayotte -180
Note: The table shows the top 10 and bottom 10 regions that experience the highest
and respectively lowest change in value added in million Euro.
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Table 2.2: Normalized Change of Value Added over Income - Top 10 and Bottom 10 Regions in %
Country Region Normalized relative
VA to Income
Top-10 affected EU28 Regions
ROU NordEst 7.31
ROU Sud Muntenia 7.20
POL Makroregion Centralny 6.86
CZE Severozápad 6.82
ROU NordVest 6.55
ROU SudVest Oltenia 6.43
SVK Vychodne Slovensko 6.34
CZE Moravskoslezsko 6.29
SVK Západne Slovensko 6.26
POL Makroregion Wschodni 6.22
Bottom-10 affected EU28 Regions









SWE Norra Sverige 1.17
Note: The table shows the top 10 and bottom 10 regions with the highest and
respectively lowest normalized relative change in value added to regional income.
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Note: The map shows the value-added change over the income of the respective EU regions. The darker the shaded region,
the more it is affected by the COVID-19 shock. To better compare the ratios across all European regions, the ratios are
normalized by using the following procedure: The minimum ratio, of the value-added over the income across all sectors
within a region, (Stockholm area, Sweden) is set equal to one. All other values are normalized relative to the minimum
ratio.
The sectoral-regional dimension of the COVID-19 shock An important dimension in
the understanding of the impact of the COVID-19 shock is the sectoral dimension across
regions. We leverage on the richness of the general equilibrium framework that allows to
account for inter-sectoral linkages within and across countries to compute the counterfac-
tual change in sectoral value-added for each country and we account for the geographic
distribution of sectors across regions and proportionally redistribute the change in sectoral
value-added across regions using equation 2.3.
Table 2.3 presents the Top-10 and Bottom-10 sectoral change in value-added across Eu-
ropean regions in absolute terms, while table 2.4 presents the same results in relative
changes to initial sectoral value-added in a region. Not surprisingly, focusing on table
2.3 the Italian region of Lombardy together with the Paris region of Ile de France lead
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the Top-10 drop in value-added in absolute terms, with the sectors of manufacturing,
public services, real estate and trade and transport. On the other hand, the sectors of
IT, agriculture and other services in southern and eastern European countries are the
least affected in absolute terms. However, looking at table 2.4, the sectors of trade and
transport and IT in Slovenian and Polish regions lead the group of the Top-10 drop in
relative value-added, while agriculture in the Swedish regions of Soedra Sverige, Oestra
Sverige and Norra Sverige are the least affected sectors in relative terms.
These results are partially driven by the nature of the COVID-19 shock, affecting in a
more severe way labor intensive sectors that cannot leverage on the teleworking, like for
example trade and transport or manufacturing, while hitting only marginally essential
sectors that did not experience restrictive lock-down policies, like for instance agriculture.
At the same time, the shock hits stronger regions and sectors that substantially rely on
across-country linkages, external inputs of production or foreign markets. That is because
the COVID-19 shock is a global shock that affects all countries at the same time; our
general equilibrium framework captures the importance of the inter-sectoral linkages both
within a country and across countries and allows us to have a complete picture of the
magnitude of the shock across sectors and regions.
Country-Sector Dimension After studying the regional and sectoral dimension of the
distribution of the COVID-19 shock, we provide aggregate results at sector-country level
to have a macroeconomic picture of the effect of the COVID-19 shock across the entire
Europe.
In aggregate and absolute terms (see table 2.5), the sectors of manufacturing, trade and
transport and public services across Germany, Italy and the UK suffer the biggest drop
in value-added, while agriculture and some residual services (other services) in eastern
European regions suffer the smallest drop in value-added.20
In table 2.6 we present the relative changes in value-added at country-sector level. Similar
to the results in table 2.4, the sectors of trade and transport, research development and
IT in eastern European countries (Slovenia and Poland) suffer the strongest decline in
value-added, while the sector of agriculture in Sweden experiences the smallest drop in
relative terms.
20 Notice that "other services" is one of the smallest sector in each country, hence it is not surprising that
it always appear in the list of bottom-10 sectors.
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Table 2.3: Change of Value Added - Top 10 and Bottom 10 Sectors of EU28 Regions in mn Euro
Country Region Sector Change of Value Added
iso-code in mn. Euro
Top-10 affected Sector of EU28 Regions
ITA Lombardia Manufacturing -12092
FRA Ile de France Public Services -11405
FRA Ile de France Real Estate -10116
FRA Ile de France Trade and Transport -9997
FRA Ile de France R&D -9737
ITA Lombardia Real Estate -9535
ITA Lombardia Trade and Transport -9089
ESP Cataluna Manufacturing -7000
ESP Cataluna Trade and Transport -6994
ESP Andalucia Trade and Transport -6797
Bottom-10 affected Sectors of EU28 Regions
GRC Thessalia IT -10
HUN Budapest Agriculture -10
GRC Voreio Aigaio Construction -9
GRC Dytiki Makedonia Other Services -8
CZE Praha Agriculture -8
ESP Ciudad Autonoma de Melilla (ES) Other Services -7
GRC Voreio Aigaio Other Services -7
ESP Ciudad Autonoma de Ceuta (ES) Other Services -6
ROU Bucuresti Ilfov Agriculture -5
FRA Corse Agriculture -3
Note: The table shows the top 10 and bottom 10 regions that experience the highest
and respectively lowest change in value added in million Euro.
2.5 Conclusion
This paper studies the distributional effects of the COVID-19 shock across European
regions. We exploit the heterogeneous disruption in production across European regions
induced by the COVID-19 pandemic to instruct a multi-country, multi-sector Ricardian
model with interactions across tradable and non-tradable sectors observed in the input-
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Table 2.4: Change of Value Added - Top 10 and Bottom 10 Sectors of EU28 Regions in %
Country Region Sector Change of
iso-code Value Added
in %
Top-10 affected Sectors of EU28 Regions
POL Makroregion Poludniowy Construction -18.571
SVN Zahodna Slovenija Real Estate -18.623
POL Makroregion PoludniowoZachodni R&D -18.701
SVN Zahodna Slovenija Construction -18.721
SVN Zahodna Slovenija Financial Services -18.726
POL Makroregion Poludniowy IT -18.735
SVN Vzhodna Slovenija R&D -18.743
POL Makroregion Polnocny Trade and Transport -18.898
SVN Zahodna Slovenija IT -18.978
SVN Vzhodna Slovenija Trade and Transport -19.356
Bottom-10 affected Sectors of EU28 Regions
SWE Norra Sverige Agriculture -2.568
SWE Soedra Sverige IT -2.834
SWE Norra Sverige R&D -3.095
SWE Norra Sverige Trade and Transport -3.144
SWE Oestra Sverige Financial Services -3.353
SWE Soedra Sverige Real Estate -3.516
SWE Norra Sverige Construction -3.563
SWE Oestra Sverige Other Services -3.567
SWE Norra Sverige Public Services -3.585
SWE Oestra Sverige Manufacturing -3.786
Note: The table shows the top 10 and bottom 10 regions that experience the highest
and respectively lowest change in value added in Percent.
output tables. We use the structural model to retrieve the primitive for our exercise,
namely the changes in value-added by country-sector; we then use a back of the envelope
calibration methodology to parsimoniously redistribute the changes in value-added across
European regions.
Understanding the effect of a global production shock induced by the COVID-19 pan-
demic across regions is crucial to target effective policies to mitigate the unequal impact
of the shock across European areas. This exercise is however extremely complex. Cali-
brating a structural general equilibrium model that accounts for inter-sectoral linkages,
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Table 2.5: Change of Value Added - Top 10 and Bottom 10 Sectors of EU28 Countries in mn Euro
Country Sector Change of
Value Added
iso-code in mn Euro
Top-10 affected Regions
Germany Manufacturing -63919
Italy Trade and Transport -52886
Italy Manufacturing -48874
Germany Public Services -45641
United Kingdom Public Services -45130
Italy Public Services -44927
United Kingdom Trade and Transport -43353
Spain Trade and Transport -41921
Germany Trade and Transport -36610
United Kingdom Manufacturing -36388
Bottom-10 affected Sectors in Regions
Latvia Agriculture -58
Malta Real Estate -55
Cyprus Agriculture -53
Latvia Other Services -53
Estonia Financial Services -48
Estonia Agriculture -47
Malta Construction -46
Estonia Other Services -33
Luxembourg Agriculture -21
Malta Agriculture -15
Note: The table shows the top 10 and bottom 10 sector country combinations that
experience the highest and respectively lowest change in value added in mn Euro.
domestic and foreign trade both in intermediates and final goods at regional level requires
information on input-output tables, bilateral trade in intermediate and final goods, sec-
toral output and value-added, consumer and producer prices for all regions and sectors
in the economy. Moreover, one would need information on productivity dispersion - the
trade cost elasticity - at regional level. Having all this data at hand, one could calibrate
the model accounting for sector-region specific specialization, productivity differences,
trade openness, and value-added and solve it to perform counterfactual simulations.
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Table 2.6: Change of Value Added - Top 10 and Bottom 10 Sectors of EU28 Countries in %
Top-10 affected Regions
Country Sector Change of Value Added
in %
Slovenia Trade and Transport -19.356
Slovenia IT -18.978
Poland Trade and Transport -18.898
Slovenia R&D -18.743
Poland IT -18.735
Slovenia Financial Services -18.726
Slovenia Construction -18.721
Poland R&D -18.701
Slovenia Real Estate -18.623
Poland Construction -18.571
Bottom-10 affected Sectors in Countries
Sweden Manufacturing -3.786
Sweden Public Services -3.585
Sweden Other Services -3.567
Sweden Construction -3.563
Sweden Real Estate -3.516
Sweden Financial Services -3.353




Note: The table shows the top 10 and bottom 10 regions that experience the highest
and respectively lowest change in value added in percent.
We propose a methodology to approximate the sector-region specific effects of the COVID-
19 pandemic for European regions, what we call back of the envelope calibration. We
leverage on a rich set of data that includes regional economic accounts from Eurostat,
which provides key information on employment and gross value-added for up to NUTS-
3 regions in Europe from 1995 to 2018. Using our methodology, we parsimoniously
redistribute the country-sector specific general equilibrium changes in value-added across
regions within a country according to the composition and importance of the sectoral
activity of each region.
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We find that the distributional effects of the COVID-19 pandemic disease are extremely
heterogeneous across European regions, exacerbating the "core-periphery" divide and the
inequality across the European area. In fact, we present evidence that the COVID-19
shock has a stronger impact on the peripheral regions of Eastern and Southern Europe,
together with most of the Mediterranean regions and the Atlantic regions of Portugal and
Spain. On the contrary, the central European regions of the Netherlands and Germany,
together with most Swedish regions experience a much milder effect of the pandemic on
their economic structure.
The enormous difference in the size of the economic effect of the COVID-19 shock -
the economic effect is up to eight time higher in east and south of Europe compared to
the least affected regions in Sweden - across European regions strongly emphasize the
importance of policy responses that target the reduction of inequality across regions as a
primary goal.
Chapter 3
Quantifying Brexit: From Ex Post to Ex
Ante Using Structural Gravity
Exploiting changes in the geography of economic integration in Europe, this paper quan-
tifies the effects of Brexit from ex post to ex ante using structural gravity. By isolating
the directional treatment effects of EU agreements for the UK, the analysis reveals im-
portant heterogeneity across agreements, sectors, and within pairs. We find that these
directional effects matter for the size and distribution of the welfare effects of Brexit –
the withdrawal of the UK from EU agreements resulting into a return of trade costs to
the situation quo ante. We make this point with the help of a modern multi-sector trade
model that is able to capture inter- and intranational production networks. In line with
other papers, the welfare costs of Brexit are higher in the UK than in most other EU
countries. However, heterogeneity tends to attenuate overall costs while giving rise to
substantial heterogeneity between EU27 members and sectors. A scenario that could
shift bargaining power eliminates asymmetries in the costs of Brexit as soon as the UK
fully liberalizes its market.
3.1 Introduction
The relationship between the European Union (EU) and the United Kingdom (UK) has
always been fraught with complexity for reasons related to history, culture and geography.
Differences over the long term goal of the EU integration process – whether the objective
is a political union or just the establishment of a common market – date back at least
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to 1983 when the term “ever closer union” was coined.1 The creation of the European
Monetary Union – from which the UK opted out – and even more so the emergence of
deficiencies in the construction of the Eurozone made the necessity of further political
integration apparent, and widened the gap between the UK and the continent. At the
same time, the relative importance of Europe as a trade partner for the UK fell from
about 65% in the early 1990s to less than 45% in 2016, presumably because trade costs
with third countries dropped more than costs of intra-EU trade.2 This fact, together with
rising net budgetary contribution to the EU, seems to imply that the relative costs of a
withdrawal from the EU are lower today than what they would have been 25 years ago.
In this paper, we ask: If, in 2014, the UK had not been part of the EU? What would
counterfactual real consumption, trade volumes, and sectoral value added have looked
like? This provides us with an estimate of UK benefits from EU membership, which
– in turn – we take as a proxy of what the costs of leaving the EU would be. To
answer this question, we first conduct an ex post evaluation to back out trade cost
changes. These can be used as proxies for non-tariff barriers in different counterfactual
Brexit scenarios. More specifically, we exploit different integration steps of the UK and
the EU members (i.e. becoming a member of the European Union Single Market, or
joining a free trade agreement) on the sector-level. To correctly estimate trade cost
shocks, we consider directionality in the treatment effects of UK-EU relations. Second,
we run ex ante simulations of the effects from reversing those trade cost savings in a
quantitative Ricardian trade model. We focus on the trade effects and do so in great
detail, distinguishing 22 goods and 28 services industries and 43 countries and a rest of
the world component representing more than 90% of world GDP.
We are not the first to study the potential economic consequences of UK’s withdrawal
from the EU, but we believe we offer the most detailed and most data-driven analysis
of the trade-related effects of Brexit. We contribute by embedding a careful ex post
evaluation of British EU membership into an ex ante analysis of its dissociation from the
EU.
First, we estimate directional trade effects of the British EU membership or of EU trade
agreements with third countries (such as with Korea) and allow these to differ across
1 The term first appeared in European Council (1983), “A Solemn Declaration on European Union”
at the Council Meeting in Stuttgart, Germany. The document prepared the creation of the Single
Market, a central request of Margaret Thatcher, but also led to the granting of annual budget rebates
to the UK in 1984.
2 Exports of goods and services; see Ward (2017).
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industries.3 Separating tariff and non-tariff barrier (NTB) trade effects in EU member-
ship, we use the estimated trade cost shocks to carry out our comparative statics exercise
in the year 2014, for which we have real data.4 This allows us to put special emphasis
on sectoral heterogeneity. In contrast, Dhingra et al. (2017) use estimates of NTBs by
Berden et al. (2013) for the US-EU relationship dating from the year 2007 and assume
a uniform increase by 25% across all sectors. Moreover, they also assume that the UK
would not be able to participate in future reductions in NTBs. Further, we estimate the
changes of non-tariff barriers and not the levels, which makes the results independent of
other policy components.5 Second, we estimate the crucial trade elasticities on exactly
the same data that we calibrate our model with and which also defines the baseline that
we compare our counterfactual equilibrium with. This is in the spirit of structural gravity
modeling and allows for a tight connection between theory, estimation and calibration.6
Moreover, the econometric exercise supplies us with the necessary information to simu-
late confidence intervals for all of our endogenous variables. By quantifying uncertainty,
we also go beyond Dhingra et al. (2017) and Steinberg (2019). Third, when evaluating
the possible effects of new bilateral trade agreements of the UK with third parties, we do
not make educated guesses about the size and distribution of sectoral changes in NTBs.
Rather, we estimate the potentially asymmetric sectoral trade effects of the EU-Korea
trade agreement for the UK and assume that new agreements could implement what has
proven feasible in that agreement. The EU-Korea deal has been in force since 2011 and
is one of the most ambitious (and successful) FTAs of the EU (Lakatos and Larsson,
2017). Further, next to tariffs and NTBs, we consider fiscal transfers within the EU as
an important component of EU membership. Hence, we evaluate their impact on disin-
tegration by decomposing welfare effects into tariff, NTB, and fiscal transfer components
in the context of Brexit.
3 Baier et al. (2016) show that asymmetries in trade agreements occur particularly within pairs and play
an important role for their exports and imports. Graziano et al. (2018) estimate uncertainty effects
surrounding the probability of Brexit considering such asymmetries.
4 Steinberg (2019) uses a dynamic general equilibrium model with firm heterogeneity, but relies on the
calibration of parameters from different sources of data and on several specific assumptions surround-
ing e.g. future technology adoption. Our focus lies on the identification of the trade cost shocks
surrounding Brexit by separating tariffs and NTBs, considering the directionality of treatment effects,
and the consideration of fiscal transfer systems within the EU. Relying on a single source of data has
the advantage to rely on fewer assumptions, but obviously limits us with respect dynamic adaptions
in case of Brexit.
5 Sampson (2017) provides an excellent overview of trade and other issues related to Brexit.
6 see Yotov et al. (2016) for an excellent survey and Mayer et al. (2019) for an application to the costs
of non-Europe
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We use a computable general equilibrium framework (see e.g, Costinot and Rodriguez-
Clare, 2014). A common feature of these models is that they give rise to a theoretical
foundation of the gravity equation of international trade and that they can be solved in
changes, a feature referred to as “exact hat algebra” in the literature (Dekle et al., 2008b).
This has obvious computational advantages but also helps with calibration as unknown
constants drop out. More specifically, our modeling framework is based on Caliendo and
Parro (2015)’s multi-sector input-output version of the Ricardian trade model by Eaton
and Kortum (2002). We extend this setup to include services trade, non-tariff barriers and
the directional treatment heterogeneity of trade agreements. Our parameter estimation
and the calibration of the model are based on data provided by the World Input-Output
Database (WIOD) as described by Timmer et al. (2015). Importantly, the model features
a detailed account of international input-output linkages.7
We consider four scenarios: (i) a WTO scenario (hard Brexit) in which the UK loses
preferential access to EU27 countries and to third countries with which the EU currently
maintains free trade agreements; most favored nations (MFN) tariffs apply and non-tariff
barriers (NTBs) are reintroduced; (ii) a scenario with a modern and ambitious trade
agreement between the EU27 and the UK, comprising tariffs and NTBs, and modeled
after the EU-Korea FTA; (iii) a global Britain scenario, with tariffs and NTBs as defined
in the WTO scenario, but bilateral FTAs between the UK with USMCA countries, Asian
countries and non-European members of the Commonwealth; and (iv) a hard but smart
Brexit scenario in which the UK decreases its tariffs to zero for all trading partners
and does not impose additional non-tariff barriers against the European Union, while
the EU27 increase tariffs against the UK to MFN levels and impose non-tariff barriers
against the UK.
The main results of our ex post evaluation of EU integration steps are that the EU
has been very successful in reducing trade costs between its members. While, in the
partial equilibrium, EU integration has boosted goods exports of the UK to the other
EU countries by about 24%, it has increased other EU members’ exports to the UK by
as much as 76%. In services trade, we find that UK exports to EU27 countries are 64%
higher due to EU membership, while bilateral services exports of other EU27 countries
to the UK have almost doubled. Ignoring this important directional heterogeneity, one
could easily overestimate the costs of Brexit to the UK and underestimate it for the rest
of the EU. At the finer sectoral level, a lot of heterogeneity exists, but the general picture
remains. For example, EU membership has increased exports of the UK to the EU in
7 Recent work by Vandenbussche et al. (2017) highlights the importance of such networks in the context
of Brexit.
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the air transport sector substantially, while it has not affected exports in its postal and
courier sector. The opposite pattern holds for the UK’s imports in these sectors. Also,
the results suggest that the EU-Korea FTA from 2011 has not had any positive effects
on UK overall exports of goods, but on services trade.
We use these partial equilibrium estimates to define directional trade cost shocks for
the counterfactual general equilibrium analysis. It turns out that effects depend on
treatment heterogeneity. We show that sectoral heterogeneity and asymmetries in trade
cost changes matters for the size of macroeconomic outcomes. Ignoring heterogeneity,
the costs of Brexit could be inflated by as much as 25% for the UK. Next, we fully
account for the directionality of effects and simulate four Brexit scenarios to assess the
general equilibrium effects on real consumption, trade, and sectoral value added for 43
countries and a rest of the world component. We find substantial heterogeneity among
EU27 members. A hard Brexit reduces real consumption more in Ireland, Luxembourg
and Malta than in the UK, where the 90% confidence interval is [-3.32%,-2.19%]. The
core EU economies France, Germany, and Italy face losses in the intervals [-0.66%,-
0.38%],[-0.84%,-0.59%], and [-0.50%,-0.31%], respectively. The conclusion of a modern
FTA, drafted after the existing EU-Korea FTA, allows avoiding three quarters of the
loss from Brexit in the EU27 countries and two thirds in the UK compared to the hard
Brexit scenario. If the UK concludes FTAs with many countries outside of the EU27,
the change in real consumption is contained in the 90% interval [-2.10%,-0.76%] for the
UK. Due to trade diversion effects, losses in EU countries would be higher than under
the hard Brexit scenario. For third countries, real consumption changes are mostly not
statistically different from zero. An exception is Switzerland, who could slightly benefit
from a hard Brexit and a subsequent relocation of financial services. With a hard but
smart Brexit strategy, the UK decreases tariffs across all goods sectors to zero for all trade
partners and does not impose additional controls on imports from the EU27, while the
EU imposes tariffs and additional non-tariff barriers against the UK. With this strategy,
the UK could lower its economic damage to half a percent. The existing asymmetry
between Britain and the EU27 would vanish and the bargaining power would shift from
Brussels to London.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 5.3 presents the method-
ological framework. Section 4.3.1 discusses the main data sources, explains the empirical
estimation method, and discusses gravity results. Based on the defined Brexit scenarios,
we examine general equilibrium consistent results on trade and welfare in section 3.4.
The final chapter concludes.
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3.2 Model
The model follows Caliendo and Parro (2015), who provide a multi-sector version of the
Eaton and Kortum (2002) gravity model with input-output linkages.
3.2.1 Setup
There are N countries indexed by i and n, as well as J sectors indexed by j and k. Sec-
toral goods are either used as inputs in production or consumed, with the representative
consumer having Cobb-Douglas preferences over consumption Cjn of sectoral final goods





Labor is the only production factor and labor markets clear. The labor force Ln is mobile




n, but not between countries. In each sector j,
there is a continuum of intermediate goods producers indexed ωj ∈ [0, 1] who combine
labor and composite intermediate input and who differ with respect to their productivity
zji (ωj) . Intermediate goods are aggregated into sectoral composites using CES production
functions with elasticity ηj. On all markets, there is perfect competition.

















The minimum cost of an input bundle is cji , where Υ
j
i is a constant, wi is the wage rate
in country i, pki is the price of a composite intermediate good from sector k, β
j
i ≥ 0 is
the value added share in sector j in country i and γk,ji denotes the cost share of source
sector k in sector j’s intermediate costs, with ∑Jk=1 γk,ji = 1. κjin denotes trade costs of
delivering sector j goods from country i to country n such that






where tjin ≥ 0 denotes ad-valorem tariffs, Din is bilateral distance, and Zin is a vector
collecting trade cost shifters (such as FTAs or other trade policies).
3.2. MODEL 67
Productivity of intermediate goods producers follows a Fréchet distribution with a loca-
tion parameter λjn ≥ 0 that varies by country and sector (a measure of absolute advantage)
and shape parameter θj that varies by sector (and captures comparative advantage).8




pjin(ωj); i = 1, . . . , N
}
. (3.3)
Caliendo and Parro (2015) show that it is possible to derive a closed form solution of














where Aj = Γ [1 + θj(1− ηj)]
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1−ηj is a constant.




















which forms the core of a gravity equation.
3.2.2 General Equilibrium
Let Y jn denote the value of gross production of varieties in sector j. For each country n
and sector j, Y jn has to equal the value of demand for sectoral varieties from all countries











γj,ki (1− βki )Y ki + α
j
i Ii, (3.6)
where national income consists of labor income, tariff rebates Ri and the (exogenous)
trade surplus Si, i.e. Ii = wiLi + Ri − Si and Xji is country i’s expenditure on sector
j goods.We keep the trade surplus relative to GDP constant. Quite mechanically, this
8 Convergence requires 1 + θj > ηj .
9 Our exposition differs from Caliendo and Parro (2015) in that they use total expenditure on composite
goods instead of total production of varieties as endogenous variable. So, in Caliendo and Parro (2015)
the value of gross production comprises all foreign varieties that are bundled into the composite good
without generation of value added.
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forces additional asymmetry on the change in trade flows even if trade cost shocks are
rather similar. We do not eliminate the trade surplus through reparameterization as in
Caliendo and Parro (2015). We assume that sn ≡ Sn/B, where B ≡
∑
nwnLn is global
labor income, to make sure that the system is homogeneous of degree zero in prices. In
the Brexit scenarios, we will redistribute the fiscal transfers of the EU budget by adjusting
the trade surplus Sn.
The first term on the right-hand side gives demand of sectors k in all countries i for
intermediate usage of sector j varieties produced in country n, the second term denotes









The second equilibrium condition requires that, for each country n, the value of total
imports, domestic demand and the trade surplus has to equal the value of total exports

















Y jn ≡ Yn (3.7)
Conditions (D.1) and (D.2) close the model.
3.2.3 Comparative Statics in General Equilibrium
We are interested in the effects of different Brexit scenarios on trade flows, wages, sectoral
value added, and real consumption (as our measure of welfare). Hence, we need to
quantify the comparative static effects of changes in trade costs (tariffs and non-tariff
barriers) κjin on endogenous quantities such as trade flows, wages, sectoral value added,
production and tariff income. As shown by Dekle et al. (2008b), we solve the model in
changes. Let z denote the initial level of a variable and z′ its counterfactual level. Then,















In Appendix C.1, we present the system of equations in changes required to solve the
model. An important advantage of solving the model in changes is that certain constant
parameters such as the absolute advantage or the elasticity of substitution between input
10 Instead of the goods market clearing condition, one can also use the expenditure equation Xji =(∑J
k=1 γ
j,k




as in Caliendo and Parro (2015).
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varieties ω drop out and need not be estimated. This reduces the data needs and lowers
the scope for measurement error – of course, at the price of functional assumptions.
Our comparative statics exercise refers to the long-run, i.e., to a new equilibrium in
which all relevant general equilibrium interactions have already fully taken place. Short-
run effects can differ from those long-run predictions. Moreover, we hold technology
fixed and abstract from endogenous innovation or technology adoption. The latter would
require leaving the bedrock of a standard and widely accepted modeling framework.
3.3 Empirical Model, Data, and Parameter Estimates
3.3.1 Empirical Model
From equations (4.2) and (B.8) we derive the following sector-level gravity equations
which we use to estimate the parameters θ and δ:







































M jin,t denotes the value of imports of country i to country n in sector j at time t, the ad
valorem tariff factor is given by 1 + tjin,t, and the trade elasticity is 1/θj > 0. ν
j
i,t and
νjn,t denote importer- and exporter-specific year fixed effects, respectively. νjin denotes
bilateral country-pair fixed effects which account for all time-invariant determinants of
trade, such as geographical distance, or initial conditions. The time-varying importer and
exporter effects control for multilateral resistance. By triangulation, they also account
for the effects of exchange rate variation. εjin,t is a random error term.
For the simulation, we require estimates of δjk/θj. Whenever an agreement affects the
UK, we allow for treatment heterogeneity, hence, its effect to differ for the UK and the
other 27 EU members (EU27). For example, we impose symmetry in the trade cost
effect of EU membership amongst the EU27, but allow the EU membership for the UK
to differ from that average; moreover, we also allow for directionality (UK exports to be
affected differently than imports). We deal similarly with the conclusion of the EU-Korea
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agreement in 2011. Because the UK is neither a member of the Schengen-zone nor the
Eurozone, we do not further differentiate those effects.11
All integration measures are defined as binary variables taking the value one in a year
if countries i and j are both members of an agreement. Schengenjin,t is different; it
systematically treats European countries as heterogeneous, as land-borne trade within
Europe from i to n may cross one or up to eight Schengen-internal borders. Aside,
even if i and/or n are outsiders to the Schengen area, a pair in may experience lower
transit costs. We thus use a variable Schengenjin,t = {1, . . . , 8} that counts the number
of Schengen-internal borders between a pair in (see Felbermayr et al., 2018a).
Econometric identification relies on countries joining the EU, the Euro, the Schengen-
zone or FTAs in the period 2000-2014. Thus, the trade cost effect of the Single Market
is identified through the various waves of Eastern enlargement (2004, 2007, 2013). The
Eurozone was created in 1999 by 11 EU members; until 2014 seven additional countries
joined. Similarly, Schengen was gradually expanded. The EU-Korea FTA entered into
force in 2011 (the latest trade agreement of the EU available in our data), as did a number
of other FTAs amongst non-EU countries.
The selection of country pairs into trade agreements with many members such as the EU
is not random; the same is true for the setting of tariffs. To obtain unbiased estimates of
θj and δjk we require that the covariances between the error term ε
j
in,t and the integration
dummy on the one hand and between εjin,t and the sectoral tariff rate on the other are
zero conditional on controls. Note that we include bilateral fixed effects νjin to account for
all time invariant variables that jointly affect policy variables and bilateral trade flows.
Next to potential endogeneity, this also addresses omitted variable bias in integration
agreements (see, e.g., Baier and Bergstrand, 2007).
As recommended by Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2006) and Fally (2015), we estimate
the model using Poisson Pseudo Maximum Likelihood (PPML) methods. We cluster
standard errors at bilateral pairs.
3.3.2 Data Sources
To calibrate the model and to estimate the possible effects of the UK leaving the EU
Single Market and Customs Union, we need comprehensive data.
11 The same approach is taken for FTAs other than the EU-Korea agreement.
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The World Input-Output Database (WIOD) comprises our main data source. It contains
information on sectoral production, value added, and bilateral trade in final and inter-
mediate goods in producer and consumer prices detailed by sector. This allows us to
extract bilateral input-output tables and expenditure levels. WIOD includes 43 countries
and a rest-of-the-world (RoW) aggregate for the years 2000 to 2014. It captures 56 sec-
tors, which we aggregate into 50 industries as some sectors display zero output for some
countries (see Table C.1 in the Appendix). This aggregation concerns mostly services;
we keep the sectoral detail in the manufacturing and agricultural industries.12
Data on bilateral preferential and MFN tariffs stem from the World Integrated Trade
Solutions (WITS-TRAINS) and the WTO’s Integrated Database (IDB).13 Data on tariffs
and on trade from WIOD are used to estimate trade elasticities for the 22 manufacturing
sectors – jointly with the ad valorem equivalent changes in NTBs associated with the
different steps of European and trade integration in general.14 We use data on FTA
membership from the WTO.15 Data on membership in the EU, the Eurozone and the
successive accession of countries to the Schengen agreement stem from the European
Commission. We capture membership in the EU, the Euro or in FTAs by indicator
variables. To obtain a geographical measure of Schengen, we follow Felbermayr et al.
(2018a) and use the count of the number of Schengen borders crossed by truck and ferry
when moving from economic centers of i to n in year t.
We use those data to structurally estimate the elasticities θ and coefficients δ. Input-
output tables provide us with data on the expenditure shares α, and the cost shares β
and γ. Further, data on bilateral trade shares π, countries’ total value added wnLn, and
trade surpluses S are calculated from input-output tables.
We take information on net fiscal transfers of EU members to the EU budget from
the European Commission. Transfer redistribution is calculated based on the operating
budgetary balance for the 2010-2014 UK average, relative to each country’s gross national
income (see Table C.2 in the Appendix). The year 2014 is the latest year available in the
12 We use the approach outlined in Aichele and Heiland (2016) to account for the fact that WIOD
expenditure shares are valued in “basic” (or “producer”) prices (net of tariffs), while expenditure shares
in the model are defined in “market” prices (including tariffs). Further, we utilize their approach to
account for changes in inventory as part of the accounting system of WIOD but do not feature in our
model.
13 As tariffs are not available for every year and every pair within our time frame, we interpolate tariff
levels forward and backward.
14 For services sectors, we borrow an average estimate of the elasticity of services trade with respect to
trade cost from Egger et al. (2012). We adapt their method to obtain a trade elasticity of services and
apply it to our estimated goods elasticity from our aggregated gravity estimation.
15 The RTA gateway is accessible via http://rtais.wto.org/UI/PublicMaintainRTAHome.aspx.
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WIOD data and thus serves as our baseline. Our simulation exercise compares the status
quo in 2014 with a hypothetical situation in which the UK would leave the European
Union in that year.
3.3.3 The UK’s Europe Exposure in Comparison
Our analysis is based on one important conjecture, namely that inward and outward
market access costs of the UK have benefited differently – possibly by less – from EU
membership than other countries, and one key assumption, namely that the analysis of
sector-level trade data for the years 2000 to 2014 is informative about the unwinding
of integration steps between the UK and continental European countries that happened
much earlier. In fact, through Brexit, we assume that trade costs between the EU and
the UK go up by the amount that the Eastern enlargement has brought them down.
While this is innocuous for trade costs between the UK and the new EU members, it
may underestimate the effect of EU membership on trade costs between the UK and old
EU member states.
Here, we present very simple facts suggesting that our presumptions are plausible. Consis-
tent with our formal model, we compute a simple index of average inverse trade frictions
of the form




where Yi and Yn denote country i’s and n’s GDPs, Y w =
∑
i Yi is world GDP and Xin
are country i’s exports to country n.16
Figure 3.1 plots countries’ inverse trade frictions with other EU members and with trade
partners outside of the EU. The upper row looks at goods trade; the lower row at services
trade. The left column compares inverse trade frictions of countries with EU members
and with non-EU members. The right column compares countries’ inverse trade frictions
with ‘old’ EU and with ‘new’ EU members. The pictures suggest that all 25 countries
(the ‘old’ 15 EU members and the ten countries that joined in 2004) have lower frictions
amongst themselves than with the rest of the world. This is no surprise and reflects lower
geographical and political trade costs. However, intra-EU goods trade frictions Ω−1i,EU are
16 A simple way of writing a model-consistent gravity equation is to posit Xin = (YiYn/Y w) Ω̃in. Total









calculated by available data. We know that this index is only an approximation; however, we do not
calculate the Head-Ries-Index, as this would require trade cost symmetry and our point is that trade
costs involving the UK and the EU are indeed asymmetric.
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Note: Data from WIOD 2016. The straight line is the 45-degrees line.
nowhere higher than in Greece, Cyprus and the UK, while the latter occupies a middle
ground when looking at trade frictions with third parties. Hence, the UK seems less
strongly tied to intra-European goods trade than other countries of similar size such as
Italy, France, Spain, or Germany. This also implies that it has less to lose should it exit
the union. With services trade, the UK’s position is slightly better.
The right-hand diagram in figure 3.1 plots inverse trade frictions of countries relative to
‘old’ (EU15) and ‘new’ (EU10) EU members. Again, the UK lies in the bottom-lower
corner, signaling relatively high trade costs with both groups of countries. Importantly,
it lies on the 45-degrees line, both for goods and services trade. This suggests that UK
exporters and importers face similar situations in both new and old member states. This
leaves us confident that, even though our strategy identifies the effects of EU membership
using accessions within the period 2000-2014, the estimates are, on average, also sensible
with regard to the UK’s trade relationship with the old EU15 countries.
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3.3.4 Gravity Analysis of Aggregate Data
Table 3.1 shows results from regressions on aggregate data. Columns (1) to (6) report the
effects on integration arrangements on goods trade; columns (7) to (10) on services trade.
It reveals four insights that are of paramount importance for the following quantitative
analysis.
First, on average, EU membership is associated with substantial trade creation. Coeffi-
cients on goods (column (1)) and on services (column (7)), both statistically significant at
the 1% level, imply trade creation of 72% and 95%, respectively. Assuming an elasticity
of 3.5 for goods and 1.5 for services, 17 the estimates imply trade cost reductions of 14%
and 36%, respectively. FTAs other than the EU create less trade and indicate trade cost
reductions of 3.4% and 4.8%, respectively. The Chi2-test clearly rejects equality of EU
and FTA effects; for services, FTAs are not even significant.
Second, accounting for other steps of European integration is important to correctly
isolate the role of EU membership. Columns (2) and (8) add Eurozone and Schengen
membership. It turns out that Schengen matters, both, for goods and services trade; but
Eurozone membership is not statistically significant. However, controlling for those, the
coefficient for the EU membership falls to 0.470 for goods and 0.594 for services, implying
a fall in the trade cost reduction relative to columns (1) and (7).
Third, the effect of EU membership on trade may differ between country pairs involving
the UK and those involving only EU27 members (excluding UK). For goods, the coefficient
in column (3) is smaller for pairs involving the UK than for non-UK pairs; column (4)
indicates that estimated trade cost reductions due to EU membership are 13% for EU27-
pairs and 11% for pairs involving the UK. Note that the difference is not statistically
significant. For services, trade cost reductions in pairs involving the UK are stronger
than for EU27 (column (9)). Again, the difference is not statistically different from zero.
Importantly, adding tariffs for goods trade in column (4) yields a very plausible estimate
of the trade elasticity (3.5), with a variance of 0.92. Accounting for tariffs reduces trade
costs of EU membership from 12.5% to 8.1% for EU27 pairs and from 10.7% to 6.4% for
EU27-UK pairs. This is crucial, as tariffs imply very different welfare implications than
iceberg trade costs (non-tariff barriers, NTBs); mistaking tariffs with NTBs would lead
to an overestimate of the welfare damage of Brexit.
Fourth, allowing exports of the UK to EU27 to be affected differently than imports,
i.e., turning to directional FTA effects, columns (5), (6) and (10) provide evidence for
17 See below for more details.
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strong asymmetries. Columns (5) and (6) show that EU27 goods exports to the UK have
increased through EU membership of the UK, but UK exports to EU27 countries have
benefited only through the elimination of tariffs but not through NTBs. The difference
between UK exports and imports is statistically significantly different from zero at the
1%-level. In the area of services, UK exports seem to have benefited more, but here the
difference is not statistically different from zero.
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3.3.5 Gravity Analysis of Sectoral Data
Table 3.2 reports key results from sector-level gravity regressions which are replica of the
equations on aggregate data described in columns (6) and (10) of Table 3.1. It documents
substantial heterogeneity across the 22 goods and 28 services sectors with respect to the
trade elasticity, and regarding effects of EU membership or the EU-Korea FTA.18
We find reasonable trade elasticities (estimated coefficients on tariffs) for most goods
sectors; in sectors where the estimates violate regularity conditions, we report estimates
based on tariff adjusted imports and replace elasticities with estimates obtained for ag-
gregate data; see Table 3.1, column (6). Economic integration arrangements have very
different effects on different sectors. Bilateral trade between the EU27 and the UK is
shown to increase unambiguously through EU integration in 33 out of 50 sectors (both
UK exports and imports go up with at least one effect statistically significant at the
10%-level). In 16 cases (mostly manufacturing), UK imports increase by more than UK
exports; in 15 sectors (mostly services) the opposite is true. In the automotive sector (20),
UK imports are affected very positively, but UK exports are not. A strong asymmetry ex-
ists in the chemicals sector, too, while in basic metals the situation is relatively balanced.
In services sectors, postal & courier and financial services stand out, where, against the
trend, UK imports have grown by more than UK exports due to EU integration.
3.4 General Equilibrium Results
3.4.1 Counterfactual Scenarios
We have now paved the way to simulate general equilibrium effects of the UK leaving the
European Union Single Market and Customs Union. For each sector, the gravity model
provides us with estimates of the (inverse) trade elasticity θ and of the NTB effects δ of
various integration steps, as well as with estimates of the associated variance-covariance
matrices. For services, we have no trade cost shifters such as tariffs. We turn to Egger
et al. (2012) to infer a trade elasticity of ˆ1/θServices = 1.446.19
18 To save space, the table drops other covariates included in the model; see Tables C.3 and C.4 in the
Appendix for full detail.
19 Importantly, Egger et al. (2012) state that services trade reacts more elastically to trade liberalization
than goods trade. Hence, assuming an elasticity of 5 as in Caliendo and Parro (2015) seems not to
be a reasonable choice in our context. This is supported by recent applications of Hobijn and Nechio
(2019) using VAT data for the EU25 and Marquez (2006) using price and income data for the US. Both
find a range for services elasticities between 1 and 3. More specifically, Egger et al. (2012) estimate
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Assuming that parameters are jointly normally distributed, we draw a value of θ to cali-
brate the model, and a full set of NTB shifters δ to inform the counterfactual analysis.20
We repeat this procedure 1,000 times and obtain a distribution of NTB cost shocks and
a distribution of changes of endogenous variables. This allows us to construct confidence
intervals.21
We define the following counterfactual scenarios. Figure 3.2 illustrates trade cost shocks
κ̂ (equation (4.2)) and their distribution for each sector.
S1 WTO Scenario (“Hard Brexit”): The UK is no longer part of the European Single
Market and Customs Union and there is no new FTA substituting for it. The EU27
and the UK apply MFN tariffs as currently granted under WTO rules on imports
of third countries.22 In addition, directional NTBs are reintroduced between the
EU27 and the UK according to the sectoral trade costs calculated from the gravity
estimations. Figure 3.2a shows NTB changes for the UK (importer) with EU27
countries; Figure 3.2b shows respective barriers for EU27 members with the UK
(exporter). Moreover, the UK loses all existing tariff and non-tariff preferences
that it currently enjoys with third countries with whom the EU has an FTA in
force. We apply the heterogeneous UK-Korea agreement effect from the gravity
model and effects from further pre-EU accession treaties. Additionally, we consider
fiscal transfers by correcting the specific trade balances for fiscal transfers between
the EU27 and the UK.
S2 FTA Scenario (“Soft Brexit”): The UK exits the EU Single Market and Customs
Union, but the EU27 and the UK negotiate a modern free trade agreement (FTA),
which comprises not only tariffs but also affects NTBs on goods and services. We
model the FTA scenario as a replication of the EU-Korea agreement of 2011 – the
latest and most comprehensive trade agreement of the EU covered in the data. We
a parameter β in their model (which belongs to a related class of new quantitative trade models),
which is given by β = βGoods − βServices. Given their estimate β̂ = 2.026 and our own estimate
β̂Goods = ˆ1/θGoods, we can infer β̂Services = ˆ1/θServices, with a variance 0.144.
20 The choice of normal distribution implies that we will always obtain some draws that violate the
model-imposed parameter constraint 1/θ > 0. To circumvent this problem we drop the (very few)
parameter draws of θ that violate the constraint. This comes at the expense of a small upward bias of
the mean parameter estimate and a downward bias of the standard errors.
21 The underlying normality assumption is not completely innocuous, given that the model outcomes
are potentially highly non-linear functions of the parameters. The distribution of model outcomes
might be highly asymmetric even if the size of the underlying sample is large enough for the normal
approximation to work well for parameter estimation.
22 Figure C.1 in the Appendix shows sectoral trade-weighted MFN tariffs granted at the product-level
by the EU to third countries in 2014. These are used for simulation in the WTO scenario.
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utilize the estimated trade cost reductions of the EU-Korea FTA from our gravity
model as a proxy for a potential NTB effects between the EU27 and the UK (see
figure 3.2c).
S3 Global Britain Scenario: We model the same relationship regarding tariffs and
NTBs between the EU27 and the UK as under the WTO scenario, but now the UK
unilaterally eliminates tariffs and concludes FTAs with various third countries in
order to lower NTBs. The scenario is divided into three stages:
(a) The UK concludes an FTA with the USMCA countries the US, Mexico, and
Canada. NTBs are reduced as under the EU-Korea FTA.
(b) Further, the UK concludes an FTA with selected non-EU Commonwealth
countries, namely Australia and India.
(c) Finally, we assume that the UK also concludes additional FTAs with selected
Asian countries (JPN, KOR, CHN).
S4 Hard but Smart Brexit: Similar to S1, the UK is no longer part of the European
Single Market and Customs Union with no new FTA in place. The EU27 apply
MFN tariffs to the UK as currently granted under WTO rules on imports to third
countries. Directional NTBs are reintroduced in the EU27 for UK’s exports accord-
ing to the sectoral trade costs calculated from the gravity estimations. In contrast
to S1, the UK now decreases all existing tariffs for all its trading partners to zero.
Additionally, we account for fiscal transfers within the EU by correcting the specific
trade balances between the EU27 and the UK.
3.4.2 The Role of Treatment Heterogeneity
Before turning to the detailed general equilibrium analysis, we illustrate the importance
of considering heterogeneity in trade cost shocks for quantitative results. Table 3.3 shows
the real wage changes for various model specifications under the hard Brexit scenario
(S1).23 While allowing for the heterogeneity of treatment effects, Panel A uses the broad
sector specification of Table 3.1, while Panel B allows elasticities to vary across the 50
sectors in our data (cp. Table 3.2).
23 We focus on real wages which are less strongly affected by whether trade cost shocks are modeled as
affecting tariffs or iceberg trade costs, a distinction that is lost when lumping together different steps
of European integration.
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Note: Dots depict percentage changes of non-tariff barriers. Bars show 90%-confidence bounds, which
are based on 1,000 replications and approximate normal distribution. Sector 1 to 4 are agricultural and
natural resources sectors, 5 to 22 are manufacturing sectors, and 23 to 50 are services sectors.
Panel A reveals that moving from a simple dummy treatment of EU membership (row [1])
to a subtler measurement allowing for variable geometry (row [2]), to asymmetry between
the effects on EU27 pairs and pairs involving the UK (row [3]), and to directionality in
the EU27-UK effects (row [4]) gradually reduces the real wage losses due to Brexit from
0.57% in row [1] to 0.41% in row [4] for the EU27 and from 3.20% to 2.53% for the UK.
Hence, a simple dummy approach overestimates the costs from Brexit by about 40% for
the EU27 average and 25% for the UK.
If trade elasticities and treatment effects vary across sectors (rows [5] to [8]), we find higher
simulated costs from Brexit relative to estimates based on a two-sector model (goods
and services) – but only for the combination of sectoral heterogeneity and directional
UK-specific treatments. Consequently, being precise in the econometric identification of
NTB effects matters for macroeconomic outcomes, even if the most simplistic treatment
3.4. GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM RESULTS 81
(row[1]) and our preferred, more sophisticated specification (row[8]) show rather similar
effects.
3.4.3 Effects on Real Consumption
We now turn to the detailed general equilibrium analysis of Brexit by using the trade
cost shocks described in the counterfactural scenarios in our general equilibrium trade
model. Table 3.4 starts by reporting changes in real consumption, our preferred measure
of welfare, for 44 countries and the four Brexit scenarios. The advantage of reporting
real consumption compared to real wage changes (see Table C.11 in the Appendix) is
that real consumption accounts for the direct effects of tariff income, transfers, and trade
imbalances.
A hard Brexit (S1) decreases the UK’s real consumption by 2.76% per annum relative to
the status quo in the year 2014.24 This compares to a reduction of 0.93% in the case of
a modern FTA (S2). Opening the British market toward non-EU countries (S3) cannot
fully compensate for the negative effect of Brexit and causes the UK’s real consumption to
fall by 1.43%. This indicates that the well-established trade ties between EU27 economies
and the UK cannot easily be compensated through trade agreements between the UK
and other Commonwealth countries, Japan, Korea, or China, and the USMCA economies.
Real consumption effects for the UK and the EU27 average are statistically significant at
the 10%-level. The changes in real consumption for the EU27 are on average smaller than
those for the UK in the first three scenarios. The reason is that a smaller trade share per
EU27 country is affected by Brexit compared to the UK. The EU27 real consumption
losses are nearly four times as large under a hard Brexit (-0.78%) compared to a FTA
(-0.20%). Global Britain slightly increases the losses (-0.83%) for the EU27 economies, as
a hard Brexit with additional FTAs between the UK and non-EU countries would cause
trade diversion away from Europe.
EU27 countries are affected very differently; mean losses lie between -8.16% in Ireland
and -0.34% in Croatia. This reflects the initial strength of trade ties by taking input-
output linkages involving third countries into account.25 In case of a hard Brexit, Lux-
embourg and Malta would face higher losses than the UK and the Netherlands, Belgium,
and Cyprus would experience drops in real consumption of more than one percent each.
24 This effect is different from Table 3.3 as it treats changes in tariffs and NTB changes separately. It
uses detailed trade costs derived from Table 3.2.
25 The relatively strong effect on Hungary or Slovakia from Brexit is related to their role in German
production networks.
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Malta and Cyprus are former colonies; Luxembourg has strong linkages to the UK fi-
nancial services industry, and the Netherlands and Belgium are geographically very close
to the UK. Larger EU countries would experience smaller losses as they are protected
by larger home markets and also tend to have more diversified trade ties. In case of a
hard Brexit, Germany faces a decrease in real consumption of 0.72%, while France loses
0.52%. A FTA between the EU27 and the UK nearly divides the size of real consumption
losses for EU27 by four. With a FTA, Ireland’s real consumption decrease is 3.08%, still
substantially more than the UK’s with 0.93%. Germany would have to face a loss of
0.20%, almost identical to the EU27 average, and statistically different from zero at the
10% level. France, in contrast, would suffer a loss of 0.10% only, which is statistically
not distinguishable from a zero effect. Compared to a hard Brexit, losses in real con-
sumption slightly worsen for EU27 countries under a global Britain scenario, as countries
are negatively affected by trade diversion caused by the conclusion of trade agreements
between the UK and third countries. Germany and France would experience a drop in
real consumption of 0.80% and 0.54%, respectively; the EU average goes from -0.78%
under S1 to -0.83% under S3.
Turning to non-EU countries, we find small losses for Brazil, Turkey, or the US and slight
benefits for China, India, Indonesia, Norway and Taiwan from a hard Brexit. Countries
with whom the UK would conclude a new FTA would mostly benefit in real consumption
terms; but the relative gains are rather small: India’s real consumption would go up by
about 0.20% or the real consumption of the US by 0.11%. Canada, with its relatively
small home market, would benefit most: its real consumption could increase by 0.26%.
All those gains are statistically different from zero.
The EU’s dominating power in the Brexit negotiations rests upon the believe that the
UK would suffer substantially more in the case of an unsorted, non-cooperative Brexit
than the EU27 on average. Our counterfactual scenarios S1 to S3, next to the existing
literature that quantifies the outcome of Brexit (see, e.g. Dhingra et al., 2017, Sampson,
2017, Steinberg, 2019) support this believe. While under any previous scenario the UK
would lose substantially more than the EU27 on average, the question is whether a
hard Brexit that reintroduces MFN tariffs and NTBs is feasible. London could shift the
bargaining power with a simple trick: the hard but smart Brexit strategy (S4). Under S4,
the UK would no longer suffer fundamentally more than the EU27. The UK’s real income
would decrease by half a percent (see Table 3.4) – which is more than 5 times less than
under a hard Brexit, and about half the loss from a soft Brexit. The effect is mainly driven
by two channels: First, the absence of tariffs does not lead to additional price increases
for British consumers, in contrast to the hard Brexit scenario (S1). In fact, the complete
tariff liberalization even leads to price decreases. A negative nominal income effect still
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outweighs these positive price effects. As the EU27 increase their barriers (tariffs and
non-tariff barriers), exporting British goods and services to the EU27 becomes more
expensive and thereby decreases the nominal income. Overall, the reduction in nominal
income dominates. Still, no other scenario is more endurable for the UK than this one,
even though the EU27 increase their barriers. The effects for the remaining EU members
do not substantially differ from the hard Brexit scenario.
In a next step, we decompose the hard Brexit scenario to identify the key components of
the overall welfare effects; see figure 3.3a for the UK and figure 3.3b for the EU27.26 We
distinguish between the effects of (a) fiscal transfers, (b) tariffs on agriculture, and (c)
tariffs on manufacturing, (d) NTBs on agriculture, (e) NTBs on manufacturing, and (f)
NTBs on services.27
Ending net fiscal transfers has direct effects on real consumption, but it also affects
countries’ terms-of-trade; see the famous debate about the German transfer problem
between Keynes (1929) and Ohlin (1929). In Keynes’s logic, transfers worsen the terms
of trade (TOT) since exports would have to increase and imports to decrease so that the
price for exported relative to imported goods would have to fall. Transfers, thus, impose
an additional burden on the paying countries. As shown in Table C.2, UK net transfers
to the EU27 amounted to an average of about 6.5 billion Euro in the 2010-2014 period
or slightly more than 0.30% of GDP. figure 3.3a shows that unwinding those transfers
would allow UK consumers to increase real consumption by 0.29%, slightly less than the
pure transfers themselves. In line with Keynes (1929), the UK benefits from an end to
transfers not only from a direct effect but also from an amelioration of its TOT, even
though this gain is extremely small. Regarding the remaining EU27 members, we assume
that the end of UK transfers is borne by all countries proportionally to their GDP. This
amounts to an average reduction of net transfers by 0.06% of GDP. Not surprisingly, the
real consumption losses from such a scenario are indeed centered around 0.06%; losses in
Ireland or Luxembourg, the Netherlands, or Germany are increased by adverse movements
in TOT: these countries seem to benefit from the system of EU transfers as this drives
up the relative demand for their exports.
figure 3.3a and 3.3b also show that the reintroduction of agricultural tariffs yields a very
small positive consumption effect in the UK; the UK benefits as the negative allocation
effects are outweighed by positive TOT effects. Tariffs are at least partly absorbed by the
UK’s trading partners while agricultural tariff income remains in the country. A similar
26 Detailed results are provided in Tables C.5 and C.6 in the Appendix.
27 Note that separate welfare effects of (a) to (f) do not add up to the total effect of all components
together, as the different barriers may complement or substitute each other.
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picture emerges in manufacturing. However, gains and losses on real consumption from
reintroducing tariffs are very minor, as tariff income is rebated and welfare damages are
always of a “triangular” form.
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Note: a: fiscal transfers; b: tariffs in agriculture; c: tariffs in manufacturing; d: NTBs in agriculture; e: NTBs in
manufacturing; f: NTBs in services. The baseline year is 2014. Bars depict real consumption percentage changes; details
are shown in Tables C.5 and C.6 in the Appendix. The black solid lines show 90%-confidence bounds, which are based on
1,000 replications.
3.4.4 Effects on Bilateral Trade
Table 4.7 reports changes in bilateral trade flows in our four scenarios for the EU27, the
UK and the rest of the world (ROW). Sectors are aggregated into three broad categories:
agriculture, manufacturing, and service. Bold face characters denote mean effects that are
statistically different from zero.28 Trade flows are impacted by changes in bilateral trade
costs and by general equilibrium forces through changes in total expenditure and revenue,
and by multilateral resistance terms. Note that we keep the trade surplus of countries
relative to GDP constant; quite mechanically, this forces some additional asymmetry in
the rates of change in trade flows even if trade cost shocks are very similar.
28 Tables C.7 to C.9 in the Appendix provide details.
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Our analysis implies that EU27 exports to the UK would fall by 27% in the hard Brexit
scenario (S1), with 90% of the probability mass lying in the interval [-30,-25]. Exports
would fall by 29% in the global Britain scenario (S3). With a FTA (S2), exports would
fall by an expected effect of 4%, but the associated confidence interval is large: [-9,1]. So,
if the EU27 and the UK sign an ambitious FTA, it is no longer certain that trade will
actually fall. Interestingly, this does not apply to services transactions, where we report
a statistically significant expected drop of 8%. In all other scenarios, EU27 exports to
the UK would contract in all sectors, with the largest effects expected in manufacturing.
In the hard but smart Brexit scenario (S4), the UK offers a liberal market access for
exporters from the EU27 and the RoW. Hence, EU27 exports to the UK fall by only 9%,
and thereby decrease by less than half compared to a hard Brexit.
Overall, we find that UK exports to the EU27 fall by 25% in S1 and S3, which is 3 to
4 percentage points less than what is expected to happen to EU27 exports to the UK.
However, the difference is not statistically distinguishable from zero. UK manufacturing
exports suffer most; in agriculture, effects are not significant, reflecting the lack of trade
cost reductions in this area. Services exports of the UK fall by about 21% in S1 and S3;
with a FTA, they drop by 7% only, but trade effects in other sectors are indistinguishable
from zero. With a hard but smart Brexit, it is not surprising that UK’s exports towards
the EU27 would also decrease by -18%, as the market access to the EU27 is simulated
similarly to a hard Brexit, where tariff and non-tariff barriers against the UK exist.
EU27 exports to RoW increase by about 1% in S1 and S3, signaling the presence of some
trade diversion. Interestingly, exports from one EU27 member to the other barely change;
and if they do, the sign is negative. It appears that the increased trade costs with the
UK lead to an overall reduction of intra-EU27 trade flows along the highly-integrated EU
production networks. Similarly, the model does not predict that UK exports to the RoW
go up from Brexit scenarios S1 and S2, as increased trade costs with Europe reduce the
UK’s competitiveness with third countries. Of course, in the context of global Britain,
UK exports to third countries would go up quite substantially and slightly less with a
hard but smart Brexit; in manufacturing, the increase can be expected to be about 15%
in S3 and 10% in S4; exports of third countries to the UK are expected to go up by much
more with an FTA. Again, this reflects the lack of evidence for strong trade creating
effects of FTAs with third countries for the UK.
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3.4.5 Effects on Overall Trade
Next, we turn to the effect on overall trade in Table 4.6. We show baseline trade levels for
2014, where the UK features a small deficit in goods and services trade, while the EU27
has a substantial surplus of 780 bn USD. Across all scenarios, overall UK exports and
imports drop; compared to the change in GDP, trade falls by more such that the openness
of the UK economy (measured as total trade over GDP) drops quite substantially. With a
hard Brexit (S1), the reduction in both exports and imports is strongest in manufacturing,
but UK services imports drop substantially as well, as domestic output is increasingly
absorbed by domestic rather than foreign demand. Total EU27 exports fall by 1.43%
and total imports by 1.75%; manufacturing exports fall the most; while the import side
is dominated by services. Trade effects for the RoW are relatively low yet statistically
significant and typically positive.
With a FTA (S2), trade losses for all parties are strongly reduced, but they remain about
five times as large for the UK as compared to the EU27, and the effects are mostly not
statistically significant. As expected, UK trade losses fall by about two thirds under
global Britain (S3) compared to a hard Brexit, while they increase slightly for the EU27.
RoW can expect a small and statistically significant increase in its overall trade, most
pronounced in manufacturing. With a hard but smart Brexit, the UK’s overall exports
still decrease by 4%, but this is almost solely driven by the decrease of exports in services.
3.4.6 Changes in Sectoral Value Added
Changes in bilateral trade depend on the sectoral composition of value added trade flows.
The dependence on (imported) intermediate inputs varies greatly across sectors, but it
is generally more important for complex manufacturing goods than for raw materials or
services. We show the changes in sectoral value added for the UK and the EU27 average
in Table 3.7.29 Sectoral value added is affected by a price and a quantity effect. Brexit
changes the wage rate by the same in all sectors (roughly by the same effect as GDP per
capita; see Table C.11 in the Appendix), and it reallocates labor between sectors. For
the UK, for example, sectors whose value-added falls by less than 3.37% under a hard
Brexit (S1) experience an increase in employment, while sectors whose value added falls
by more see their employment shrink.
29 Full results and initial VA per sector in 2014 are provided in Tables C.12, C.13, C.14, and C.15 in
the Appendix. Country-sector level results on all remaining economies in the sample can be obtained
from the authors on request.
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Within manufacturing, the largest sectors for the UK in terms of value added are food,
beverages & tobacco, mining & quarrying (includes oil and gas extraction), machinery
& equipment, fabricated metals, pharmaceuticals, and motor vehicles, with 47, 43, 32,
28, 22, and 21 bn USD value added, respectively. Amongst these, mining & quarrying
and machinery & equipment are expected to lose most with a hard Brexit (-8% and -
7%, respectively). The other mentioned sectors feature changes that are not statistically
significant; the food sector even is expected to expand as higher trade costs force the
UK to move into this comparative disadvantaged sector. The same is true for crops &
animals. The largest percentage loss is expected in basic metals (-17%) and fishing &
aquaculture (-16%), but initial value added positions in these sectors are relatively small.
Value added changes from a FTA (S2) differ from those in S1 in sign, size and statistical
significance, because the structure of trade cost savings available under the FTA may
deviate from those obtained in the EU Single Market. Nonetheless, the overall picture
remains: Brexit drives the UK into the agri-food sectors and out of manufacturing sectors,
such as basic metals. Note, however, that changes are statistically insignificant for many
UK sectors in S2. Global Britain (S3) yields sectoral value-added gains where trade
cost reductions with third countries are expected. This is the case in transportation, for
example, but not in chemicals or pharmaceuticals, where reductions in NTBs are usually
harder to realize. The expansion of agri-food remains, as historical experience does not
suggest significant trade costs savings from FTAs with third countries in these sectors. UK
textiles is expected to shed employment as import competition goes up. Compared to the
other three scenarios, a hard but smart Brexit (S4) leads to stronger sectoral divergences.
The liberalization of the agrifood sector puts pressure on British farmers, while effects
in the manufacturing industry are quite heterogeneous. The value-added increases in
sectors that import a large amounts of intermediate products and simultaneously export
only few final goods (i.e. pharmaceuticals, chemicals, machinery, and electronics). The
explanation is simple: the intermediate product imports are cheaper than before.
Turning to services, the largest losses from a hard Brexit (S1) in the UK are expected in
wholesale trade (-8%), a sector that generates value added worth 88 bn USD in 2014; legal
& accounting and business services, both quantitatively important sectors, also have to
expect sizable losses of 2% and 3%, respectively. Interestingly, financial services are not
affected in a statistically significant way. The reason is the combination of two effects:
First, the ex post analysis of trade integration does not suggest large trade cost savings in
the first place; Second, the UK has a strong comparative advantage over its competitors.
This is less true for publishing and media services, two sectors with smaller quantitative
importance which would lose about 2% of their value added. With a hard but smart
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Brexit (S4), the services sectors lose more compared to manufacturing and agriculture,
as potential tariff reductions are not relevant for services.
In the EU27, sectoral value-added effects are generally less pronounced. One sector
worth pointing out is motor vehicles, where losses of about 2% are to be expected, as
the relatively high EU tariffs of 10% kick in and strongly affect the tight production
network between the EU27 and the UK. With global Britain (S3), the loss increases as
EU firms face tougher competition from third country suppliers in the UK. In contrast,
if the EU and the UK strike a FTA (S2), losses for the EU car industry disappear. With
a unilateral reduction of UK tariffs, losses from a hard Brexit in the automotive industry
are reduced by half under a hard but smart Brexit (S4).
3.5 Robustness
Finally, we analyze the robustness of our findings with regard to the choice of trade
elasticities. We focus on changes in real consumption for the hard Brexit scenario. Results
are summarized in Table C.17 in the Appendix.
First, even though our calculated services elasticities are in line with the above discussed
literature on services elasticities, we now rely on elasticities of a value of five as assumed
in Caliendo and Parro (2015) and Costinot and Rodriguez-Clare (2014). Overall, we
find that real consumption losses are slightly smaller due to the down weighting of trade
cost changes in services. We need to keep in mind that services sectors are extremely
important for the UK, hence, assuming a much higher trade elasticity might strongly
affect results. For a hard Brexit, losses are 5.4 times smaller compared to the baseline
in Table 3.4 for the most extreme case (Luxembourg) with its very strong reliance on
services sectors. Other EU27 countries experience losses that are two to three times
smaller compared to the baseline. The UK faces losses of -1.17% of real consumption,
which is 2.4 times smaller than in the baseline of -2.76%.
Second, we apply sectoral elasticities estimated by Caliendo and Parro (2015) (see Table
C.16 in the Appendix). To be empirically consistent, we re-estimate our sector-level
gravity equations constraining θ to equal the external estimate and backing out new
NTB changes. We find that countries lose less from a hard Brexit comparing magnitudes
to the baseline. In relative terms, EU27 countries real consumption losses are doubled
compared to the baseline. On the contrary, the UK loses 0.8 times more (-3.27% compared
to -2.76%). Note, that 10% confidence intervals in the baseline are [-3.32, -2.19] and [-
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3.95, -2.59] for the UK, such that the slightly higher losses are still close to the range of
our baseline estimates.
Further, while the magnitudes of real consumption changes vary slightly with the choice of
elasticities, the ranking of countries does not vary much. Countries with the highest losses
in the baseline and both robustness checks are Ireland, the UK, Malta, Luxembourg and
the Netherlands. EU27 countries with the lowest losses are Greece, Romania, Austria,
Croatia. Germany varies between rank 11 and 15, while France switches between rank 17
and 19. Hence, we are confident that our baseline results represent reasonable estimates
for the changing trade policy environment with Brexit.
3.6 Conclusion
In this paper, we conduct an ex ante analysis of trade and welfare effects of Brexit based
on an econometric ex post assessment of EU integration and other trade agreements.
We quantify the economic consequences of Brexit through a quantitative trade theory
framework and isolate the role of EU membership for the UK in three distinct ways: first,
we allow for directional treatment heterogeneity in the relation between the UK and EU27
economies; second, we distinguish different steps of European integration that affect tariffs
and iceberg trade costs separately to model trade cost shocks. Third, we consider fiscal
transfers within the EU, which affect the terms-of-trade of countries, and their role in the
economic costs of Brexit. The analysis is based on the integration of parameter calibration
and scenario definition based on the estimation of sector-level gravity equations. It allows
for simulating confidence intervals for all endogenous variables. This makes an important
component of uncertainty surrounding our results visible. Interestingly, in most cases,
the confidence intervals are rather narrow.
In the partial equilibrium gravity analysis, we find that the EU and trade agreements have
been very successful in reducing trade costs and boosting trade between its members, but
effects turn out to be directional, in particular, with respect to the UK. We make use of the
treatment heterogeneity identified at the finer sectoral level and of the model structure to
back out the trade cost effects of European integration steps for the counterfactual general
equilibrium analysis. Allowing for treatment heterogeneity in the ex post analysis turns
out relevant quantitatively for the overall economic costs of Brexit and its distribution
between the UK and the other European countries. Neglecting the asymmetry in EU-UK
relations overestimates the costs from Brexit up to 40%.
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We simulate real consumption, gross and value-added trade changes for four different
scenarios. While we find a lot of heterogeneity across the 43 geographical countries and
the RoW component, a general pattern persists. Both, the UK and EU27 countries lose
welfare in any of the assumed Brexit scenarios. Some small EU27 countries with very
close trade ties to the UK, such as Ireland, Luxembourg, and Malta, lose even more than
the UK itself. Overall, conducting new trade agreements outside of the EU cannot fully
compensate the losses suffered from Brexit for the UK, while EU27 countries lose even
more in this scenario due to trade diversion. A comprehensive trade agreement between
the EU and the UK would definitely be preferred. But in the light of the staggering
process around such a new and comprehensive trade agreement, we offer an alternative
hard but smart Brexit – where besides falling back to WTO rules, the UK eliminates all
existing tariffs against the remaining EU27 members and the RoW countries. For the
UK, this generates the smallest losses, while the EU27 at least loose less than under a
hard Brexit. Still, a lot of potential exists in trade relations between the UK and the
remaining EU countries.
Overall, our paper is probably the most ambitious amongst the existing studies on Brexit
in mapping out the trade effects. But it does not feature labor or capital mobility. Need-
less to say, a careful analysis of these facets of European integration would be important
but faces both modeling and data-related issues. Brexit underlines the urgency for addi-
tional research in these areas.
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Table 3.2: EU Integration Steps and Bilateral Imports (2000 - 2014)
Dep. var.: Bilateral Imports
Sector Description exp: EU27 exp: UK EU27 - KOR UK - KOR Tariff
id-WIOD imp: UK imp: EU27
1 Crops & Animals◦ 1.254*** 0.733*** 0.327 -0.212 -3.471***
2 Forestry & Logging◦ 0.194 0.267 0.091 -0.919*** -3.471***
3 Fishing & Aquaculture◦ 0.003 1.057 -0.174 0.605 -3.471***
4 Mining & Quarrying◦ -0.797*** -0.192 1.136*** 2.792*** -3.471***
5 Food, Beverages & Tobacco 0.736*** 0.555*** 0.18 -0.611*** -1.066
6 Textiles, Apparel, Leather◦ 0.117 0.295 0.345*** -0.414* -3.471***
7 Wood & Cork◦ 0.076 -0.109 0.410*** 0.479*** -3.471***
8 Paper◦ 0.369 0.307** 0.341*** -0.167 -3.471***
9 Recorded Media Reproduction -0.111 -0.011 0.879*** 0.174 -1.254
10 Coke, Refined Petroleum -0.292 -0.029 0.512* 0.372*** -6.020***
11 Chemicals 0.777*** 0.253** 0.318*** 0.166** -3.531***
12 Pharmaceuticals 1.098*** 0.828*** -0.061 -0.088 -11.390***
13 Rubber & Plastics 0.698*** 0.448*** 0.307*** 0.116* -2.258**
14 Other non-Metallic Mineral 0.265 0.223* 0.029 0.033 -1.366*
15 Basic Metals 0.681** 0.641*** 0.308*** 0.075 -3.191***
16 Fabricated Metal 0.551*** 0.254 0.275*** 0.135 -1.543***
17 Electronics & Optical Products 0.694*** -0.208 -0.15 -0.809*** -7.780***
18 Electrical Equipment 0.601*** 0.151 0.370*** -0.003 -6.001***
19 Machinery & Equipment 0.568*** 0.214* 0.119* 0.180*** -7.873***
20 Motor Vehicles 0.730*** 0.364 0.311*** 0.144 -4.611***
21 Other Transport Equipment 0.188 -0.303 0.315 0.169 -2.947
22 Furniture & Other Manufacturing -0.086 -0.149 -0.571*** -1.110*** -3.727***
23 Electricity & Gas 0.895** 1.068** 0.355 -1.653*** -1.446***
24 Water Supply -0.334 0.001 0.629*** 0.623*** -1.446***
25 Sewerage & Waste 1.314*** 0.893*** -0.015 -0.015 -1.446***
26 Construction 1.239*** 2.154*** 0.137 0.234 -1.446***
27 Trade & Repair of Motor Vehicles 1.503** 2.256*** 0.736*** 1.097*** -1.446***
28 Wholesale Trade 1.515*** 2.611*** 0.471*** 1.299*** -1.446***
29 Retail Trade 1.374*** 1.571*** 0.425* 0.847*** -1.446***
30 Land Transport 0.333* 1.047*** 0.327* 0.384 -1.446***
31 Water Transport 0.679** 0.759** 0.302 -1.020** -1.446***
32 Air Transport 0.198 0.700*** 0.108 -0.859** -1.446***
33 Aux. Transportation Services 0.24 0.638*** 0.04 -0.025 -1.446***
34 Postal & Courier 1.266*** 0.245 0.680** -0.163 -1.446***
35 Accommodation & Food 0.002 -0.018 -0.456*** -1.576*** -1.446***
36 Publishing 0.23 0.542* -0.191 -0.096 -1.446***
37 Media Services 0.027 0.565** 0.071 0.063 -1.446***
38 Telecommunications 0.466 0.323 0.604*** -0.06 -1.446***
39 Computer & Information Services 1.067*** 0.532** 0.848** -0.221 -1.446***
40 Financial Services 1.809*** 0.484 0.899*** -0.366* -1.446***
41 Insurance -0.121 -0.609 0.058 -0.147 -1.446***
42 Real Estate 0.832** 1.104*** 0.04 0.544 -1.446***
43 Legal & Accounting 0.520** 0.599** 0.16 0.018 -1.446***
44 Business Services 0.999*** 0.993*** 0.809*** 0.413*** -1.446***
45 Research & Development -0.134 -0.049 -0.138 -1.095*** -1.446***
46 Admin. & Support Services 0.229 -0.097 0.046 -0.509*** -1.446***
47 Public & Social Services 0.438 0.657 0.095 1.085*** -1.446***
48 Education 1.062*** 1.503*** 0.555 1.065*** -1.446***
49 Human Health & Social Work 0.271 0.959** 0.971*** 1.058*** -1.446***
50 Other Services, Households 0.824 0.397 0.023 0.919*** -1.446***
Note: ***, **, * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% levels, respectively. All models estimated use Poisson Pseudo Maximum Likelihood
(PPML) methods. Robust standard errors (not reported) allow for clustering at the country-pair level. Pair as well as year specific importer
and exporter fixed effects included but not reported. Sectors marked with ◦ report estimates based on tariff adjusted imports, applying overall
trade elasticities for goods trade from Table (3.1) column (5). For services sectors, we calculate the trade elasticity for services according to
Egger et al. (2012). Varying observations between 23,085 and 27,735. Detailed effects for the 22 goods and 28 services sectors can be found
in Tables C.3 and C.4 in the Appendix.
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Table 3.3: Average Real Wage Changes in a Hard Brexit Scenario (S1), in %, Based on Various NTB Estimations
EU27 UK RoW
Panel A: Broad sectoral disaggregation
[1] Single EU dummy (col. (1) and (7)) -0.57 -3.20 -0.01
[2] Variable geometry (col. (2) and (8)) -0.51 -2.88 -0.01
[3] UK and EU treated differently (col. (3) and (9)) -0.49 -2.76 -0.01
[4] Allowing for directionality (col. (5) and (10)) -0.41 -2.53 -0.01
Panel B: Detailed sectoral disaggregation
[5] Single EU dummy (col. (1) and (7)) -0.59 -3.50 -0.01
[6] Variable geometry (col. (2) and (8)) -0.43 -2.61 0.00
[7] UK and EU treated differently (col. (3) and (9)) -0.56 -3.29 0.00
[8] Allowing for directionality (col. (5) and (10)) -0.60 -3.45 0.00
Note: The estimates can be retrieved from table 3.1. RoW: Rest of the World. The baseline
year is 2014. All reported numbers are statistically different from zero at the 10%-level based
on 1,000 replications. Panel A uses estimates from Table 3.1, while those of Panel B stem
from Table C.3 for goods sectors and Table C.4 for services sectors in the Appendix.
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Table 3.4: Counterfactual Change in Real Consumption, in %
Change in Real Consumption Change in Real Consumption
in % in %
S1 S2 S3 S4 S1 S2 S3 S4
UK -2.76 -0.93 -1.43 -0.50 Portugal -0.45 -0.12 -0.46 -0.40
[-3.32, -2.19] [-1.65, -0.21] [-2.10, -0.76] [-0.63, -0.37] [-0.56, -0.35] [-0.25, 0.01] [-0.56, -0.35] [-0.50, -0.29]
Austria -0.35 -0.09 -0.38 -0.28 Romania -0.37 -0.16 -0.39 -0.32
[-0.42, -0.27] [-0.19, -0.00] [-0.45, -0.30] [-0.35, -0.20] [-0.45, -0.29] [-0.25, -0.08] [-0.47, -0.31] [-0.39, -0.24]
Belgium -1.40 -0.29 -1.46 -0.96 Slovakia -0.73 -0.33 -0.77 -0.38
[-1.71, -1.09] [-0.71, 0.13] [-1.77, -1.15] [-1.28, -0.64] [-0.86, -0.60] [-0.52, -0.15] [-0.91, -0.64] [-0.46, -0.30]
Bulgaria -0.51 -0.24 -0.50 -0.46 Slovenia -0.42 -0.17 -0.46 -0.33
[-0.62, -0.40] [-0.36, -0.11] [-0.60, -0.39] [-0.56, -0.36] [-0.50, -0.35] [-0.25, -0.08] [-0.54, -0.38] [-0.41, -0.25]
Croatia -0.34 -0.04 -0.34 -0.29 Spain -0.39 -0.13 -0.42 -0.29
[-0.43, -0.24] [-0.17, 0.09] [-0.43, -0.24] [-0.38, -0.20] [-0.48, -0.30] [-0.23, -0.02] [-0.50, -0.33] [-0.38, -0.20]
Cyprus -1.37 -0.35 -1.36 -1.08 Sweden -0.75 -0.11 -0.79 -0.64
[-1.80, -0.94] [-0.91, 0.21] [-1.79, -0.93] [-1.50, -0.66] [-0.91, -0.58] [-0.34, 0.12] [-0.95, -0.62] [-0.80, -0.47]
Czech R. -0.75 -0.35 -0.84 -0.51 Australia -0.00 -0.00 0.12 0.01
[-0.90, -0.60] [-0.51, -0.20] [-0.99, -0.69] [-0.65, -0.36] [-0.01, 0.00] [-0.01, 0.00] [0.08, 0.15] [0.01, 0.01]
Denmark -0.89 -0.12 -0.91 -0.71 Brasil -0.01 0.00 -0.01 0.00
[-1.10, -0.67] [-0.46, 0.22] [-1.12, -0.70] [-0.93, -0.49] [-0.01, -0.01] [-0.00, 0.00] [-0.01, -0.00] [0.00, 0.01]
Estonia -0.70 -0.27 -0.71 -0.62 Canada 0.00 -0.01 0.26 0.01
[-0.88, -0.51] [-0.46, -0.07] [-0.89, -0.52] [-0.79, -0.44] [-0.00, 0.01] [-0.03, 0.00] [0.15, 0.37] [0.00, 0.01]
Finland -0.50 -0.08 -0.52 -0.45 China 0.05 0.02 0.13 0.06
[-0.60, -0.39] [-0.22, 0.06] [-0.62, -0.41] [-0.55, -0.35] [0.04, 0.05] [0.00, 0.03] [0.11, 0.14] [0.05, 0.06]
France -0.52 -0.10 -0.54 -0.40 India 0.02 0.00 0.20 0.07
[-0.66, -0.38] [-0.32, 0.12] [-0.68, -0.40] [-0.54, -0.25] [0.01, 0.02] [-0.00, 0.01] [0.16, 0.25] [0.06, 0.08]
Germany -0.72 -0.20 -0.80 -0.48 Indonesia 0.01 -0.00 0.00 0.02
[-0.84, -0.59] [-0.36, -0.04] [-0.92, -0.67] [-0.61, -0.36] [0.01, 0.01] [-0.01, 0.00] [0.00, 0.01] [0.01, 0.02]
Greece -0.39 -0.12 -0.37 -0.37 Japan -0.00 0.00 0.06 -0.00
[-0.48, -0.29] [-0.23, 0.00] [-0.47, -0.28] [-0.46, -0.27] [-0.00, 0.00] [-0.00, 0.01] [0.05, 0.08] [-0.01, -0.00]
Hungary -0.87 -0.34 -0.94 -0.60 Korea -0.03 -0.09 0.15 0.06
[-1.01, -0.74] [-0.49, -0.18] [-1.07, -0.80] [-0.74, -0.46] [-0.08, 0.02] [-0.16, -0.02] [0.09, 0.21] [0.05, 0.08]
Ireland -8.16 -3.08 -8.22 -5.39 Mexico -0.01 -0.01 0.04 0.01
[-9.60, -6.72] [-4.82, -1.34] [-9.66, -6.78] [-6.80, -3.98] [-0.01, 0.00] [-0.02, -0.00] [0.02, 0.05] [0.00, 0.01]
Italy -0.40 -0.09 -0.43 -0.31 Norway 0.52 0.23 0.61 -0.15
[-0.50, -0.31] [-0.21, 0.04] [-0.53, -0.34] [-0.41, -0.22] [0.10, 0.94] [-0.37, 0.84] [0.13, 1.09] [-0.26, -0.04]
Latvia -0.58 -0.16 -0.58 -0.51 Russia 0.01 -0.08 -0.02 0.05
[-0.76, -0.40] [-0.36, 0.04] [-0.75, -0.40] [-0.67, -0.34] [-0.02, 0.03] [-0.16, -0.01] [-0.05, 0.00] [0.02, 0.07]
Lithuania -0.51 -0.07 -0.55 -0.42 Switzerland -0.01 0.04 -0.04 0.12
[-0.66, -0.35] [-0.28, 0.14] [-0.71, -0.40] [-0.56, -0.29] [-0.16, 0.14] [-0.12, 0.20] [-0.19, 0.11] [0.05, 0.19]
Luxembourg -5.23 2.15 -5.46 -3.15 Taiwan 0.13 0.06 0.09 0.10
[-8.61, -1.85] [-2.64, 6.95] [-8.82, -2.09] [-6.67, 0.36] [0.11, 0.16] [-0.49, 0.61] [0.06, 0.12] [0.08, 0.12]
Malta -5.19 -0.76 -5.16 -3.36 Turkey -0.04 -0.07 -0.08 0.05
[-6.65, -3.73] [-2.94, 1.43] [-6.63, -3.69] [-4.40, -2.32] [-0.07, -0.01] [-0.10, -0.04] [-0.11, -0.05] [0.05, 0.06]
Netherlands -1.64 -0.37 -1.71 -1.06 USA -0.01 -0.00 0.11 -0.01
[-1.94, -1.33] [-0.84, 0.10] [-2.01, -1.40] [-1.36, -0.76] [-0.02, -0.01] [-0.01, 0.00] [0.08, 0.14] [-0.01, -0.00]
Poland -0.69 -0.25 -0.73 -0.47 ROW -0.02 0.02 -0.02 0.02
[-0.81, -0.57] [-0.38, -0.12] [-0.85, -0.61] [-0.59, -0.35] [-0.05, 0.01] [-0.02, 0.06] [-0.05, 0.01] [-0.01, 0.06]
EU27 -0.78 -0.20 -0.83 -0.56
[-0.93, -0.63] [-0.38, -0.01] [-0.97, -0.68] [-0.71, -0.40]
ROW 0.00 0.00 0.08 0.02
[-0.00, 0.01] [-0.01, 0.01] [0.06, 0.10] [0.02, 0.02]
Note: The baseline year is 2014. Mean effects and [p5, p95] intervals. Bold characters indicate significance at the 10%-level based on 1,000 replications. Confidence
intervals in square brackets. The results for EU27 and ROW are calculated as GDP weighted averages.
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Table 3.5: Counterfactual Changes of Bilateral Exports of EU27, UK and RoW, in %
Changes of Exports in %
EU27 to UK to ROW to
EU27 UK ROW EU27 ROW EU27 UK ROW
Panel A: S1
Agriculture -0.24 -22.74 0.85 -4.46 -6.31 -1.19 10.05 0.25
Manufacturing -0.14 -30.63 1.15 -32.19 -10.00 -0.91 9.80 0.24
Services -0.30 -21.21 0.44 -20.85 -0.43 -0.96 0.07 0.20
Total -0.18 -27.42 0.87 -24.69 -4.57 -0.97 7.16 0.23
Panel B: S2
Agriculture -1.34 40.06 -0.13 96.05 -7.20 -1.96 9.62 -0.04
Manufacturing -0.31 -4.71 0.35 7.16 -7.58 -0.68 1.80 0.06
Services 0.25 -7.55 0.32 -7.16 -0.76 -0.33 1.04 0.01
Total -0.20 -4.15 0.33 3.15 -3.80 -0.75 2.40 0.03
Panel C: S3
Agriculture -0.34 -19.87 0.95 -6.70 7.11 -1.49 22.05 0.27
Manufacturing -0.35 -34.35 1.14 -32.33 14.80 -1.35 34.19 0.03
Services -0.48 -19.76 0.37 -21.33 4.49 -1.13 9.04 0.11
Total -0.39 -29.31 0.84 -25.11 8.81 -1.30 26.05 0.08
Panel D: S4
Agriculture -0.28 -10.90 -0.12 2.50 7.61 -0.57 -2.51 0.25
Manufacturing -0.22 -11.52 -0.51 -17.84 9.93 0.19 9.96 0.16
Services 0.28 -4.29 0.21 -18.79 1.44 -0.07 -4.28 0.19
Total -0.09 -9.23 -0.23 -17.47 5.15 -0.01 4.77 0.18
Note: The baseline year is 2014. Bold characters indicate significance at the 10%-level based on
1,000 replications. Table reports cross-border trade only (no domestic trade). Full results are
presented in Tables C.7, C.8, and C.9 in the Appendix.
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Table 3.6: Counterfactual Changes of Overall Trade, in %
Initial Exports Changes in Exports Initial Imports Changes in Imports
bn USD in % bn USD in %
S1 S2 S3 S4 S1 S2 S3 S4
Panel A: UK
Agriculture 29.93 -5.52 36.83 1.22 5.43 50.44 1.50 17.56 11.12 -4.70
Manufacturing 304.41 -18.50 -1.94 -3.25 -0.71 489.57 -12.19 -1.74 -3.08 -1.72
Services 413.60 -8.35 -3.24 -5.52 -6.41 225.95 -11.96 -3.81 -7.24 -4.29
Total 747.93 -12.36 -1.11 -4.33 -3.61 765.96 -11.22 -1.08 -3.37 -2.67
Panel B: EU27
Agriculture 194.46 -1.45 1.80 -1.30 -0.96 462.82 -1.02 0.91 -1.32 -0.41
Manufacturing 4177.81 -1.55 -0.32 -1.90 -1.06 3474.84 -1.48 -0.18 -1.76 -0.67
Services 2064.33 -1.20 -0.20 -1.22 -0.04 1721.33 -2.49 -0.68 -2.69 -1.64
Total 6,436.60 -1.43 -0.22 -1.67 -0.73 5,659.00 -1.75 -0.25 -2.01 -0.95
Panel C: RoW
Agriculture 2039.67 0.20 -0.17 0.39 0.07 1750.78 0.21 -0.11 0.35 0.31
Manufacturing 8115.92 0.34 0.00 0.77 0.43 8633.73 0.20 -0.05 0.57 0.24
Services 3209.29 -0.07 -0.03 0.10 -0.01 3739.93 0.23 0.05 0.48 0.28
Total 13,364.88 0.22 -0.03 0.55 0.27 14,124.44 0.21 -0.03 0.52 0.26
Note: The baseline year is 2014. Bold characters indicate significance at the 10%-level based on 1,000 replications. Confidence intervals
can be retrieved from Table C.10 in the Appendix.
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Table 3.7: Counterfactual Changes of Sectoral Value Added, in %
UK EU 27
S1 S2 S3 S4 S1 S2 S3 S4
1 Crops & Animals 7.87 6.71 8.30 -2.22 -1.36 -0.70 -1.46 -0.54
2 Forestry & Logging -1.96 -1.28 -1.22 -0.10 -0.52 0.04 -0.63 -0.70
3 Fishing & Aquaculture -15.83 -7.68 -10.36 -15.11 1.08 0.91 1.00 0.71
4 Mining & Quarrying -7.93 8.22 -3.60 6.77 2.51 5.86 2.75 -1.07
5 Food, Beverages & Tobacco 1.86 2.39 3.50 -3.06 -1.55 -0.53 -1.67 -0.63
6 Textiles, Apparel,Leather -6.82 -2.97 -10.62 -4.02 -0.38 0.93 -0.83 -1.15
7 Wood & Cork 0.43 -3.86 -1.78 0.45 -0.72 0.16 -0.88 -0.84
8 Paper 0.81 0.36 1.00 0.46 -0.83 -0.29 -0.88 -0.85
9 Recorded Media Reproduction -1.13 1.10 0.55 0.40 -0.47 -0.23 -0.62 -0.49
10 Coke, Refined Petroleum 4.13 18.84 19.89 0.75 -0.44 2.02 -0.82 -1.02
11 Chemicals -5.71 0.34 -4.12 -3.74 -1.10 -0.64 -1.33 -0.80
12 Pharmaceuticals -3.08 -5.82 -11.94 8.75 -0.67 -2.16 -0.02 -1.92
13 Rubber & Plastics -0.68 0.93 0.66 -3.25 -1.16 -0.49 -1.37 -0.51
14 Other non-Metallic Mineral -1.01 0.94 0.71 -0.93 -0.70 -0.23 -0.84 -0.54
15 Basic Metals -16.95 -9.73 -6.11 -2.13 -0.43 -0.14 -0.74 -0.43
16 Fabricated Metal -0.49 1.44 2.63 1.21 -0.79 -0.26 -1.00 -0.61
17 Electronics & Optical Products -3.05 -2.15 -6.60 13.07 -1.73 -2.69 -1.48 -2.43
18 Electrical Equipment -8.48 -0.35 -8.93 3.67 -0.60 -0.25 -1.18 -1.10
19 Machinery & Equipment -6.86 -3.93 -4.11 8.38 -0.12 -0.24 -0.16 -1.04
20 Motor Vehicles -2.52 -1.49 5.13 -3.33 -1.57 -0.21 -2.24 -0.81
21 Other Transport Equipment -2.80 11.80 23.45 10.01 -0.77 1.22 -3.86 -1.40
22 Furniture & Other Manufacturing -3.10 -1.29 -2.29 4.39 -0.27 -0.58 -0.05 -1.34
23 Electricity & Gas -1.08 0.67 0.99 -0.53 -0.67 -0.12 -0.86 -0.52
24 Water Supply -0.67 0.46 0.91 -0.35 -0.61 -0.07 -0.80 -0.48
25 Sewerage & Waste -1.72 -0.79 -0.84 -2.45 -0.62 -0.14 -0.79 -0.16
26 Construction -0.46 0.87 1.15 -0.70 -0.70 -0.18 -0.89 -0.50
27 Trade & Repair of Motor Vehicles -2.14 -0.74 0.38 -2.62 -0.45 0.09 -0.69 -0.07
28 Wholesale Trade -7.91 -6.50 -5.40 -9.32 0.05 0.51 -0.10 0.52
29 Retail Trade -0.60 0.49 1.01 -1.02 -0.65 -0.14 -0.83 -0.39
30 Land Transport -1.86 -0.58 -0.30 -1.87 -0.51 -0.01 -0.68 -0.40
31 Water Transport 0.78 -1.00 0.97 1.45 -0.41 0.33 -0.52 -0.37
32 Air Transport -0.84 -0.25 0.49 -0.18 -0.62 0.06 -0.68 -0.76
33 Aux. Transportation Services -3.28 -2.08 -1.76 -3.15 -0.39 0.06 -0.55 -0.29
34 Postal and Courier 0.03 1.71 1.41 -0.31 -0.86 -0.48 -1.01 -0.43
35 Accommodation & Food -0.76 0.47 0.53 0.16 -0.57 -0.15 -0.75 -0.46
36 Publishing -1.59 -0.73 -0.64 -0.18 -0.82 -0.18 -0.96 -0.77
37 Media Services -1.77 -0.54 -0.67 -0.78 -0.17 0.15 -0.34 -0.08
38 Telecommunications -0.65 0.62 0.64 -0.83 -0.68 -0.17 -0.82 -0.45
39 Computer & Information Services -0.64 1.02 0.89 -0.22 -0.43 -0.23 -0.56 -0.35
40 Financial Services 0.38 1.78 1.43 0.16 -0.78 -0.43 -0.94 -0.48
41 Insurance 1.17 3.17 2.29 2.73 -0.94 -0.61 -1.09 -0.94
42 Real Estate -0.35 0.73 1.09 -0.58 -0.67 -0.17 -0.85 -0.45
43 Legal and Accounting -1.51 0.66 0.74 -0.87 -0.46 -0.05 -0.62 -0.34
44 Business Services -2.57 0.51 0.78 -2.05 -0.39 -0.12 -0.58 -0.06
45 Research and Development -0.68 0.41 0.52 0.38 -0.56 -0.12 -0.73 -0.52
46 Admin. & Support Services -0.17 1.47 1.16 0.90 -0.77 -0.37 -0.90 -0.69
47 Public & Social Services -0.59 0.61 0.93 -0.56 -0.67 -0.15 -0.87 -0.50
48 Education -0.66 0.49 0.84 -0.56 -0.68 -0.14 -0.87 -0.50
49 Human Health and Social Work -0.52 0.60 0.94 -0.51 -0.71 -0.14 -0.91 -0.54
50 Other Services, Households -0.22 0.89 0.80 -0.37 -0.70 -0.21 -0.89 -0.45
Note: The baseline year is 2014. Bold characters indicate significance at the 10%-level based on 1,000 replications.
Full results and initial value added per sector in 2014 are provided in Tables C.12, C.13, C.14, and C.15 in the
Appendix.
Chapter 4
Revisiting the Euro’s Trade Cost and
Welfare Effects
When, about twenty years ago, the Euro was created, one objective was to facilitate intra-
European trade by reducing transaction costs. Has the Euro delivered? Using sectoral
trade data from 1995 to 2014 and applying structural gravity modeling, we conduct an
ex post evaluation of the European Monetary Union (EMU). In aggregate data, we find
a significant average trade effect for goods of almost 8 percent, but a much smaller effect
for services trade. Digging deeper, we detect substantial heterogeneity between sectors,
as well as between and within country-pairs. Singling out Germany, and embedding the
estimation results into a quantitative general equilibrium model of world trade, we find
that EMU has increased real incomes in all EMU countries, albeit at different rates. E.g.,
incomes have increased by 0.3, 0.6, and 2.1 percent in Italy, Germany, and Luxembourg,
respectively.
4.1 Introduction
The idea about a European Monetary Union was first discussed in 1970, when the so-
called Werner report recommended a common European currency. The objective was to
foster intra-European economic exchange, in particular trade, by eliminating currency
related transaction costs, such as insurances for exchange rate fluctuations, or reduced
price transparency.
The Euro received a lot of negative media attention in the last decade and it got exploited
for arguments of populist movements across Europe. Research and political debates
mainly focused on macroeconomic and monetary effects of the EMU, while benefits of
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having a joint currency, such as trade creation effects received less attention. In this
chapter, we revisit the trade cost effects of the introduction of the Euro and ask the
following question: What are the general equilibrium effects for EU member states and
specifically Germany if the European Monetary Union was dissolved. The exercise informs
us about the trade and welfare effects of having a common currency in the EU. We aim
to highlight the importance and drawbacks of having a joint currency union.
To answer the question, we first employ a structural gravity model to identify country-
sector specific trade cost changes observable due to the European Monetary Union. These
trade cost changes are imputed into a general equilibrium model to derive sectoral value
added, trade and welfare changes. We allow for trade cost effects to differ between
sectors and country-pairs. More specifically, we single out Germany and allow its effects
to differ between imports and exports as well as between old and new members of EMU.
Identification relies on geographical and chronological heterogeneity in countries’ adoption
of the Euro and is facilitated by the inclusion of intra-country trade flows. To deal with
the uncertainty associated to our econometric estimates in the simulation, we construct
confidence intervals for all the simulated variables.
We are not the first to study the trade effects of a currency union. Rose (2000) uses a
simple gravity model to show that sharing a common currency more than triples trade
between the participating countries. Rose (2000) used a currency union dummy variable
as a right-hand side regressor, which yields one coefficient for the assessment of the trade
effect of currency unions. This chapter was followed by a vast literature that addressed
problems, such as omitted variables, self-selection, and other econometric issues (see also
Baldwin (2006); Baldwin et al. (2008)). Chen and Novy (2018) apply a modern gravity
analysis that avoids the econometric problems of the earlier literature. The authors argue
that the trade effect of currency unions is heterogeneous across and within country pairs.
Glick and Rose (2016) emphasize the use of exporter and importer year-specific fixed
effects. The authors find that currency unions increase trade on average by 40% and
that the EMU increases trade even more.1 Building on Yotov et al. (2016), Larch et al.
(2017) show how to structurally estimate the effects of currency unions on trade. To cope
with issues such as heteroscedasticity or zero trade flows, the authors employ Pseudo-
Maximum-Likelihood estimation as advocated by Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2006). They
control for exporter and importer year specific fixed effects to account for changes in
multilateral resistance (Feenstra (2015); Baldwin and Taglioni (2007)), and time-invariant
pair fixed effects that absorb the unobservable barriers to trade (Baier and Bergstrand,
2007).
1 Other important papers are Glick and Rose (2002), Glick and Rose (2016), and De Sousa (2012).
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We use the same empirical strategy but add to the literature by scrutinizing to what
extent the formation of the EMU contributed to trade between Germany and its partners
across sectors. We contribute to the literature by providing more detailed estimates on
sectoral level. Further, instead of estimating one single average treatment effect, we allow
for Germany-specific asymmetric effects. Third, we back out the trade cost effects of the
Euro and use a quantitative general equilibrium trade model to simulate the welfare
effects of the EMU. We account for parameter uncertainty in our simulation exercise.
Our empirical gravity model is derived from the general equilibrium framework proposed
by Caliendo and Parro (2015), a multi-sector input-output version of the Ricardian trade
model by Eaton and Kortum (2002), extended to services and non-tariff barriers by
Aichele et al. (2016). Both the empirical and the simulation draw on data from the
World Input-Output Database (WIOD); see Timmer et al. (2015) for a description. The
data provide detailed intra- and international input-output linkages. We account for
trade diversion effects, competitiveness effects through changing prices of intermediate
inputs, and effects on real GDP.
On average, our empirical results are comparable to the literature (Micco et al. (2003);
Baldwin and Taglioni (2007), Silva and Tenreyro (2010), Olivero and Yotov (2012)).
However, we go beyond aggregates and report effects for detailed manufacturing and
services sectors. We find that not all sectors benefited from the Euro; in particular, the
services sectors did not profit as much as the manufacturing sectors. German outward
trade costs fell more than inward trade costs. Our counterfactual analysis suggests,
that German real GDP would have been 0.6% lower if the Euro had not existed in 2014.
Among the large EMU members, this is the largest effect; small members such as Belgium
or Luxembourg benefited more (1.4% and 2.1%, respectively). German gross trade is by
about 1.1% to 1.5% higher with the Euro; within the other EMU members, the effect is
even more pronounced.
The chapter is structured the following: In section 2, we explain the research design.
Second 3 presents the data and empirical results. Section 4 discusses the results of the
general equilibrium analysis. Section 5 concludes.
4.2 Research Design
Our theoretical model follows Caliendo and Parro (2015), who provide a multi-sector
version of Eaton and Kortum (2002) with input-output linkages. We briefly derive the
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gravity equation to be estimated and describe how we simulate the counterfactual equi-
librium.2
There areN countries indexed by i and n, as well as J sectors indexed by j and k. Sectoral
goods are either used as inputs in production or consumed, with the representative con-
sumer having Cobb-Douglas preferences over consumption Cjn of sectoral final goods with




n = 1. Labor is the only production factor and





but not between countries. In each sector j, there is a continuum of intermediate goods
producers indexed ωj ∈ [0, 1] who combine labor and composite intermediate input and
who differ with respect to their productivity zji (ωj) . Intermediate goods are aggregated
into sectoral composites using CES production functions with elasticity ηj. In all markets,
there is perfect competition.
















The minimum cost of an input bundle is cjn, where Υjn is a constant, wn is the wage rate
in country n, pkn is the price of a composite intermediate good from sector k, βjn ≥ 0 is
the value-added share in sector j in country n and γk,jn denotes the cost share of source
sector k in sector j’s intermediate costs, with ∑Jk=1 γk,jn = 1. κjin denotes trade costs of
delivering sector j goods from country i to country n such that






where tjin ≥ 0 denotes ad-valorem tariffs, Din is bilateral distance, and Zin is a vector
collecting trade cost shifters (such as FTAs or other trade policies).
Productivity of intermediate goods producers follows a Fréchet distribution with a loca-
tion parameter λjn ≥ 0 that varies by country and sector (a measure of absolute advantage)
and shape parameter θj that varies by sector (and captures comparative advantage).3




pjin(ωj); i = 1, . . . , N
}
. (4.3)
2 Details are relegated to the Appendix D.
3 Convergence requires 1 + θj > ηj .
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Caliendo and Parro (2015) show that it is possible to derive a closed form solution of














where Aj = Γ [1 + θj(1− ηj)]
1
1−ηj is a constant.
4.2.1 Gravity
Given this structure, one can show that a country n’s expenditure share πjin for source




















which forms the core of a gravity equation.
Log-linearizing equation (B.8) and making use of (4.2), one obtains the following gravity
equation:



















M jin,t is the value of imports of country n from partner country i in sector j at time t.
The interesting parameters are the sectoral tariff elasticities θ and shifters of sectoral
trade costs δ. The vector ein,t takes the value of one if two countries i, n share the Euro
at time t, and zero otherwise, where we allow for different parameters between different
country groups and also with respect to directionality.
In the baseline gravity model, ein,t in equation (4.6) contains only one single binary
variable which switches to one if two countries are both members of EMU. In further
specifications the vector ein,t contains binary variables that specifically control for trade
flows between Germany and the ‘old’ and ‘new’ EMU members.4 In a symmetric gravity
specification, the directional effects - whether Germany is the exporter or importer -
4 Old EMU partner members: Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Nether-
lands, Portugal, and Spain. The new EMU partners of Germany: Greece, Slovenia, Malta, Cyprus,
Slovakia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania.
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are ignored, while this distinction is made in the asymmetric gravity specification. The
following sub-chapters explain the vector ein,t in more detail.
Given the nature of the underlying theoretical model, these estimates can be translated
into changes in ad valorem tariff equivalents of non-tariff trade costs. 1 + τ jin,t depicts the
ad valorem tariff, with the trade elasticity 1/θj > 0. Since we can observe the data for
these ad valorem tariffs for all bilateral pairs across sectors, the trade cost elasticity can





are needed, where l ≡ [1, 2].
Identifying variation stems from the membership accessions between 1995 and 2011, which
is our available time frame. The Euro was officially launched on 1 January 1999 in 12 EU
countries.5 Between 2002 and 2015, the remaining members joined.6 The vector Zin,t
contains dummy variables accounting for membership in the EU, the Schengen Area or
other regional trade agreements.
In order to account for multilateral resistance, importer- and exporter-specific year fixed
effects, νji,t and ν
j
n,t, are included. These terms are generally unobserved and fully control
for all exporter- and importer-specific time-varying determinants of trade (such as produc-
tion or consumption). Effectively, they also control for nominal and real exchange rates
movements relative to a third currency, and in combination (through triangle arbitrage)
between countries i and n.
νjin are bilateral country-pair fixed effects, which absorb all time-invariant bilateral trade
frictions. The fixed effects may account for potential endogeneity issues of the EMU
dummy if two countries that decide to join a currency union have traditionally traded a lot
with each other (see e.g. Micco et al. (2003)). This fixed effect may also prevent potential
selection bias. The selection of country pairs into plurilateral agreements may not be
completely random, but is also not a purely bilateral decision. We further believe that
reverse causality is not a major issue. Apart to potential endogeneity, this also addresses
omitted variable bias in integration agreements (see, e.g., Baier and Bergstrand, 2007).
εjin,t is the random error term. As recommended by Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2006),
we estimate the model using Poisson Pseudo Maximum Likelihood (PPML) methods to
address the OLS inconsistency and sample selection bias. We cluster standard errors at
the country-pair level.
5 Initial states included Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxem-
bourg, the Netherlands, Portugal and Spain.
6 The ’new’ wave of members include Slovenia, Cyprus, Malta, Slovakia, Estonia, Lithuania, and Latvia.
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Following the common practice (see Baier and Bergstrand, 2007), we exploit variation
within country-pairs and sectors over time to then identify the effects of policy changes.
Thus, econometric identification relies on countries joining an agreement and the EMU
in the period 1995-2011.
4.2.2 Comparative Statics
We wish to answer the question: How does welfare (real per capita income) in the observed
baseline 2014 differ from a counterfactual situation in which the Euro did not exist. To
answer this question, we need to close the model introduced in Section 5.3 above. We
do this be requiring that in all countries, accounting for trade surpluses, income equals
expenditure, and that for all sectors, goods markets clear. Appendix D.1 provides the
essential equations.
We are interested in the effects of the decrease in transaction costs due to the membership
of the EMU on income, trade, and value added. As shown by Dekle et al. (2008b), the
model can be solved in changes. Let z denote the initial level of a variable and z′ its
counterfactual level. The Appendix D.2 provides more detail. The transaction cost shocks















Solving the model in changes has several important advantages. First, certain constant
parameters which would be difficult to estimate such as the level of absolute advantage,
the level of non-tariff trade barriers, or the elasticity of substitution drop out from the
analysis. This should reduce measurement error. Second, the procedure has computa-
tional advantages as one does not need to solve for the baseline and the counterfactual
equilibria separately.
4.2.3 Construction of Confidence Intervals
We simulate confidence intervals for all endogenous outcome variables. More specifically,
we use the variance-covariance matrix of the sectoral gravity regressions and, assuming
joint normality, we draw a thousand different parameter sets for each sector. We use
these to calibrate a thousand simulation exercises, obtaining a distribution of changes in
outcome variables. We report the 5th and the 95th percentiles of these distributions (the
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90% confidence interval) together with the mean. This allows for a sound treatment of
statistically insignificant gravity coefficients and for a proper quantification of parameter
uncertainty.
4.3 Data and Empirical Results
4.3.1 Data
The World Input-Output Database (WIOD) is our main data source. It is described in
detail by Timmer et al. (2015). It provides information on the expenditure shares α, the
cost shares β and γ, as well as data on bilateral trade shares π, bilateral trade in final
and intermediate goods in producer and consumer prices detailed by sector, countries’
total value added wnLn, values of production, and trade surpluses S.
There are two waves of WIOD data. The first wave includes data for 40 countries, 16
goods sectors and 19 services sectors for the years 1995 until 2011. The second wave,
which was published in 2016 includes information about 43 countries, a rest-of-the-world
aggregate and 56 sectors for the years 2000 to 2014. Unfortunately, no official concordance
between the two waves exists, and any mapping of sectors is likely to contaminate the
crucial time variance in the data required for proper estimation. For this chapter, we
use the first WIOD wave to be able to cover the first Euro accessions by Germany, Italy,
Belgium, Finland, France, Ireland, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, and Spain in
1999. One disadvantage of the first WIOD wave is the fact that we cannot take account
of the most recent Euro accessions of Lithuania and Latvia in 2014 and 2015. Single
Market and Customs Union effects are identified through the enlargement of the EU
between 1995 and 2011 and thus do not cover the most recent accessions by Croatia.
We thus cover almost all Euro and EU accessions, which leaves us confident to correctly
proxy the Euro effects.
However, to pin down the baseline, we have constructed a concordance between the
two waves and work with the year 2014, the most recent one available. We use WIOD
data on sectoral outputs, bilateral aggregated intermediate and final trade shares final
expenditure and intermediate cost shares. Moreover, we match the cross-section of tariffs
in 2014.7 Data on bilateral preferential and MFN tariffs stem from Felbermayr et al.
7 We use the approach outlined in Aichele and Heiland (2016) to account for the fact that WIOD
expenditure shares are valued in “basic” (or “producer”) prices (net of tariffs), while expenditure shares
in the model are defined in “market” prices (including tariffs). Further, we utilize their approach to
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(2018d). Sectoral trade cost elasticities θ and the trade cost changes δ are identified
through structural state-of-the-art gravity estimation. Data on tariffs and on trade from
WIOD are used to estimate trade elasticities for the 16 manufacturing and agricultural
sectors – jointly with the ad-valorem equivalent changes in NTBs associated with the
different steps of European and trade integration in general.8 We use data on RTA
membership from the WTO.9 Data on membership in the EU, the Eurozone and the
successive accession of countries to the Schengen Agreement stem from the European
Commission. Information about the EU membership and RTA membership is taken the
website of the European Commission.
4.3.2 Gravity Analysis of Average Effects
The first baseline gravity model estimates the average trade effect of bilateral country
pairs being members of the EMU at time t. So, ein,t in equation (4.6) is not a vector,
but rather contains only one single binary variable which switches to one if two countries
are both members of EMU. Further, control variables, such as being a member of the
European Union, the Schengen Area, a customs union or a trade agreement are also
included (Zjin,t). We start with this simple specification to make our results comparable
to earlier literature. The first line in Table 4.1 shows the estimates for aggregate goods
and services trade.
On average, becoming a EMU member increased imports of goods by 7.8% and is sta-
tistically significant. This average result is in line with literature, (see e.g. Felbermayr
et al. (2018b) and Larch et al. (2017)); the authors find rather small, but positive effects,
although lacking significance in the latter example. Interestingly, the effect on services
trade is small and statistically not significant.
The rest of Table 4.1 shows the gravity estimation results for all 16 goods sectors. The
EMU has heterogeneous effects across the sectors, but with the only exception of the
textiles sector, effects are positive. Many coefficients have large standard errors. As a
consequence, we expect sizeable confidence intervals in our simulation exercise. In the
account for changes in inventory as part of the accounting system of WIOD but do not feature in our
model.
8 For services sectors, we borrow an average estimate of the elasticity of services trade with respect to
trade cost from Egger et al. (2012). We adapt their method to obtain a trade elasticity of services
and apply it to our estimated goods elasticity from our aggregated gravity estimation. This is given
by β = θGoods − θServices, which is θServices = 1.446 = 3.471− 2.026(β̂) and a relative standard error of
0.144 = 0.924/6.404 (t-value).
9 The RTA gateway is accessible via http://rtais.wto.org/UI/PublicMaintainRTAHome.aspx.
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area of services industries, sales and repair of vehicles, or accommodation (hotels) have
strongly benefitted. Again, most estimated effects are positive but standard errors are
large.
4.3.3 Singling Out Germany and Allowing For Directionality
Table 4.2 goes one step further and singles out Germany from the other EMU members.
Moreover, it distinguishes between ‘old’ and ‘new’ EMU members.10 However, effects
are still symmetric in the sense that German exports and imports are affected similarly.
Dropping time indices to avoid clutter, the vector ein in equation 4.6 becomes
ein,t = {symeold,DEU ; symenew,DEU ;eRest} , (4.8)
Columns (1) and (2) show that especially trade between Germany and the other ‘old’
EMU members was enhanced due to EMU. On average trade in goods increased by 13.8%
and trade in services by 7.2%, with both being statistically significant. Trade between
Germany and the ‘new’ member states significantly decreased by 11.5% in manufacturing
sectors, and by 10.5% in services sectors (Column (2) and (5)). Next, columns (3) and
(4) (broad goods), and column six (broad services) differentiate between Germany being
an exporter and an importer. So, we have
ein,t = {eold,DEU ;eDEU,old;enew,DEU ;eDEU,new;eRest} , (4.9)
which allows Germany’s Euro-effects to be asymmetric. To save degrees of freedom, in
this specification, we do not decompose the effect for the remaining Euro zone mem-
bers. Estimation results suggest that German exports of goods towards the old members
increased by 18.2% (see column (4), line asym.eDEU,old) and goods’ imports from old
EMU members increased by 7.5% (see column (4), line asym.eold,DEU). German services
exports towards old EMU members increased by 16.3% (see column (6)). But, as for
imports, the effect is not distinguishable from zero. In contrast, exports and imports of
goods from and to Germany to and from the new members even decreased by 11.2% (see
column (4), line asym.eDEU,new) and 11.8% (see column (4), line asym.enew,DEU). The
trade effects for the German service industry are even more pronounced: German exports
10 Old EMU partner members: Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Nether-
lands, Portugal, and Spain. The new EMU partners of Germany: Greece, Slovenia, Malta, Cyprus,
Slovakia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania.
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Table 4.1: The Impact of EMU on sectoral Bilateral Imports
Dep. var.: Bilateral Imports
ID Goods both Euro ID Services both Euro
b/se b/se
Broad Goods 0.0753*** Broad Services 0.0104
(0.03) (0.03)
1 Agriculture 0.08516*** 17 Electricity 0.26883***
(0.03) (0.06)
2 Mining 0.00194 18 Construction 0.00239
(0.07) (0.02)
3 Food, Beverages 0.16106*** 19 Sale, Repair Vehicles 0.11129***
(0.03) (0.03)
4 Textiles -0.15815*** 20 Wholesale Trade 0.01043
(0.04) (0.06)
5 Leather 0.04468 21 Retail Trade 0.02799
(0.06) (0.03)
6 Wood 0.22584*** 22 Hotels 0.13393***
(0.03) (0.04)
7 Pulp, Paper 0.07960** 23 Inland Transport 0.04196
(0.03) (0.04)
8 Coke, Petroleum 0.85288*** 24 Water Transport -0.10906
(0.14) (0.11)
9 Chemicals 0.08157** 25 Ait Transport 0.02897
(0.04) (0.07)
10 Rubber, Plastics 0.00675 26 Auxiliary Transport 0.01410
(0.03) (0.06)
11 Other Minerals 0.06857** 27 Telecommunications -0.00197
(0.03) (0.04)
12 Basic Metals 0.04256 28 Financial Interm. -0.06000
(0.03) (0.09)
13 Machinery 0.03305 29 Real Estate 0.00166
(0.03) (0.07)
14 Electronics 0.00180 30 Business Activities 0.00839
(0.04) (0.04)
15 Transport Equipment 0.01186 31 Public Admin 0.11808**
(0.03) (0.05)






Note: ***, **, * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% levels, respectively. All models estimated use PPML
methods. Robust standard errors (in parentheses) allow for clustering at the country-pair level. Pair as well as year
specific importer and exporter fixed effects included but not reported. Further controls, such as membership of EU,
RTA, FTA, Schengen and Tariffs are included in estimation but not reporte, but can be retrieved from the tables
D.1 and D.2 in the Appendix. Number of observations: 27,200.
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in services to the new members decreased by 16.9%, which is also significant, whereas
German services imports decreased by 4.7%. But this result is not significant.
Table 4.2: The Impact of EMU on German Bilateral Imports from Old and New EMU Members
Dep. var.: Bilateral Imports
Goods Services
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
sym. eDEU,old 0.1291*** 0.1367*** 0.0698*
(0.03) (0.03) (0.04)
sym. eDEU,new -0.1251*** -0.1227*** -0.1107***
(0.03) (0.03) (0.04)
asym. eDEU,new -0.1135* -0.1191* -0.1851**
(0.07) (0.07) (0.09)
asym. enew,DEU -0.1376** -0.1263** -0.0485
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
asym. eDEU,old 0.1876** 0.1922*** 0.1734*
(0.07) (0.07) (0.10)
asym. eold,DEU 0.0719 0.0823 -0.0206
(0.07) (0.06) (0.08)
Both eRest 0.0137 0.0211 0.0138 0.0212 -0.0332 -0.0333
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04)
Both EU 0.4444*** 0.4493*** 0.4447*** 0.4496*** 0.2277*** 0.2275***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
RTA 0.2609*** 0.2328*** 0.2606*** 0.2325*** 0.1999*** 0.1997***
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (0.07)
Schengen 0.0345*** 0.0336*** 0.0345*** 0.0336*** 0.0200* 0.0202*
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Tariffs -3.4704*** -3.4666***
(0.83) (0.83)
Note: ***, **, * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% levels, respectively. All models estimated use PPML methods. Robust
standard errors (in parentheses) allow for clustering at the country-pair level. Pair as well as year specific importer and exporter
fixed effects included but not reported. Number of observations: 27,200.
To sum up, the effect on German exports and imports varies substantially. Further
it also differs across the trading partners. Trade with old EMU members expanded,
whereas, trade with the new members decreased, both across services and goods and for
German exports and imports. Note that this is not due to a ‘wrong’ initial exchange
rate between Germany and the new members, as initial conditions are accounted for by
country-year fixed effects. The effects can also not be explained by different paths of
prices (i.e., inflation) or even nominal exchange rates, which are effectively dealt with by
fixed effects. Also, trade diversion cannot be blamed, because it is taken into account by
the inclusion of fixed effects (which proxy for multilateral resistance terms). Note, that
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the welfare effects of the EMU do not depend on whether outward trade costs have gone
down; of course, inward trade costs are at least of equal importance for welfare gains.
Tables 4.3 and 4.4 take the gravity specification, which accounts for directional trade
between Germany and the new and old EMU members to a more disaggregated sectoral
level. This specification informs the general equilibrium simulations. The respective
tables solely show the results for the effects of the Euro between Germany, the old and
new members, and the average effects for the remaining EMU members. Estimates of
coefficients on additional control variables can be retrieved from the Table D.3 and D.4
in the Appendix D.
Exports of German agricultural products to old EMU members went up, while the re-
spective effect on imports is less pronounced. Trade between Germany and new EMU
members did not experience a decrease in transaction costs. German trade with old
members solely increased in the manufacturing industries, except for textile and leather
products. German exports towards the new members decreased for almost all manufac-
turing products, except Coke, Refinery, Printing, Paper Services. Trade with new EMU
members decreased through Euro membership. Only a few services sectors could profit.
4.4 Counterfactual Analysis
In the next and final step, we use the econometric ex post evaluation of EMU in our
general equilibrium model to conduct a counterfactual analysis: what, if, in 2014, the
Euro had not existed? Our empirical exercise provides the needed estimates of the inverse
trade elasticity so that we can back out the transaction cost effects of EMU membership;
see equation (6).11 This allows us to compute the shock κ̂inj associated to an end of
EMU, which we use in our simulations. Essentially, these amount to solving the system
of equations in the Appendix D. The econometric exercise also provides us with estimates
of the variance-covariance matrices to simulate confidence intervals.12
Table 4.5 shows the changes in real income for all members of EMU and the remaining
non-EMU members available in the data. The real income effect for Germany is compa-
rable to the average effect across EMU members. Our simulations suggest that Italy and
11 However, since we do not have trade cost shifters such as tariffs for the services industries, we take
the trade cost elasticity from Egger et al. (2012).
12 We draw 1000 realizations of parameter sets based on our gravity estimates and use them to simulate
the model a 1000 times. The resulting distribution of endogenous variables is then characterized using
the mean and the 5% and 95% percentiles.
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Table 4.3: The Impact of EMU on sectoral Bilateral Imports of Goods
eDeu,old eold,DEU eDeu,new enew,DEU eRest
1 Agriculture 0.1775* 0.0901 -0.3042*** 0.0198 0.0552**
(0.10) (0.06) (0.09) (0.05) (0.03)
2 Mining 0.3782*** -0.2119 -0.1306 -0.1870 -0.1081*
(0.13) (0.16) (0.10) (0.12) (0.06)
3 Food, Beverages 0.3172*** 0.1923*** 0.0104 0.0652 0.0863**
(0.09) (0.07) (0.19) (0.07) (0.04)
4 Textiles -0.3612*** 0.0389 -0.0467 -0.2175 -0.1600***
(0.10) (0.08) (0.10) (0.13) (0.06)
5 Leather -0.2373 0.1017 0.2037 -0.2390 0.1122
(0.16) (0.12) (0.15) (0.15) (0.07)
6 Wood 0.3861*** 0.3228*** -0.1535 -0.0450 0.1245***
(0.10) (0.08) (0.17) (0.10) (0.03)
7 Pulp, Paper 0.2743** 0.0881 0.0731 0.0015 -0.0252
(0.11) (0.08) (0.07) (0.06) (0.04)
8 Coke, Petroleum 1.0338*** 0.4842 0.0986 0.2097 0.9409***
(0.35) (0.36) (0.28) (0.29) (0.17)
9 Chemicals 0.1858* 0.1456** -0.2245** -0.1022 -0.0074
(0.10) (0.07) (0.10) (0.09) (0.04)
10 Rubber, Plastics 0.0844 0.0963 -0.1444* -0.1156 -0.0970***
(0.08) (0.06) (0.09) (0.09) (0.03)
11 Other Minerals 0.2446** 0.1065 -0.0496 -0.0250 -0.0323
(0.12) (0.10) (0.08) (0.07) (0.04)
12 Basic Metals 0.2572*** 0.0297 -0.2437*** -0.1669** -0.0628*
(0.08) (0.08) (0.07) (0.08) (0.03)
13 Machinery 0.1325* 0.0325 -0.0178 -0.1023* -0.0438
(0.07) (0.08) (0.07) (0.06) (0.03)
14 Electronics 0.1293 0.0356 -0.0475 -0.1838** -0.0843*
(0.09) (0.09) (0.10) (0.07) (0.05)
15 Transport Equipment 0.0626 0.0566 -0.3067*** -0.2244** -0.0127
(0.06) (0.08) (0.09) (0.09) (0.04)
16 Manufacturing 0.0032 0.1389** -0.1079 -0.1679*** 0.0120
Note: ***, **, * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% levels, respectively. All models estimated use PPML
methods. Robust standard errors (in parentheses) allow for clustering at the country-pair level. Pair as well as year
specific importer and exporter fixed effects included but not reported. Further controls, such as membership of EU,
RTA, FTA, Schengen and Tariffs are included in estimation but not reported. The remaining control variables can
be retrieved from the tables D.3 and D.4 of the Appendix. Number of observations: 27,200.
Greece benefited slightly less from the currency union than the other EMU members.
One should keep in mind that, in principle, the model could also lead to negative welfare
effects for countries inside and outside of the EMU. The reason for this is that terms of
trade can move against countries and offset the direct transaction cost savings. However,
the analysis suggests that this is not the case for any of the EMU members. All average
real income changes are statistically significant at the 10%-level. Also, European Union
members, which are not part of the EMU (such as the UK or Sweden), also indirectly
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Table 4.4: The Impact of EMU on sectoral Bilateral Imports of Services
eDeu,old eold,DEU eDeu,new enew,DEU eRest
(0.07) (0.06) (0.10) (0.04) (0.03)
17 Electricity 0.5398*** 0.2966** -0.0388 0.1221 0.1798***
(0.16) (0.14) (0.15) (0.20) (0.06)
18 Construction 0.1903** -0.0125 -0.0224 -0.0991* -0.0838***
(0.08) (0.08) (0.07) (0.06) (0.02)
19 Sale, Repair Vehicles 0.1218 0.1427 -0.2197*** -0.2171** 0.1079***
(0.10) (0.11) (0.07) (0.10) (0.04)
20 Wholesale Trade 0.3898*** 0.0085 -0.1911 0.2126** -0.1029
(0.14) (0.11) (0.13) (0.09) (0.09)
21 Retail Trade 0.1761* -0.0377 -0.0867 -0.1150 0.0060
(0.10) (0.09) (0.12) (0.11) (0.04)
22 Hotels 0.2570** 0.1132 -0.1166 0.1267 0.1010*
(0.12) (0.12) (0.20) (0.09) (0.05)
23 Inland Transport 0.2171** -0.0628 -0.5063*** -0.2403 0.0362
(0.11) (0.09) (0.16) (0.23) (0.05)
24 Water Transport 0.4966** -0.5947*** -0.2404 -0.0083 -0.0690
(0.22) (0.20) (0.26) (0.29) (0.12)
25 Ait Transport 0.3845** -0.0456 -0.6180*** -0.0083 -0.0881
(0.15) (0.13) (0.13) (0.21) (0.08)
26 Auxiliary Transport -0.2000 0.1951** -0.3187* -0.1452 0.0417
(0.18) (0.10) (0.18) (0.28) (0.06)
27 Telecommunications 0.0759 -0.0883 -0.0073 -0.2057 0.0093
(0.13) (0.12) (0.15) (0.13) (0.05)
28 Financial Interm. 0.4427** -0.3384** -0.3628** -0.1437 -0.0974
(0.17) (0.15) (0.17) (0.16) (0.12)
29 Real Estate 0.1223 -0.0492 -0.0900 -0.0259 -0.0240
(0.20) (0.20) (0.12) (0.09) (0.08)
30 Business Activities 0.1800 -0.1078 -0.1410 -0.1905** 0.0102
(0.14) (0.11) (0.11) (0.09) (0.05)
31 Public Admin 0.3648*** 0.0521 -0.1906 -0.1978*** 0.0372
(0.14) (0.10) (0.12) (0.07) (0.04)
32 Education 0.0611 -0.0088 -0.2806* -0.1118 0.0600
(0.15) (0.14) (0.15) (0.07) (0.05)
33 Health 0.2125** 0.1420** -0.2594** -0.0596 -0.0326
(0.09) (0.07) (0.11) (0.06) (0.03)
34 Other 0.0273 0.1128 -0.1240 0.0116 -0.0327
(0.15) (0.13) (0.25) (0.16) (0.04)
Note: ***, **, * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% levels, respectively. All models estimated use PPML
methods. Robust standard errors (in parentheses) allow for clustering at the country-pair level. Pair as well as year
specific importer and exporter fixed effects included but not reported. Further controls, such as membership of EU,
RTA, FTA, Schengen and Tariffs are included in estimation but not reported. The remaining control variables can
be retrieved from the tables D.3 and D.4 of the Appendix. Number of observations: 27,200.
profited from the Eurozone, often because they benefit from an increased level of eco-
nomic activity in the Eurozone and the associated boost in demand for imported inputs.
This is even true for some non-EU and non-EMU countries, such as Australia, who prof-
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ited from the creation of the Eurozone. Note that high levels of trade with the EMU
member states prior to the introduction of the Euro magnify the positive effects because
resource savings due to lower transaction costs are larger. Therefore, we do not expect
that EMU has benefited member states symmetrically. This is the reason why small and
more central countries such as Luxembourg or the Netherlands belong to the countries
that benefited the most in terms of real income gains. Similarly, the Baltic countries
and particularly Estonia also experienced an increase in their real incomes through the
lowering of transaction costs.
Table 4.5: Real Income Changes, in %
European Monetary Union Member States Non-EMU Countries
Change in Real Income Change in Real Income Change in Real Income Change in Real Income
in % in % in % in %
Austria 0.90 Latvia 1.34 Australia 0.01 Mexico 0.01
[0.90, 0.91] [1.33, 1.35] [0.01, 0.01] [0.01, 0.01]
Belgium 1.43 Lithuania 0.85 Brasil 0.00 Norway 0.01
[1.42, 1.44] [0.84, 0.85] [0.00, 0.00] [0.01, 0.01]
Cyprus 0.88 Luxembourg 2.05 Bulgaria 0.05 Poland 0.02
[0.87, 0.89] [2.03, 2.07] [0.05, 0.05] [0.02, 0.02]
Estonia 1.36 Malta 0.22 Canada -0.00 ROW 0.01
[1.35, 1.37] [0.20, 0.24] [-0.00, -0.00] [0.01, 0.01]
Finland 0.43 Netherlands 1.16 China 0.00 Romania 0.05
[0.43, 0.43] [1.16, 1.17] [-0.00, 0.00] [0.05, 0.05]
France 0.45 Portugal 0.75 Croatia 0.04 Russia -0.05
[0.44, 0.45] [0.74, 0.75] [0.04, 0.04] [-0.05, -0.05]
Germany 0.57 Slovakia 0.65 Czech R. 0.02 Sweden 0.01
[0.57, 0.57] [0.64, 0.65] [0.01, 0.02] [0.01, 0.01]
Greece 0.35 Slovenia 1.13 Denmark -0.01 Switzerland 0.01
[0.35, 0.35] [1.12, 1.13] [-0.01, -0.01] [0.01, 0.01]
Ireland 0.61 Spain 0.42 Hungary 0.00 Taiwan -0.01
[0.60, 0.62] [0.42, 0.42] [-0.00, 0.00] [-0.01, -0.00]
Italy 0.33 India -0.00 Turkey 0.03
[0.33, 0.33] [-0.00, -0.00] [0.03, 0.03]
Indonesia -0.00 UK 0.02
[-0.00, -0.00] [0.02, 0.02]
Japan 0.01 USA 0.01
[0.01, 0.01] [0.01, 0.01]
Korea -0.01
[-0.01, -0.01]
Note: The baseline year is 2014. Mean effects and [p5,p95] intervals. Bold characters indicate significance at the 10%-level based on 1,000 bootstrap replications.
Confidence intervals in square brackets.
Table 4.6 shows the effects on overall trade, i.e., across all trade partners for Germany, the
remaining EMU members and the non-EMU members across the three sector categories
and an aggregate (total). Across all sector categories, overall German exports and imports
increase; compared to the change in real income, trade increases more, which indicates
that the openness of the German economy, measured as total trade over GDP, increases
substantially. The same is evident for the remaining EMU members. Non-EMU members,
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on the other hand, are confronted with overall decreases in exports and imports. Only
exports of services expand (statistically significant at the 10%-level).13
Table 4.6: Change in Aggregate Trade, in %
Germany Rest of EMU Non-EMU members
Change in % Change in % Change in %
Exports Imports Exports Imports Exports Imports
Agriculture 1.54 0.23 1.49 2.12 0.04 -0.17
[0.39, 2.69] [-0.35, 0.82] [0.04, 2.94] [1.37, 2.87] [-0.04, 0.12] [-0.24, -0.11]
Manufacturing 1.35 2.01 2.57 2.27 -0.18 -0.05
[0.93, 1.76] [1.41, 2.60] [1.78, 3.35] [1.60, 2.94] [-0.26, -0.11] [-0.08, -0.02]
Services 0.27 0.49 0.30 0.97 0.09 -0.09
[-0.45, 0.98] [-0.52, 1.50] [-0.63, 1.23] [-0.12, 2.06] [0.05, 0.13] [-0.13, -0.06]
Total 1.13 1.48 1.69 1.83 -0.08 -0.08
[-0.10, 2.36] [0.13, 2.82] [-0.07, 3.46] [0.63, 3.03] [-0.27, 0.11] [-0.17, 0.02]
Note: The baseline year is 2014. Bold characters indicate significance at the 10%-level based on 1,000 bootstrap
replications and an approximate normal distribution. Confidence intervals in square brackets. Domestic trade is not
taken into account.
The positive change in exports and imports of the EMU members, including Germany,
can be explained through trade creation effects among the EMU members and by trade
diversion effects with non-members. Table 4.7 reports the changes in bilateral trade flows
for Germany, the remaining EMU members (Rest of EMU) and the rest of the world
(ROW). Trade flows are shown for three broad categories, agriculture, manufacturing,
and services. The bold values denote the mean effects which are statistically different
from zero at the 10% level.
Our simulations suggest that the introduction of the EMU led to a significant increase
in trade among EMU members. Especially agricultural and manufacturing trade could
be expanded, while trade in services seems to be less affected. In relative terms, imports
from the EMU members towards Germany increased to a higher extent than vice versa.
Trade diversion effects are more pronounced in the agricultural and services sectors.
EMU members substitute initial agricultural and services trade of non-EMU members
with trade among each other, while manufacturing exports of EMU members towards
non-EMU and among each other increased. The formation of EMU strengthened the
region in terms of purchasing power, which led to an increase of imports from the non-
EMU members. Former trade among non-EMU is now substituted with trade towards
the Eurozone.
13 Note that positive effects on openness do not necessarily imply positive welfare effects. The reason
is that the latter are not driven by gross trade but by changes in domestic value added and in the
aggregate price index.
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Table 4.7: Counterfactual Change of Bilateral Trade, in %
Change of bilateral trade, in %
Germany Rest of EMU ROW
Panel A: Germany
Agriculture 3.97 -0.10
[6.63, 1.30] [0.39, -0.60]
Manufacturing 3.96 0.04
[5.30, 2.62] [0.17, -0.10]
Services 1.27 -0.11
[3.90, -1.35] [-0.02, -0.19]
Total 3.50 0.00
[4.88, 2.13] [0.12, -0.11]
Panel B: Rest of EMU
Agriculture 1.00 4.09 -0.37
[3.80, -1.81] [6.52, 1.66] [0.06, -0.79]
Manufacturing 5.57 5.48 0.19
[7.40, 3.74] [7.26, 3.70] [0.36, 0.03]
Services 0.67 1.39 -0.17
[3.03, -1.69] [4.10, -1.31] [-0.05, -0.29]
Total 3.94 4.07 0.03
[5.46, 2.42] [5.74, 2.41] [0.15, -0.09]
Panel C: Non-EMU members
Agriculture -0.18 1.67 -0.17
[1.08, -1.43] [2.49, 0.85] [-0.11, -0.23]
Manufacturing -0.69 -0.60 -0.10
[-0.31, -1.07] [-0.21, -0.99] [-0.04, -0.15]
Services 0.34 0.74 -0.07
[0.58, 0.10] [0.98, 0.49] [-0.03, -0.11]
Total -0.38 0.18 -0.10
[-0.08, -0.68] [0.32, 0.04] [-0.05, -0.15]
Note: The baseline year is 2014. Bold characters indicate significance at the 10%-level based on
1,000 bootstrap replications and an approximate normal distribution. Confidence intervals in square
brackets. Domestic trade is not taken into account.
Table 4.8 shows the changes in sectoral value added for Germany. All sectors, except the
textile industry and the coke and petroleum industry can generate positive value-added
effects. The largest gains in relative terms are seen in the chemicals and agri-food.
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Table 4.8: German Sectoral Value Added Changes, in %
Value Added Value Added
Initial Change Initial Change
in mn Euro in % in mn Euro in %
Panel A: Agriculture and Manufacturing Goods
Agriculture 26199 0.75 Rubber and Plastics 38050 0.71
[0.43, 1.08] [0.31, 1.11]
Mining and Quarrying 6785 0.34 Other Non-Metallic Mineral 22719 0.69
[-0.84, 1.51] [0.40, 0.97]
Food, Beverages and Tobacco 59688 1.10 Basic Metals 104364 0.57
[0.76, 1.45] [0.35, 0.79]
Textiles 10552 -1.90 Machinery, Nec 149590 0.51
[-3.11, -0.69] [0.20, 0.83]
Wood Products 9030 0.72 Electrical Equipment 107097 0.10
[0.49, 0.96] [-0.44, 0.64]
Pulp, Paper, etc. 26606 0.68 Transport Equipment 17951 0.60
[0.46, 0.91] [-0.09, 1.30]
Coke, Petroleum, etc. 13264 -1.64 Manufacturing, Nec 31631 0.59




Electricity, Gas, etc. 76277 0.63 Auxiliary Transport Activities 65821 0.52
[0.40, 0.86] [0.34, 0.71]
Construction 164523 0.54 Telecommunications 98577 0.52
[0.33, 0.76] [0.32, 0.72]
Sale, Repair of Vehicles 200340 0.50 Financial Intermediation 155998 0.52
[0.35, 0.64] [0.35, 0.69]
Wholesale Trade, except vehicles 161246 0.50 Real Estate Activities 447330 0.56
[0.34, 0.67] [0.35, 0.76]
Retail Trade, except vehicles 114236 0.55 Other Business Activities 341557 0.48
[0.35, 0.75] [0.31, 0.65]
Hotels, Restaurants 85804 0.52 Public Admin, Defence, etc. 400351 0.53
[0.32, 0.72] [0.33, 0.74]
Inland Transport 67411 0.45 Education 190796 0.56
[0.25, 0.65] [0.35, 0.77]
Water Transport 10621 0.37 Health and Social Work 275879 0.57
[-0.01, 0.75] [0.35, 0.79]
Air Transport 8878 0.76 Other Social Services 30479 0.60
[0.24, 1.29] [0.35, 0.84]
Note:The baseline year is 2014. Bold characters indicate significance at the 10%-level based on 1,000 bootstrap replications and an
approximate normal distribution. Confidence intervals in square brackets.
4.5. CONCLUSION 116
4.5 Conclusion
This chapter conducts an ex-post analysis of the trade effects of the European Monetary
Union and of the welfare effects that these effects entail. The economic consequences
of the currency union are quantified allowing for asymmetries in the relation between
Germany and the other EMU economies across sectors. The analysis is based on a
quantitative trade theory framework, which gives rise to a structural gravity equation.
The model’s setup allows us to simulate confidence intervals for all endogenous variables,
which is important since many of the Euro-related parameter estimates come with very
substantial standard errors. Interestingly, though, we find that confidence intervals are
quite narrow in most cases.
In the partial equilibrium gravity analysis, we find that the EMU has been successful in
increasing trade between its members, but that effects differ quite a bit across sectors,
country pairs, and direction. We exploit the heterogeneity identified at the sectoral level
and of the structure of our quantitative general equilibrium model to back out the trade
cost effects of EMU membership. We use these trade cost effects in the counterfactual
analysis to simulate the real income, trade, and value-added changes associated to the
trade cost savings of introducing the Euro. We find that all EMU members could increase
their real income and that non-EMU could generate small gains, too, despite the presence
of trade diversion effects. Trade ties between the EMU members intensified, some trade
relationships within the currency union substituted former trade with non-EMUmembers.
Overall, we obtain very clear evidence for positive welfare effects from the transaction
cost savings generated by the creation of the EMU.
We believe that highlighting transaction cost savings and the benefits is crucial if one is to
show a profound picture of the advantages and disadvantages of the European Monetary
Union. We are aware that our analysis does not show the entire picture because we
ignore additional channels of the common currency. However, much other work (e.g., as
surveyed by Hartman and Smets, 2018) that focuses on the macroeconomic implications
of the Euro is partial, too, as it ignores the transaction cost savings that we stress. Future
work should try to integrate both strands of literature.
Chapter 5
Quantifying the EU-Japan Economic
Partnership Agreement
This chapter provides a quantitative analysis of the new EU-Japan Economic Partnership
Agreement (EPA), the biggest bilateral deal that both the EU and Japan have concluded
so far. It employs a generalized variant of the Eaton-Kortum (2002) model, featuring
multiple sectors, input-output linkages, services trade, and non-tariff barriers (NTBs).
It uses the results of an econometric ex post analysis of a related existing FTA, the
one between the EU and Korea, to approximate the expected reductions in the costs
of NTBs. This approach yields long-run welfare effects for Japan of about 18 bn USD
per year (0.31% of GDP) and of about 15 bn USD (0.10%) for the EU. On average, the
agreement does not appear to harm third countries. 14% of the welfare gains inside the
EPA stem from tariffs, the remaining 86% from NTB reform, and the services sector
account for more than half. In the EU, value added in the agri-food sector goes up most,
while in Japan the manufacturing and services sectors gain.
5.1 Introduction
On 1 February 2019, the Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) between the EU and
Japan entered into force. As of today, it is the largest free trade area in the world. In the
times of growing protectionism and unilateralism, it is of strategic importance for both
the EU and Japan. In this paper, we provide a quantitative analysis of the trade and
welfare effects of the EU-Japan EPA. We employ what Ottaviano (2014) has called “New
Quantitative Trade Theory”. More precisely, we rely on the model of Eaton and Kortum
(2002), extended by Caliendo and Parro (2015), and generalized to include tariffs and
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non-tariff barriers (NTBs) by Aichele et al. (2016). We employ a state-of-the-art sector
level gravity model to ex-post estimate the trade cost changes of a free trade agreement,
which is similar in the scope, namely the EU-Korea FTA. The estimated trade cost
changes are used as a proxy for the potential trade cost shocks between EU and Japan.
Together with observable tariff reductions, these trade cost changes are induced as trade
cost shocks to inform the CGE model, which provides a data-driven ex-ante analysis of
the potential effects of the EU-Japan EPA. We perform the counterfactual EPA scenario
on three different baselines. First, we analyze the effects of the trade cost reductions
due to the EU-Japan EPA based on a world as of today, without Brexit, TPP and other
future FTAs, such as CETA. The second baseline assumes an economy with Brexit, thus
UK left the European Union. The EU-Japan EPA is only implemented between the EU27
and Japan and excludes UK as a EPA partner. The third baseline includes Transpacific
Partnership (TPP) agreement in the baseline.
We are not the first to study the impact of the EU-Japan EPA. Sunesen et al. (2010)
assesses the impact of bilateral barriers to trade and investment between the EU and
Japan. He approximates trade cost shocks through qualitative expert judgments. Benz
and Yalcin (2015) quantify the EU-Japan EPA by using a single-sector Melitz (2003)
type model featuring three regions, the EU, Japan and a rest of the world aggregate.The
European Commission (2016) published a report about the potential impact of the EPA,
using qualitative exercises and stakeholder consultations. Further, the European Com-
mission (2018) published an economic impact assessment report of the EU-Japan EPA by
using the general equilibrium tools provided by GTAP. The authors further qualitatively
assess the potential reduction of technical barriers to trade and Sanitary and Phytosani-
tary Standards. A study of Lee-Makiyama (2018) shows descriptive evidence about the
relationship of the EU and Japan and its potential fro growth. Kawasaki (2017) also
uses the GTAP model to measure the impact of an EPA under the assumption that tariff
rates go to zero immediately and non-tariff barriers (NTBs) are reduced by 50%. We
contribute to the literature by providing a more data-driven approach to quantify the
potential effects of the EU-Japan EPA. Our strategy does not require initial non-tariff
barrier levels, expert judgments or qualitative assessments.
We document several novel results: First, the ex post evaluation of the EU-Korea agree-
ment shows that the EU market opening has led to less substantial trade cost reductions
than the one of its Asian partner and is quite heterogeneous across sectors. The coun-
terfactual simulation shows that both, Japan and the EU experience very similar welfare
gains in absolute terms. In relative terms, Japan’s gains are three times as large as the
EU’s. The EPA leads to trade diversion in Japan towards Europe, especially Eastern
Europe and away from former ASEAN countries. Within the EU, Italy is benefits more
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than Germany due to gains in agri-food and an fashion.While the German automotive
sector is set nuder pressure. In the EU, the agri-food sector profits the most in relative
terms. In absolute terms, the services sectors benefit the most, while the European auto-
motive industry, the energy sector and the metal industry lose slightly due to the EPA.
In Japan, the agri-food sector loses slightly. The largest Japanese gains are generated in
various manufacturing sectors, such as the automotive industry and the chemical sector,
followed by services. These findings are in line with previous, more qualitative studies.
The second counterfactual scenario includes Brexit in the baseline. The welfare gains
turn out to be substantially smaller for Japan if UK is not a member of the EU anymore.
The third counterfactual scenario includes the implementation of the Transpacific Part-
nership (TPP) agreement in the baseline. It has little importance for the effects of the
EU-Japan EPA.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the methodological
framework. Section 3 discusses the main data sources. Section 4 explains the empirical
estimation method and discusses the gravity results. Based on the defined EU-Japan sce-
narios, we examine general equilibrium consistent results on trade and welfare in section
5. The final section concludes.
5.2 Descriptive Evidence of potential growth opportunities
between EU and Japan
The ratification of the EU-Japan EPA is an agreement among two of the most advanced
economies of the world. It is the culmination of a long history of cooperation between
Japan and the EU. Since 1979 the European Commission has been encouraging European
enterprises to enter the Japanese market and has given them concrete assistance through
promotion programs such as the Executive Training Program and the EU Gateway Pro-
gram. Since 1999, EU and Japan have a so called Business Round Table whose aim is
to facilitate dialogue and exchange of views between EU and Japanese businesses. Since
2004, a cooperation framework to promote two-way investments exists. At the EU-Japan
Summit of 28 May 2011, the EU and Japan agreed to work towards a new framework for
their bilateral relations and to explore the feasibility to pursue an EPA. In line with the
summit conclusions, a joint scoping exercise was conducted to determine the scope and
the level of ambition of the joint undertaking. The exercise defined non barriers to trade
that both sides considered as obstacles in bilateral trade and investment. Following the
successful completion of the scoping exercise, in July 2012 the Commission recommended
the Council to launch negotiations for an FTA and in November 2012 the Council au-
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thorized the Commission to start the negotiations. The first round of negotiations took
place in Brussels in April 2013. In December 2017, negotiations were formally concluded.
The next part shows descriptive evidence why forming a trade partnership can potentially
be of strategic relevance for the EU and Japan. Both regions are technologically advanced
and belong to the category of high income countries.1 But the share of world economic
activity fell in both regions over the last two decade (see the left hand-side of figure 5.1).
Compared to Germany, one of the most technologically advanced countries, Japan’s GDP
at a slower rate (see right hand-side of figure 5.1). Joining forces by forming a trade union
could help to reverse this declining trend.
Figure 5.1: Shares in World GDP, current USD (1970-2015) and Evolution of real GDP per
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Note: The left figure shows the share of the world GDP for Japan, Germany and the European Union
from 1960 until 2017. The figure on the right hand-side shows the real GDP per capita in purchasing
power parities with 1990 equal to 100, from 1990 to 2015. Source: World Development Indicators (2018),
World Bank; own calculations.
1 Measured at current market prices, the Japanese and EU economies combined account for 22 150
billion US-Dollar of GDP and 640 million consumers. The EU’s GNI per capita lies at 32 778 and
38 550 US-Dollar for Japan in 2017 (measured in current USD), which lies at the upper bound of the
World Bank’s classification ‘high income countries’.
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Japan is an extremely interesting but ambivalent market for the European Union. The
potential for growth opportunities becomes evident if one looks at very simple trade data.
Japan is is technologically very advanced and is one of the main innovators of automated
and robotized manufacturing. Compared to China, who surpassed Japan in terms of real
GDP in 2012, Japan remains almost equal to the size of the Chinese market measured in
consumption. As investors, Japan and China are of equal importance, at 8.4 and 8.6%
respectively of global FDI outflows. Thus, the market is very promising.
A trade agreement and a reduction in trade barriers offers promising potential for welfare
gains, because Japan is still relatively protectionist, in particular when looking at non-
tariff barriers; see European Commission (2016). Compared to other OECD countries,
Japan is a relatively closed economy. In 2011, only about 13.5% of its final demand is
spent on foreign value added. In comparison, the share in Germany is about 25%; in
the USA it is about 15%. Larger economies tend to serve a larger fraction of domestic
demand with domestic production. The EU-Japan Economic Partnership Agreement can
yield positive effects on Japan’s economy and for the EU members. Table 5.1 illustrates
the initial bilateral trade relationship between the EU and Japan in 2011, our baseline
year of the simulation. It shows the volume of bilateral exports between EU28 and Japan.
Further, the share of EU exports to Japan relative to the total EU exports are illustrated.
The right part of the table shows the same columns for Japan. Although Japan amounts
to almost 8% of world GDP (excluding the EU), the EU countries deliver not more than
3% of their overall exports to Japan. Room for expansion is evident. The export shares
are especially small for EU’s competitive manufacturing sectors, such as the machinery,
automotive, or electronic equipment sectors. In contrast, the EU already constitutes an
important trading partner for Japan.
Tariffs still represent a sizable barrier and their elimination is relevant for additional
welfare gains. At the same time, it is worth to emphasize, that in comparison to other
countries the average tariff rates between the EU and Japan are on average relatively
low (e.g., China has a simple average MFN-bound rate of 10 per cent). A large share
of these traded products between Japan and the EU is subject to tariffs which comply
with the World Trade Organization’s (WTO) regulations. At the same time, in both
regions around one quarter of products are not subject to such import duties. Across
all goods that are protected by tariffs around 85% of the bound duties turn out to be
below 10%-points. Except for a handful of traded goods with tariff peaks, the remaining
product lines reach import duties of around 30 per cent in the EU and 35 per cent in
Japan. Peak tariff rates reach 60 per cent in Japan and 75 per cent in the EU. Figure 5.2
summarizes the prevailing applied tariff rates for EU industries for which trade data is
available. The figure illustrates the simple average tariffs, which sometimes substantially
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Table 5.1: Initial Bilateral Trade between EU and Japan, in bn USD & %
Exports EU28 Exports JPN
total share total share
EU-JPN JPN-EU
in bn USD in % in bn USD in %
Agri-Food 538 1.3 538 1.3
Automotive 679 1.4 163 11.5
Chemicals 1067 2.1 124 11.8
Electronic Equipment 241 0.8 89 11.8
Energy 32 0.1 0 0.7
Financial & Business Services 722 2.3 30 30.8
Machinery and Equipment 1234 1.3 294 13.5
Other Manufacturing 93 1.7 10 16.4
Metals 537 0.7 91 8.0
Raw Materials 585 0.8 39 8.5
Other Services 341 2.0 21 25.8
Textiles & Apparel 226 1.7 11 9.4
Trade and Transportation 515 2.9 39 31.9
Note: GTAP 9.1 (2011); Column 2 shows the initial export volume for EU28 countries to all destination including
intra-EU markets. Column 3 shows the share of EU28 exports that go to Japan. Column 4 shows the total Japanese
export volume to all destinations. Column 5 shows the share of these exports that go to the EU.
differ from the weighted ones. While Japan also shows a strong tariff variation across
the listed industries, interestingly tariff rates in most of the industries turn out to be on
average lower than in the respective European industry, except in the chemical industry.
Tariffs for machinery products are on average 7.5% in the EU and 6.6% in Japan.
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Japan Tariff Difference EU28
Note: The figure illustrates the simple average tariffs (in %) for Japan (in gray) and the EU28 (in blue).
The figure shows the differences in the tariff heights between Japan and the EU28. Source: WTO Tariff
Profiles; own illustration.
5.3 Theoretical Framework
The model is described in detail in Aichele et al. (2016) who extend the model of Caliendo
and Parro (2015). The framework is a multi-sector version of the Eaton and Kortum
(2002) model, a multi-country Ricardian general equilibrium model extended to incorpo-
rate rich value chain interactions, and non-tariff trade costs. The general class of models
is described in detail by Costinot and Rodriguez-Clare (2014).
Consumption and Production The model hasN countries, which are indexed by i, n and
the J sectors by j, k. The representative consumer utility over final goods consumption is
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with ∑j αjn = 1 and a country’s labor force Ln is mobile across sectors (e.g. Ln =∑J
j=1 L
j
n), but not across countries.
A continuum of goods ωj is produced with labor ljn(ωj) in each sector j and with a













Every sector j of each country n has a value added share, βjn ≥ 0 and the cost share of




n = 1, which indicates
that sectors are interrelated because sector j uses sector k’s output as intermediate input
and vice versa. The inverse efficiency of good ωj in sector j and country n is the xjn(ωj),
while θj is the dispersion of efficiencies in a sector j. The lower θj the lower is the
dispersion of productivity across the goods ωj.
An input bundle’s dual cost cjn depends on the wage rate wn and the price of the composite
intermediate goods k of country n.










The only difference between the sectoral goods ωj is their efficiency xjn(ωj), thus the
goods can be depicted as xjn. Υjn is a constant.
We denote by the trade costs of delivering sector j goods from country i to country n
by κjin. They consist of ad-valorem tariffs τ
j
in ≥ 0 and iceberg trade costs d
j
in ≥ 1. So,




in. In line with the gravity literature, the iceberg trade costs are modeled
as a function of bilateral distance, regional trade agreements, and observable trade cost
proxies as djin = D
ρj
ine
δjZin . Din is the measure for bilateral distance while Zin is a trade
cost shifting vector (e.g. RTAs or other trade policies). With perfect competition and
constant returns to scale, firms charge the following unit costs:
pjin(x
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Intermediate goods are characterized by the efficiency xj = (xj1, . . . , xjN) of producing
countries, and country n searches across all trading partners for the cheapest supplier.
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Countries differ in their productivity across sectors, which introduces for comparative
advantage. A country’s produced set of goods follows an exponential cumulative distri-
bution function, and the productivity distribution is assumed to be independent across

















where λjn shifts the location of the distribution, and measures the absolute advantage. In
contrast, θj > 0 indexes productivity dispersion, thus comparative advantage.
Each sector j’s composite intermediate good qjn is produced with a Dixit-Stiglitz CES
technology and ηj denotes the elasticity of substitution. rjn(xj) depicts the demand for



























The composite intermediate good qjn can then be used to produce intermediate inputs of
each sector k, for the production of final consumption goods.
Trade Once one solves for the price distribution and integrates over the sets of goods
where each country i is the lowest cost supplier to country n, the composite intermediate














where Aj = Γ [1 + θ(1− ηj)]
1
1−ηj is a constant. The prices are correlated across all sectors
(via cji ) and the strength of the correlation depends on the input-output table coefficients
γk,jn .
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The expenditure share πjin for source country i’s goods in sector j of country n follows




















General equilibrium Y jn denotes the gross production’s value of varieties in sector j.
Sector j, Y jn has to be equal to the value of demand for sectoral varieties from all countries











γj,ki (1− βki )Y ki + α
j
i Ii, (5.11)
where national income consists of labor income, tariff rebates Ri and the (exogenous)
trade surplus Si, i.e. Ii = wiLi + Ri − Si and Xji is country i’s expenditure on sector j
goods. The first term on the right hand side gives demand of sectors k in all countries i
for intermediate usage of sector j varieties produced in n, the second term denotes final









The model is closed with an income-equals-expenditure condition, which takes into trade
imbalances for each country n into account. The value of total imports, domestic demand
and the trade surplus has to equal the value of total exports including domestic sales,
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Y jn ≡ Yn (5.12)
5.3.1 Comparative Statics in General Equilibrium
In accordance with Dekle et al. (2008b), the relative, global change in a variable from its








change in trade cost due to the implementation of trade integration agreements.
2 Our exposition differs from Caliendo and Parro (2015) in that they use total expenditure on composite
goods instead of total production of varieties as endogenous variable. So, in Caliendo and Parro (2015)
the value of gross production comprises all foreign varieties that are bundled into the composite good
without generation of value added.
3 Instead of the goods market clearing condition, one can also use the expenditure equation Xji =(∑J
k=1 γ
j,k




as in Caliendo and Parro (2015).
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n (1− F j
′
n )− Sn, Ln denotes country n’s labor force, and Sn is the
(exogenously given) trade surplus. We fix sn ≡ Sn/B, where B ≡
∑
nwnLn is global
labor income, to make sure that the system is homogenous of degree zero in prices.
Equation D.3 shows the shift in unit costs occurring due to changes in input prices (i.e.,
wage and intermediate price changes). The trade cost changes directly affect the sectoral
price index pjn, and the changes in unit costs have an indirect effect (see equation (D.4)).
Once the trade costs, unit costs and prices change, the trade shares will change in re-
sponse. The intensity of this reaction is driven by the productivity dispersion θj. A
higher θj implies bigger trade changes.
Equation (D.6) ensures goods market clearing in the new equilibrium and the counterfac-
tual income-equals-expenditure or balanced trade condition is given by equation (D.7).








which is the appropriate welfare measure in this model.
4 See also Caliendo and Parro (2015). The feature of solving in counterfactual changes rather than levels
reduces the set of parameters and moments that have to be estimated or calibrated. In particular, no
information on price levels, iceberg trade costs, or productivity levels is needed.
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To solve the system of equations for multiple sectors, we again relate to Caliendo and
Parro (2015), who extend the single-sector solution algorithm proposed by Alvarez and
Lucas (2007). We start with an initial guess about a vector of wage changes. Using (D.3)
and (D.4), it computes changes in prices, trade shares, expenditure levels, evaluates the
trade balance condition (D.7), and updates the change in wages based on deviations in
the trade balance.
The model provides static level effects on real income and trade. As dynamic effects
of trade disintegration are not taken into account, it provides a lower bound for the
potential effects. Contrary to trade agreements, where effects occur after a phase-in5,
disintegration effects would potentially occur immediately.
5.4 Model Calibration and Scenario Definition
5.4.1 Data
Information on bilateral preferential and MFN tariffs is taken from Felbermayr et al.
(2018d). The trade elasticities for the manufacturing sectors stem from Aichele et al.
(2016) and for services sectors from Egger et al. (2015); see Table E.2 in the Appendix.
To inform our scenarios, we estimate the sector-level trade cost effects of the EU-Korea
agreement. For this purpose, we use the World Input-Output Database (WIOD) panel
data from 2000 to 2014. The data because provides us with need information to properly
identify the estimates of the gravity analysis.
Second, to calibrate the model, we use the Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP) 9.1
database that provides us the data on expenditure shares α, cost shares β and γ, bilateral
trade shares π, countries’ total value added wnLn, and trade surpluses S.6 The GTAP
data is available for the year of 2011. Hence, in what follows, our assumption is that the
structure of the world has remained approximately constant since 2011.7 We do adjust
5 This is particularly relevant for non-tariff trade costs. Evidence from existing FTAs shows that this
phasing-in process usually takes between 10 and 12 years (see, e.g., Jung, 2012).
6 We could calibrate the model using WIOD, but GTAP has much richer country detail; see Table E.4
in the Appendix. This is needed to properly capture the Japanese production networks in the ASEAN
region. Further, it can distinguish 56 sectors with 15 of these representing services, while the rest
shows agri-food and manufacturing sectors. The GTAP data has no panel dimension, and it does not
provide information on intra-national trade.
7 One could, of course, produce out-of-sample projections on the GTAP data, but we refrain from doing
so since this would entail additional measurement error.
5.4. MODEL CALIBRATION AND SCENARIO DEFINITION 129
our baseline for observed trade policy changes (new FTAs concluded, changes in tariffs)
that occurred between 2011 and 2018.
5.4.2 Learning from EU-Korea for EU-Japan
While the tariff changes agreed upon in the EU-Japan EPA can be simply taken from the
published text, it is harder to predict the extent of trade costs, which might be reduced
due to the numerous vertical and horizontal provisions on NTBs. In this paper, we prefer
a data-driven approach over the more conventional strategy to use expert judgment.
More specifically, we use an econometric ex-post estimation of the trade cost effects of
the EU-Korea trade agreement, which is in force since 2011, to approximate the trade cost
savings expected from the EU-Japan free trade agreement. This allows us to incorporate
sectoral heterogeneity, asymmetry between trade partners, and it also ensures that the
scenarios are feasible.
Data availability constraints allow us to solely exploit the EU Korea FTA as a proxy
for the EU-Japan EPA because CETA was provisionally applied in 2017, thus it is not
observable in our data. The Singapore FTA is still under negotiation and can therefore not
be exploited either. We argue that the EU Korea FTA sufficiently proxies the potential
trade cost reductions between the EU and Japan. Chowrdy et al. (2018) provide a detailed
study on the similarities between the EU-Japan EPA and the three new generation FTAs
(CETA, EU-Singapore, EU-Korea). The EU-Korea agreement is a modern agreement,
which, however, falls short from the most ambitious pacts that the EU (EU-Canada) and
Japan (TPP-11) have concluded so far. According to Chowrdy et al. (2018), the EU-
Japan EPA is still more similar to the EU-Korea FTA in terms of structure, coverage,
and depth. Both, the EU-Japan EPA and the EU-Korea FTA include commitments on
goods and services trade, public procurement, intellectual property and technical barriers.
A descriptive analysis of underlying trade patterns between the EU and the comparison
country substantiates similarities between South Korea and Japan. Korea has more
similarities to Japan in its economic structure than any other large economy with which
the EU has an FTA, i.e., it is a resource-importing country, has significant machinery and
automotive sectors, and operates production networks in Asia. Also, Korea and Japan
have similar bureaucratic systems and heavy government regulations. Thus, it is plausible
that NTBs share similar characteristics. Further, geographical distance from the EU is
similar to Korea and Japan. Likewise, cultural distance (language, business culture) are
also comparable. Clearly, our assumption is bold. We view it as complementary to other
papers that base scenario definitions on expert judgment.
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Note: The figure on the left hand-side shows the evolution of European imports from Japan, South
Korea and the Rest of the World. The figure on the right hand-side shows the European exports to
Japan, South Korea, and the Rest of the World. The data is normalized with 2011 equal 100. Source:
UN-Comtrade (2017), own calculations.
The subfigures of 5.3 depict the bilateral imports to (left) and bilateral exports (right)
from the EU28 member states from and to Japan, South Korea and the rest of the world.
Both figures are normalized (2011 = 100). Since the inception of the EU-Korea free
trade agreement in July 2011, both EU exports and EU imports to and from Korea have
outperformed Japanese trade with the EU as well as overall EU trade. Without providing
a formal proof, the illustrations highlight the possibility that the divergence is due to the
FTA. It also visualizes the hope that a trade agreement with Japan could trigger a similar
development. We turn to a more rigorous econometric analysis below.
We use a gravity model consistent with our theoretical framework to estimate the effects
of the EU-Korea FTA. The econometric technique isolates the effects of the trade agree-
ment from other determinants of bilateral trade such as price levels, the development
of the GDP, other trade policy initiatives, or changes in the structure of comparative
advantage. The gravity analysis follows exactly the work of Yotov et al. (2016). The
specification uses econometric panel data methods on bilateral sector-level trade flows
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for the period 2000-2014, which stems from the latest version of the WIOD data. The
sample for the main estimation includes all 56 sectors and the estimation is based on
more than 1.5 million observations. The use of panel data is necessary because it en-
sures to comprehensively treat time-invariant trade costs. Second, following Baier and
Bergstrand (2007), we are able to treat potential endogeneity of the policy variables of
interest. We follow gravity theory to properly define the set of fixed effects that are
needed for the estimations. Informed by the sectoral and by the panel gravity literature,
the main specification is estimated with exporter-sector-time and importer-sector-time
fixed effects to account for the unobservable multilateral resistance terms highlighted by
Anderson and Van Wincoop (2003). These fixed effects also absorb all other observable
and unobservable characteristics on the importer and on the exporter side. Following the
recommendations of Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2006) to account for heteroskedasticity
and to take into account the information that is contained in the zero trade flows, we use
the PPML estimator in order to obtain our main estimates. In the sensitivity analysis
we also obtain OLS estimates in the usual log form, hence zero trade flows drop out.
In order to take advantage of all the information contained in the data, we estimate the
main specification with data for all years in the sample. This is important because we
only have four post-agreement years in the data, namely 2011 until 2014. Bergstrand
et al. (2015) argue that the RTA estimates from panel gravity specifications may be
biased upward because they may capture general effects of globalisation. To address
this issue, our main specification follows Bergstrand et al. (2015) and introduces yearly
dummy variables.
Baier et al. (2016) further show that the effects of FTAs might be asymmetric. Following
Baier et al. (2016), we allow for the effects of the EU-Korea FTA to be different for EU
exports to Korea and for Korean exports to the European Union. In addition, we also
allow the pair fixed effects to be directional. Finally, in addition to accounting for the
specific effects of the EU-Korea FTA, which are of primary interest here, the main esti-
mate also controls for the presence of any other regional trade agreement that may have
impacted trade between the countries in our sample during the period of investigation.
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Xkij,t denotes the nominal bilateral trade flows from exporter i to importer j in sector
k at time t, which also include intra-national trade flows. EUKORkij,t is an indicator
variable that is equal to one for exports from EU to Korea for the years after 2010 and
it is equal to zero otherwise. Similarly, KOREUij,t is a dummy variable that takes a
value of one for Korea’s exports to EU after 2010, and it is equal to zero otherwise. Zij,t
is a vector of included explanatory variables, such as RTAij,t, which is an indicator for
the presence of any other regional trade agreement.8 The control variable is a dummy
variable, which takes the value one if both trading partners are part of the agreement at
time t and zero otherwise. Further, the vector includes an FTA dummy variable, which
takes the value one, if both partners agree to ratify a free trade agreement and again
zero otherwise. Moreover, dummy variables for being member of a customs union and
GSP-type agreements are included. Further, the difference between Economic Integration
Agreements and other free trade agreements is made. Economic integration agreements
go beyond pure tariff reductions and which are more difficult to quantify because they
also affect investments.
Finally, πkij,t, χkij,t and µkij,t are exporter-sector-time, importer-sector-time, and directional
sector-pair fixed effects, respectively. The two first ones control perfectly for the theoreti-
cal multilateral resistances and for all other observable and unobservable variables at the
exporter-sector-time and the importer-sector-time dimensions. The latter one absorbs all
time-invariant trade costs by allowing them to vary by sector and in each direction of
trade. In addition, it is equivalent to implementing the average treatment effect methods
to account for endogeneity of regional trade agreements following Baier and Bergstrand
(2007).
A key aspect for the simulation exercise are unbiased estimates to back out the actual
non-tariff barrier effects. Since we are able to also control for observable tariff lines, which
then gives us the trade cost elasticities, we can back out the pure non-tariff barrier trade
creation effects.9
Results based on aggregate trade data. Table 5.2 shows results based on aggregate
trade. The EU-Korea FTA seemingly promoted trade between the EU and Korea, which
is supported by the positive and significant estimates of the coefficients on each of the
two indicator variables. The agreement increased EU exports to Korea on average by
8 The EU Korea FTA is excluded.
9 adding 1
θk
(1 + τij,t), to the right hand-side of the gravity equation. Since we know the trade cost
elasticity 1
θk
, we can then back out the pure non-tariff barrier increase.
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52% and Korean exports to the EU by 14%.10 Interestingly, EU exports increased by
much more than Korean exports, reflecting an asymmetric reduction in trade costs due
to the FTA. This is not surprising, as evidence suggests that NTBs are more pronounced
in Korea than in the EU; a similar observation is made for Japan by Lakatos and Nilsson
(2017).11
Column (2) presents an OLS estimator and finds very similar results. In column (3)
we revert to PPML but differentiate between different regional trade agreements. Not
surprisingly, we find that membership to the European Customs Union boosts trade quite
substantially.12 One has to be aware of the fact that the estimates presented here are to
be understood as partial equilibrium effects, and that additional trade effects from higher
incomes as well as trade diversion effects are not accounted for. These will be dealt with
in the subsequent GE analysis.
Results based on sectoral trade data. The above evaluation of aggregate data illustrates
general patterns. However, for our multi-sector trade model, we require sectoral estimates.
Consistent with our theoretical model, we specify sector-level gravity regressions that are
similar to the aggregate one used above. Results are shown in Table 5.3 and in table
E.1.13
The table reveals several interesting results. First, in line with the findings of Table 5.2, on
average, the effects on EU exports are stronger than on Korean exports. However, there
is substantial heterogeneity across the sectors, and the available time span is relatively
short. 92% of the effects of EU-Korea FTA on EU exports to Korea are positive, with
84% being statistically significant. 73% of the estimates of the EU-Korea FTA’s effects
on Korean exports to the EU are positive, with more than half of them being statistically
significant. Another interesting pattern is the fact that the effects are on average stronger
for goods than for services.
The results suggest a relatively symmetric trade-creating effect ranging between 28% (EU
exports) and 34% (Korean exports) for the crop and animal production. This result can
10 The trade creation effects are computed from the estimated effects by applying the formulas 100% ∗
exp 0.42− 1 = 52%. All other point estimates presented in the table can be interpreted similarly.
11 Note that as of 2014, the last year in our sample, the agreement is not fully phased in and the economic
effects have certainly not fully ramped up either. Hence, the estimated effects can be understood as
lower bounds of the long-run effects. Also note that the asymmetry is not driven by the strong
depreciation of the Euro vis-à-vis the Won, as the inclusion of country-year fixed effects effectively
controls for currency movements.
12 Note that this effect is identified through the Eastern Enlargement of the EU only; this explains the
relative low effects.
13 The sector classification is based on the WIOD data. We map the WIOD sectors into GTAP sectors
using an appropriate concordance table.
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Table 5.2: Gravity Estimates of the Aggregate Trade Effects of the EU-Korea FTA
(1) (2) (3)
Main OLS Type of agreement
EU → KOR 0.42 0.42 0.43
(0.04)** (0.03)** (0.04)**
KOR → EU 0.13 0.17 0.14
(0.04)** (0.02)** (0.04)**
Other RTAs 0.02 0.2
-0.02 (0.01)**








Note: Own estimation, based on WIOD (2017) data. Note: Standard errors in parentheses, + p < 0.10, * p < .05,
** p < .01. Number of observations: 1,515,818. All regressions include a full set of yearly dummy variables for
international borders for each year in our sample. All regressions use PPML estimates, except (2).
be translated to the EU and Japan case because both regions have relatively restrictive
barriers for the agricultural sectors and once these decrease, we can expect equal trade
creation effects in both regions.
The Japanese market for agricultural products is the fourth important one for EU’s
respective exports. In total, EU’s agricultural exports to Japan are worth more than 20
times of Japanese exports towards the EU. Up until today, European firms face lots of
trade barriers for exports. The EU-Japan EPA will grant easier access to the Japanese
market. Equally, the Japanese exports in the agricultural sector will be granted more
opportunities to sell the products to the European consumers. In fishing and aquaculture,
the trade creating effects amount to 102% for the EU, while we have no evidence for
higher exports from Korea to the EU. This result is also plausible for the EU-Japan
example because Japan’s non-tariff barriers seem to be stricter compared to international
standards in the fishery sector. Satisfying the required quality and safety standards can
be costly. A trade liberalization with accompanying decreases of strict non-tariff barriers
will lead to higher trade creation effects for the respective trading partners (here: the
EU). In the area of processed food, beverages, and tobacco, the situation is relatively
balanced with positive effects of 29% on EU exports and of 18% on Korean exports.
Trade in textiles, apparel, and leather was stimulated as well, but the effects do not come
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Table 5.3: Aggregated Sectoral Trade Creation Effects (%) of the EU-Korea FTA
Trade Creation Effects in %
Mean EU(%) p-value Mean KOR(%) p-value
Agri-Food 32.24 0.02 25.63 0.07
Raw Materials 43.20 0.07 38.67 0.01
Textiles & Apparel 13.00 0.48 21.05 0.08
Energy 76.30 0.00 44.80 0.00
Chemicals 547.00 0.00 130.00 0.00
Metals 57.10 0.01 12.67 0.65
Automotive 53.60 0.00 30.60 0.02
Machinery and Equipment 50.15 0.03 15.45 0.49
Electronic Equipment 31.00 0.00 24.20 0.01
Other Manufacturing 60.50 0.00 15.40 0.17
Trade and Transportation 158.32 0.07 -11.20 0.11
Financial & Business Services 57.13 0.00 24.03 0.12
Other Services 54.49 0.00 15.25 0.52
Note: Own estimates, based on WIOD (2014) data. The table illustrates the simple mean of the coefficients and
p-values of all GTAP sectors, which aggregated into the depicted broad categories. A detailed table can be found in
the appendix (see table E.1). It depicts each of the coefficients, which are translated into percentage trade creation
effects. P-values below 0.10 denote statistical significance at least at the 10 percent level. If cell is blank it means
that no sectoral estimate could be provided due to the lack of sufficient transactions in this area. + p < 0.10, * p <
.05, ** p < .01.
out as statistically significant. This is different for the manufacture of wood and cork,
where, albeit from low initial levels, exports went up by 41% and 36%, respectively.
Substantial trade creation effects are reported in the manufacturing sectors. The effects
tend to be stronger for the EU than for Korea. The automotive sector (ID 20) plays an
especially important role. While Korean exports have grown by 47%, the EU exports
increased by some 41%. In contrast, EU exports in the transport equipment sector
expanded by almost 80% and is thus a much more asymmetric development. The effect
is mainly driven by the aircraft sector. Korean exports, on the other hand, did not
grow.14 Easier access towards each of the markets will likely make imports of Japanese
manufacturing products and its components cheaper. The same is true for Japan’s exports
towards the EU. Further, the econometric analysis shows strong heterogeneity across the
services sectors. Though, some effects are very large numerically, one has to be aware
14 The point estimates of the petroleum sector (ID 10) is 1.867 for EU exports and suggests that trade
has multiplied by a factor of 5. This is a somewhat surprising result, but has also been noticed by
Forizs et al. (2016). Accordingly, the EU mineral product exports increased substantially in 2012
and tapered off in the subsequent years. Supposedly the main drivers were increased EU oil exports,
liquefied natural gas and oil preparations.
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that they are mostly not statistically significant because the level of trade was almost zero
in the initial situation. The analysis reveals rather symmetric trade creation effects for
the construction industry (ID 27). While, the EU exports increased by 39%, the Korean
exports expanded by 26%. Retail trade is confronted with positive effects of 54% for the
EU and of 27% for Korea. The air transport services expanded substantially (In the EU by
84% and 33% in Korea). The effects on trade in postal services (ID 35) or in audiovisual
media (ID 38) are not statistically significant. The publishing and telecommunication
services exports from Korea to the EU could not benefit, while the effect is positive for
the vice versa case. Large trade creation effects are evident in both financial services
sectors, but the EU benefits more than Korea. This can also be seen in other services
sectors. Exports in the EU’s insurance sector (ID 42) more than doubled while Korean
exports grew by only 30%. The advertising sector (ID 48), public administration and
defense do not experience trade creation effects. Opposed to that, EU exports to Korea
increase by 117% in the health care sector. Korean exports to the EU in this sector
increased as well, but only by 6%.
5.4.3 Counterfactual Scenarios
In our scenarios, we assume that tariffs are decreased to zero, and non-tariff barriers are
reduced exactly as observed for the EU-Korea FTA. For that purpose, we use the results
of our ex-post evaluation of the EU-Korea FTA and the estimates of 1/θk reported in
Table E.2 in the Appendix to calculate the implied changes in iceberg trade costs following
equation (5.4).
There are several reasons why our results show a lower bound of the potential outcomes:
First, Japan is a larger economy than Korea. Evidence from the literature shows that
larger countries have more bargaining power in trade negotiations, which might lead
to higher benefits for the ones estimated for Korea. Second, the data available for the
structural gravity estimation to identify the causal effects for the NTBs goes from 2011 to
2014. Thus, the effects stemming from the EU-Korea FTA might not fully be observed in
the data because FTAs take longer time to fully unfold. Further, the model features only
static gains; the dynamic gains from trade are not modeled. They can be very substantial;
see Felbermayr and Gröschl (2013) for empirical evidence. Moreover, Japan has a different
way of serving foreign markets compared to most EU countries. Rather than producing
at home and to export, its firms serve foreign markets via local production. Through
this strategy, Japanese firms have insulated themselves from trade costs; however, as a
consequence, lowering trade costs is of relatively little advantage to them. So, Japanese
exports do not rise too much in absolute and in percentage terms. Imports, bound by
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the model to exports in order to keep trade surpluses constant at their 2014 level, and
cannot increase very strongly, neither. This also keeps welfare gains down. Since Jung
(2012) finds that FTAs take between 8 and 12 years to fully unfold, we square the trade
cost savings factors, such that we effectively estimate the general equilibrium effects
after an implementation period of 8 years. Given the findings of Jung (2012), we may
underestimate the true effects by as much as 50%.
S1: The counterfactual scenario replicates a deep and comprehensive free trade agree-
ment with complete tariff elimination in all sectors, between the EU and Japan.
Further, the non-tariff measures, modeled to the example of the EU-Korea agree-
ment of 2011, are reduced at the respective amount for the EU-Japan trade partners.
NTBs are not directly reduced for third countries, but will unambiguously affect
third countries via spillover effects. The baseline of this counterfactual scenario
assumes a world as of January 1st, 2018. Rising protectionist measures, such as
Brexit or ongoing trade war measures (e.g. tariff increase between the US and
China) are not regarded.
S2: Additionally, we compute a scenario that accounts for the exit of the UK from
the EU. We therefore construct a baseline, which anticipates Brexit. We model a
tough Brexit; i.e., the EU and the UK reintroduce tariff barriers, and non-tariff
barriers reemerge to the level observed with other WTO members. Brexit implies
that the EU-Japan EPA does not apply to UK. The actual counterfactual scenario
introduces the EU-Japan EPA between the EU27 and Japan, with the baseline
including Brexit. Tariffs are eliminated in all sectors. The change in non-tariff
barriers stems from the ex-post trade cost estimation of the EU-Korea agreement
of 2011. They are reduced at the respective amount for the EU27-Japan trade
partners.
S3: In the baseline of the third scenario the TPP-11 agreement of Japan with 10 other
pacific nations is already in place. On such a modified baseline, the counterfactual
scenario S1 is applied.
5.5 General Equilibrium Results
Our general equilbrium analysis captures all general equilibrium feedbacks, e.g. those
through trade diversion effects or changes in aggregate income. In contrast, the gravity
estimates presented in the previous section refer to partial equilibrium effects of the
agreement because incomes and aggregate prices are taken as given. The advantage of
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our approach is that no direct measures of observed reductions in non-tariff trade costs are
needed, and the simulation exercise is cleanly tied to the gravity estimation. The model
framework allows for drawing conclusions about the EU-Japan EPA on the structure of
bilateral trade flows at the GTAP 9.1. level of aggregation, aggregate trade (volumes and
openness measures), levels of value added, employment, emissions, and price levels, both
at the sectoral and on the aggregate levels, wages and overall price levels, measures of real
per capita GDP and of welfare (compensating variation measures). Simulating the effects
of the EU-Japan EPA in the frame of the model, two vectors will change compared to the
status quo: first, the vector that reflects tariffs between the EU and Japan and second,
the vector that reflects non-tariff measures. While the former is directly observable, the
latter one is indirectly estimated by the partial equilibrium analysis.
We report effects on marco- and microeconomic outcomes, such as the real income
changes, or sectoral value added and trade changes. In our Ricardian trade model, low-
ering trade costs allows countries to specialize more strongly in sectors in which the
comparative advantage is the strongest. But such a trade liberalization does not neces-
sarily lead to an overall welfare gain. Consumers benefit from lower prices, but they may
source from more inefficient countries. At the same time, governments lose tariff income.
Moreover, the preferential nature of trade liberalization gives rise to the Viner-ambiguity.
The FTA may affect world market prices such that some partner countries could be hurt.
Further, the European Union and Japan are both advanced economies with quite similar
patterns of their comparative advantage in the manufacturing industry. Once countries
have similar technological structures with similar domestic prices, a removal of trade
barriers incites small trade flow changes and relatively small welfare gains, respectively.
This makes the analysis of the EU-Japan trade agreement especially interesting. The
next part will now present the results of the simulations and gives insights about the
loser and winners in respect to the trade agreement members, other regions (e.g. Taiwan,
ASEAN, etc.) and sectors within these regions.
5.5.1 Changes in Real Income
This section depicts the real income changes for certain countries and regions (also see
equation 5.18). Table 5.4 shows the respective real income changes occurring because of
the EPA between the EU and Japan under the three different baseline scenarios. The
changes are sorted by the magnitude of effects of S1.15
15 The aggregation of the regions can be found in the Appendix E.4.
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The potential for growth in both regions is evident if one looks at the positive changes
in real income across all scenarios. Japan’s economy has been growing slowly after the
burst of a real estate bubble in 1992. Measured in purchasing power parities the real
per capita income has grown by only about 0.77% per year, while Germany’s real per
capita income increased by 1.35% per year. This resulted in a strong collapse of Japan’s
share in the value of world output (and demand, both measured in USD) from about 15%
in 1990s to the value of 5.6% observed today (Germany: 4.6%). Nonetheless, together
the EU and Japan account for more than a third of the world’s GDP. Indeed, Japan is
the third biggest economy of the world, after the US and China, and about 25% greater
than Germany. An impulse in the form of such a trade agreement can therefore lead to
relatively high changes of Japan’s and EU’s real income.
The effects for Japan are positive in all depicted scenarios. The largest positive changes
can be seen in scenario S1 and S3. When Japan ratifies the TPP (with Australia, Brunei,
Canada, Chile, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Peru, Singapore, and Vietnam)
the changes in real income increase slightly (0.308 to 0.314%) (S3) compared to the
scenario S1 because Japan’s economy is stronger under the existence of TPP and can
therefore also indirectly trade more with the European Union. The positive change on
Japan’s real income shrinks, once the baseline takes account of Brexit. Not only will
a Brexit lead to UK leaving the European Union, but this also connotes that the UK
dissolves from existing trade agreements. Japan will then have access to a smaller market
with less consumers and potential buyers of Japanese products, which explains the smaller
positive real income effects of Japan in scenario S2.
All EU countries are expected to benefit. Japan is one of Europe’s most important
trading partners, which explains the relatively large results for the European countries.
For Germany, the fourth largest economy in the world (measured in current market
prices), the effect of the EPA is the largest under Brexit because Germany will be able
to substitute large parts of UK’s initial trade with Japan.16 The ratification of a TPP
leads to slightly smaller positive changes than under S1. The positive change of the EPA
almost vanishes for the UK once it leaves the European Union (S2). Only indirect trade
channels lead to a small positive increase in real income of 0.01%.
The remaining countries and regions loose slightly because of the simulated trade agree-
ment. The largest losses can be expected in Taiwan, Thailand and South Korea, which
maintain close trade relationships with Japan. With the EPA in place, existing trade
relationships between Japan and these respective countries will be substituted with trade
16 Germany’s real income increases by 0.0775% in scenario 1 and by 0.0804% in scenario 2.
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Table 5.4: Counterfactual Real Income Changes, in %
Real Income Changes in % Real Income Changes in %
S1 S2 S3 S1 S2 S3
Japan 0.31 0.27 0.31 Europe, n.e.c. 0.00 0.00 0.00
UK 0.11 0.01 0.11 India 0.00 0.00 0.00
RoEU 0.10 0.10 0.10 Middle East -0.00 -0.00 -0.00
Germany 0.08 0.08 0.07 Africa -0.00 -0.00 -0.00
France 0.07 0.07 0.07 Latin America -0.00 0.00 0.00
Italy 0.06 0.06 0.07 ASEAN, n.e.c. -0.00 -0.00 -0.01
Vietnam 0.01 0.01 0.00 Malaysia -0.01 -0.01 -0.01
Rest of World 0.01 0.01 0.01 China -0.01 -0.01 -0.01
Oceania 0.01 0.00 0.00 Singapore -0.01 -0.00 -0.01
Philippines 0.00 0.00 0.00 South Korea -0.01 -0.01 -0.01
USA & Canada 0.00 0.01 -0.00 Thailand -0.02 -0.02 -0.02
Indonesia 0.00 0.00 0.00 Taiwan -0.03 -0.02 -0.03
World 0.05 0.04 0.05
Note: S1 simulates the EU-JPN FTA based on the baseline that assumes the world existing as of January 1st 2018. S2 simulates
the EU-JPN FTA under a hard Brexit. S3 simulates the EU-JPN FTA based on a world with a ratified TPP11.
towards the EU. A more profound explanation can be found in section 5.5.4. Interestingly,
Vietnam will be able to generate income gains as soon as Japan ratifies the agreement.
The gains will even be larger without the TPP 11 than with its existence.
5.5.2 Welfare Decomposition
The remaining analysis concentrates on the first scenario because the three main scenarios
deviate only slightly. Next, we decompose the aggregate welfare effects shown above into
different parts. More specifically, we distinguish the welfare effect attributable to (a) the
elimination of agri-food tariffs, (b) the elimination of manufacturing tariffs, the reduction
of NTBs in (c) the agri-food sector, (d) the manufacturing sector and (e) the services
sector. This different liberalization steps interact with each other: e.g., the benefits that
accrue from NTB liberalization increase when tariffs are lowered, too, as the lowering
of NTBs applies to a larger trade base. However, that complementarity effect (f) need
not be positive, e.g., if tariff liberalization leads to expansion of trade which is relatively
strongly affected by NTBs.
Figure 5.4 shows the main trade cost drivers of scenario S1. In both panels, the total
gains in real income changes are sorted in decreasing order. The sum of income gains
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Manuf-NTBs Services-NTBs Complementary Effect
Note: Both figures show the welfare decomposition of selected countries for scenario 1. The sum is equal
to the change in welfare in scenario 1.
for Japan is 18.8 bn USD. 11% of the total is due to the reduction of manufacturing
tariffs; agri-food tariffs add almost nothing. In Europe, the share of gains due to agricul-
tural tariffs is 6%, while tariffs in manufacturing sectors almost shred the increase. The
reduction of NTBs in the services sectors contribute 57% and 73% of welfare gains in
Japan and the EU, respectively. The relatively minor role of tariffs for welfare gains is
easily understood, given their low initial levels.17 The complementarity effect is positive
in Japan, contributing about 6% to total gains from trade. The reduction of NTB costs
allows Japan to diversify its input sourcing particularly in those sectors which benefit
strongly from tariff cuts (e.g., automotive). For the EU, in total, the complementarity
effect is almost zero.
A couple of interesting additional observations stand out: The UK slightly loses from
the elimination of agri-food tariffs between the EU and Japan because it is a strong net
importer of food from the EU where additional demand from Japan drives up prices.
The Rest of the World loses from tariff liberalization between the EU and Japan, but
17 As tariff levels are low to start with, “triangular” welfare losses associated to them are small, too.
NTB changes, in contrast, give rise to “rectangular” gains.
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slightly benefits from lower NTBs. The reason is that the former measure tends to
damage RoW’s terms-of-trade, while the latter leads to resource savings which tend to
benefit third parties as well. Finally, China is interesting: it loses from the elimination of
manufacturing tariffs, but benefits from the elimination of agri-food barriers: as Japanese
imports are diverted away from the US from where China imports a lot of agricultural
goods, China benefits from better prices.
5.5.3 Changes in Sectoral Value Added
The next part looks at the sectoral value added effects of the EU and Japan. For this
purpose, we concentrate on Scenario S1. When interpreting the findings illustrated by
Figure 5.5 one should bear in mind that a reduction in a sector’s value added does not
necessarily mean that that sector’s output shrinks and its gross exports shrink, since the
FTA can affect the sectoral depth of value added.
In the services sectors, value added tends to increase in both regions (except finance,
which shrinks in the EU). The value added in the service industries increases by a total
of 13.5 bn US-Dollar in the EU and by 9.2 bn US-Dollar in Japan. Generally, the services
sectors tend to absorb resources shed in the shrinking manufacturing (EU) and agri-
food sectors (Japan). This is due to the fact that substantial NTB (i.e. iceberg) cost
reductions act like productivity boosters for manufacturing, and this frees up resources
to be used in the sector with the smaller NTB cuts. The reduction of non-tariff barriers
provides great opportunities for the Japanese services sector. Compared to other OECD
countries, Japanese services still have a lower average labor productivity, which can be
ascribed to the relatively high protectionism against foreign firms in the domestic market.
The protectionist measures comprise market entry restrictions, licensing, or regulations on
foreign ownership. A liberalization will thereby enhance productivity in the competitive
sectors.
The sector with the largest action appears to be agri-food. It adds 7 bn US-Dollars value
added in EU while it sheds 3.1 bn US-Dollars in Japan. As detailed in the tables E.5 and
E.6 in the Appendix, this is an increase of 0.82% of value added in Europe and a decrease
of almost 1.5% in Japan. This result suggests the danger of a disruption in Japanese
agriculture, but one needs to bear in mind that the results pertain to the (very) long run,
as agri-food liberalization is staged over periods of up to 15 years.
Another sector of substantial churning would be automotive sector. Value added goes
up by 6.1 bn US-Dollars (6.6%) in Japan, while it shrinks by 4.6 bn USD (1.6%) in
the EU. This is because the EU has the higher tariffs, and NTB cost reduction is quite
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symmetric. A similar situation exists in the chemicals sector, which grows by 3.7% in
Japan but shrinks in the EU by 0.5%.
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Note: The figure shows the height of the value added changes in the EU28 (blue) and Japan (gray) , in
bn USD, in scenario 1. Source: World Development Indicators, World Bank..
5.5.4 Changes in Trade
Outcomes of the two trading regions look quite complementary in the agri-food and goods
sector. All the sectors that can generate gains in terms of value added are losing in the
other region and vice versa. The only exceptions are the electronic equipment, machinery
sector and the textiles and apparel sector. The services sectors behave similarly and
are confronted with positive value added effects in both regions. The EU-Japan trade
agreement would seemingly lead to diversion effects in the agri-food and goods sectors
and to output creation in the service industry. The next part will now look into the
changes of the trade patterns between Japan and its trade partners on an aggregate and
sectoral level. Table 5.5 shows the change of Japanese exports, while table 5.6 shows the
respective imports. Both tables are identical in their structure. The first column depicts
the sectors, which were already shown in the table E.5. The remaining columns show the
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changes of Japanese exports/imports with the EU28, China, ASEAN, Rest of the World
and USA/Canada as relative and absolutes changes (in mn USD). The last line shows
the aggregate, bilateral trade change per bilateral partner. Let’s first concentrate on the
Japanese export structure:
Overall, Japan is able to increase its exports towards all countries and regions. Not
surprisingly, Japan’s exports to the EU increase to the largest extent, by 79 bn USD,
which is equivalent to a 64% increase in Japanese exports towards the EU. The export
increases towards the remaining countries and regions cannot be neglected either. Chinese
imports of Japanese products increase by 23% (470 mio USD), ASEAN by 0.2% (200 mio
USD), USA/Canada by 0.33% (520 mio USD) and imports of the Rest of the World from
Japan by .2% (690 mio USD). Japanese imports from the EU increase by 74%, which is
equal to an increase of 83 bn USD. Other than on the export side, Japanese imports from
the remaining world decreases by 6.5 bn USD. Trade diversion away from third countries
and towards the EU is evident on the import side.
The largest export increase towards the EU can be expected in the automotive sector (20.8
bn USD). Further, Japanese exports towards the EU increase in the chemical industry
(14.9 bn USD). The same is true for the machinery and equipment, raw materials and
metal industry that export additional products worth 25.3 bn USD more towards the
EU. The increase of exports in the Japanese service industry is not negligible either.
The EU is already successfully active in Japan in some service sectors, such as in the
construction, health and machinery services, with an export volume of around 2.5 billion,
760 million, and 670 million Euros in 2014. Japanese exports in these sectors turn out
to be negligible so far, while in other industries a reversed pattern is prevailing. E.g.
in the whole sale services, water transport, and technical activities Japan achieves trade
volumes between 2.3 billion and 1 billion Euros while EU exports in the same industries
remain on a relative low level. Implicitly, the new trade agreement somewhat balances
the observed asymmetries across the different service sectors while at the same time there
are several service industries in which both Japan and the EU can increase bilateral trade
by eliminating non-tariff barriers and market access regulations, which are the only trade
restricting measures in services compared to the primary and secondary industries.
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Table 5.5: Change of Japanese bilateral Exports, in bn USD
Change of Japanese Exports to
EU28 China ASEAN USA & Canada Total
in bn USD in bn USD in bn USD in bn USD in bn USD
Agri-Food 0.39 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.41
Automotive 20.76 0.07 0.05 0.21 21.29
Chemicals 14.93 0.01 0.01 0.01 15.00
Electronic Equipment 0.71 0.08 0.03 0.03 0.91
Energy 0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00
Financial & Business Services 7.11 -0.01 -0.02 -0.07 6.96
Machinery and Equipment 9.18 0.40 0.17 0.37 10.66
Metals 5.48 -0.02 -0.02 -0.01 5.39
Other Manufacturing 0.11 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.11
Other Services 2.29 -0.02 -0.01 -0.04 2.18
Raw Materials 10.61 -0.03 -0.01 -0.01 10.53
Textiles & Apparel 0.94 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.98
Trade and Transportation 6.71 -0.03 -0.02 0.00 6.66
Total per region 79.21 0.47 0.20 0.52 81.09
Note: The list shows the aggregated sector categories. A detailed sector list can be found in the Appendix, table E.3.
Table 5.6: Change of Japanese bilateral Imports, in % and mn USD
Change of Japanese Imports from
EU28 China ASEAN USA & Canada Total
in bn USD in bn USD in bn USD in bn USD in bn USD
Agri-Food 11.51 -1.74 -1.71 -6.15 -5.45
Automotive 2.83 0.09 0.08 0.06 3.13
Chemicals 3.91 0.17 0.14 -0.02 4.16
Electronic Equipment 4.41 -0.30 -0.13 -0.06 3.77
Energy 0.00 0.01 0.29 0.03 2.71
Financial & Business Services 7.29 0.03 0.02 0.14 7.56
Machinery and Equipment 14.62 -1.24 -0.57 -1.03 11.22
Metals 1.15 0.07 0.10 0.02 1.62
Other Manufacturing 0.18 -0.01 -0.00 -0.02 0.13
Other Services 7.19 0.02 0.01 0.12 7.38
Raw Materials 10.46 -0.23 -0.22 -0.06 9.99
Textiles & Apparel 2.20 -4.18 -0.19 -0.12 -2.62
Trade and Transportation 17.36 -0.38 -0.27 -0.84 14.91
Total per region 83.10 -2.93 -0.99 -2.77 76.63
Note: The list shows the aggregated sector categories. A detailed sector list can be found in the Appendix, table E.3.
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5.6 Conclusion
This paper provides a quantitative analysis of the trade and welfare effects of the forth-
coming EU-Japan Economic Partnership Agreement, the so far largest agreement that
both the EU and Japan have concluded as of today. Its conclusion is of strategic impor-
tance for both the EU and Japan in times of growing protectionism and unilateralism.
We argue that the EU-Japan EPA is comparable to the existing agreement between the
EU and Korea in terms of how NTBs are treated by the text. Thus, we carry out an
econometric ex post evaluation of the EU-Korea, which entered into force in 2011, to
form expectations about how the Japan-EU FTA can affect NTBs. We find substantial
NTB cost reductions in all sectors. However, NTBs have fallen more in the Asian country
than in Europe. Interestingly and importantly, trade costs appear to go down in sectors
which are not explicitly covered by sector-specific provisions, probably due to horizontal
provisions and complementarity effects.
Feeding tariff cuts and NTB reductions into our general equilibrium trade model, we find
that EU exports to Japan go up by 73% (83 bn USD); Japanese exports to EU go up
by 63% (79 bn USD). In particular, there is very strong growth in Agri-Food exports for
EU, but from much lower level; substantial growth in automotive trade; large growth in
chemicals (pharma) exports for Japan. We find some evidence that Japanese firms switch
input sourcing from ASEAN countries to Eastern Europe.
Europe has large value added gains in the electronic equipment sector which shrinks in
Japan. In contrast, Japan gains in automotive and chemicals; both gain in services and
machinery. Overall, aggregate welfare effects are quite balanced in absolute size (between
15.2 and 18.2 bn USD), but three times larger in relative terms in Japan (0.31%) than
in EU (0.10%)
In general, the conclusion of the Transpacific Partnership (TPP) agreement (Japan plus
10 other Pacific countries) has little importance for the effects of the EU-Japan EPA. The
exit of Britain from the EU, in contrast, slightly reduces gains for Japan. In general, third
country welfare effects are small as input-output linkages contribute towards a diffusion
of the gains from trade; some ASEAN countries benefit while the Americas, Africa tend
to lose a bit from the FTA.
Appendix A
Appendix to Chapter 1 - Globalization in
the Time of COVID-19
A.1 Data Sources and Description
This section describes the data sources used for the construction of the COVID-19 shocks
and for the counterfactual simulations.
Data Needed for the Counterfactual Simulations. We use data from World Input-
Output database (WIOD) as our main data source for the simulations. It provides
information on bilateral intermediate and final trade, sectoral output and value-added
information, consumer and producer prices. With this data, one can construct bilateral
input-output tables, intermediate consumption and expenditure levels for 43 countries
and a rest of the world aggregate (RoW) (Timmer et al., 2015). In total each country
consists of 56 sectors, which we aggregate into 50 industries (see table A4) in the Ap-
pendix. This aggregation concerns mostly services; we keep the sectoral detail in the
manufacturing and agricultural industries. Data on bilateral preferential and MFN tar-
iffs stem from the World Integrated Trade Solutions (WITS-TRAINS) and the WTO’s
Integrated Database (IDB). The parameter for the productivity dispersion, hence the
trade cost elasticity is taken from Caliendo and Parro (2015).
Construction of the Shock. As described in the main body of the paper, we construct
a simple measure that quantifies the intensity of the economic shock. To construct the
shock, as detailed in equation 2.1, we need employment data across countries, regions and
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sectors, the duration of the policy interventions on regional and national level, data on
the severity of the policy interventions, and information on teleworkability of the sectors.
Duration of the Policy Interventions. To construct the measure of policy intervention,
we need the country-region-sector specific duration of the policy intervention, which oc-
curred due to Covid-19. We exploit the data from national ministries (e.g. Estonia,
Germany, France) and the Corona Net project, which is a joint project of the TU Munich
and partner universities. They collect data almost real time data on the laws, regulations
and other measures with which governments and public authorities at the national and
sub-national levels have reacted to the COVID-19 pandemic. The project has so far iden-
tified over 15 thousand different Corona interventions in 195 countries, which provides
us with the largest, most comprehensive source of information on government action re-
lated to the Corona crisis. Most important, the database distinguishes between different
types of national and subnational policies and the time period implemented.(Cheng et al.,
2020). This provides us with a regional variation of duration of different policy interven-
tions. As seen in the sensitivity analysis, the distinction plays a crucial role. Data about
the regional restrictiveness of the policy interventions are not available for four European
member states (France, Belgium, Sweden, and Lithuania). Hence, we take a different
source for the construction of the restrictiveness index for those countries, namely data
from the Oxford university about countries’ duration of quarantine.
Data on Covid-19 Policy Interventions. For the construction of this quarantine index
ψji we require information on the degree of restriction for each country (IndexClosurei).
We use the index on government responses to the COVID-19 diffusion of the University
of Oxford, where IndexClosurei is an index of restrictiveness of government responses
ranging from 0 to 100 (see Hale et al. (2020) for a detailed description of the index),
where 100 indicates full restrictions. The index is meant to capture the extent of work,
school, transportation and public event restrictions in each country. Further, using the
information contained in the data-set on government responses to the COVID-19 from
the University of Oxford, we account for the average duration of strict quarantine for the
respective countries. COVID-pandemics is still ongoing, which is why we do not have the
final number of quarantine days across countries.
Employment Data. Information on employment by country-region and sector is crucial
to account for the geographical distribution of sectors across each country. In Italy, for
example, Covid-19 hit the region Lombardy the worst, which lead to a longer shutdown
of specific businesses compared to other regions in the country. A sector that is solely
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Figure A1: Restrictiveness Index Across Countries
Note: The map reports the restrictiveness index for all countries in our sample. An index equal to zero means no restrictions
(i.e. in Sweden), while an index equal 100 means that the entire economy is set under a complete shutdown (i.e. France it
is 0.97. No information is available for countries shaded in gray.
located in Lombardy will therefore be hit more than a sector that is only located in
another region, such as Molise.1
The data of duration on regional level is then merged with the regional, sector level
employment data. This way, we can construct a measure that accounts for the sector
and region specific length of the restriction with which a sector is hit by the COVID-19
pandemic. This way, the severity of the effect in a sector depends on the geographical
distribution of the sector across regions, on the share of employment affected in each
region and on the labor intensity of each sector.
For the EU, we use the information contained in Eurostat. For the US we use IPUMScps
to construct employment by state(region) and sector of activity. To construct the em-
ployment shares across regions and sectors for China, we use two data sources: first, we
use data from the National Bureau of Statistic of China for the year 2018 on employment
by region and sector.2 The second data source comes from the 2000 census. The National
1 Data on employment at sector-region level are not available for some countries in the sample, we
therefore construct a simpler version of equation 2.1. In this case, the formula does not capture
the geographical distribution of sectors in the country, but accounts for the sectoral distribution
of employment and for their labor intensity. This is the case for Australia, Brazil, Canada, India,
Indonesia, Japan, Korea, Mexico, Russia, Taiwan, RoW.
2 See http://www.stats.gov.cn/english/ for a general overview of the data collected by the NBSC, and
http://data.stats.gov.cn/english/ for employment data at regional level.
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Bureau of Statistic of China provides the sector information for 19 sectors and 31 regions.
Sectors consist of one agricultural sector, one mining sector, one manufacturing sector
and 16 services sectors, hence a more aggregated sector level than provided in the paper.
We therefore complement the available data with the employment shares by prefectures
and sector from the 2000 census to construct the regional employment level for each of
the WIOD sectors. The census data is used to retrieve the employment shares in each
Chinese region and sector. We now have information for China divided into 340 prefec-
tures and 151 sectors (SIC industry code), which is then aggregated to 31 Chinese regions
and the 50 WIOD sectors.3 We then redistribute the most recent available number of
employment from the National Bureau of Statistic of China according to the shares from
the 2000 census data (see figure A2).4 This returns regional employment shares for each
WIOD sector and region in China.
Figure A2: Employment Shares Across Chinese Regions
Note: The map shows the regional employment over total Chinese employment, which is crucial to construct the geographical
distribution of the extent of the shock. We further have data on the within regional sector distribution needed to construct
the shock 1.
Teleworkability. We follow Dingel and Neiman (2020) to construct a measure of the
degree of teleworkability of each occupation. The information contained in the Occupa-
3 The concordance of SIC industry codes to WIOD can be retrieved from the authors. We aggregate
the 340 Chinese prefectures to 31 regions, because the COVID-19 data is only available at the more
aggregated, regional level.
4 The correlation of the employment shares across regions of the census 2000 data and the data from
the National Bureau of Statistics is 0.93.
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tional Information Network (O*NET) surveys is used to construct a measure of feasibility
of working from home for each sector. The information on O*NET is provided as NAICS
classification, for which we provide a concordance to match the WIOD sector classification
(see table A1). The policy interventions implemented due to COVID-19 explicitly exempt
the sensitive sectors from all restrictive measures, which is the reason why we increase the
share of teleworkable employment for such sensitive sectors to 0.8. Precisely, the sensitive
sectors are still producing their goods and services without a complete shutdown. The
list of sensitive sectors includes (ISIC rev 3 sectoral classification): Agriculture (sector 1),
Fishing (sector 3), Electricity and gas (sector 23), Water supply (sector 24), Sewage and
Waste (sector 25), Postal and courier (sector 34), Human health and social work (sector
49).
Table A1: Teleworkability by Sector
NAICS WIOD Sector Teleworkability NAICS WIOD Sector
sec-id sec-id Description sec-id sec-id Description
11 1 Crops, Animals 0.08 23 26 Construction 0.19
11 2 Forestry, Logging 0.08 42 27 Trade, Repair of Motor Vehicles 0.52
11 3 Fishing, Aquaculture 0.08 42 28 Wholesale Trade 0.52
21 4 Mining, Quarrying 0.25 44-45 29 Retail Trade 0.14
11 5 Food, Beverages, Tobacco 0.08 48-49 30 Land Transport 0.19
31-33 6 Textiles, Apparel,Leather 0.22 48-49 31 Water Transport 0.19
31-33 7 Wood, Cork 0.22 48-49 32 Air Transport 0.19
31-33 8 Paper 0.22 48-49 33 Aux. Transportation Services 0.19
31-33 9 Recorded Media Reproduction 0.22 48-49 34 Postal and Courier 0.19
31-33 10 Coke, Refined Petroleum 0.22 72 35 Accommodation and Food 0.04
31-33 11 Chemicals 0.22 51 36 Publishing 0.72
31-33 12 Pharmaceuticals 0.22 51 37 Media Services 0.72
31-33 13 Rubber, Plastics 0.22 51 38 Telecommunications 0.72
31-33 14 Other non-Metallic Mineral 0.22 55 39 Computer, Information Services 0.79
31-33 15 Basic Metals 0.22 52 40 Financial Services 0.76
31-33 16 Fabricated Metal 0.22 52 41 Insurance 0.76
31-33 17 Electronics, Optical Products 0.22 53 42 Real Estate 0.42
31-33 18 Electrical Equipment 0.22 54 43 Legal and Accounting 0.80
31-33 19 Machinery, Equipment 0.22 54 44 Business Services 0.80
31-33 20 Motor Vehicles 0.22 54 45 Research and Development 0.80
31-33 21 Other Transport Equipment 0.22 56 46 Admin., Support Services 0.31
31-33 22 Furniture, Other Manufacturing 0.22 99 47 Public, Social Services 0.41
22 23 Electricity, Gas 0.37 61 48 Education 0.83
22 24 Water Supply 0.37 62 49 Human Health and Social Work 0.25
22 25 Sewerage, Waste 0.37 71 50 Other Services, Households 0.30
Note: The table shows the degree of teleworkability of each WIOD sector. Zero would indicate that work cannot be
done from home, while teleworkability equal to 1 indicates that the entire work is independent of the location.
A.2 Additional results
In this subsection, we present different scenarios in which we gradually increase trade
costs in each economy. In practice, we increase trade costs from 10 percentage points to
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Note: The map reports the intensity of the shocks imputed into the model for all countries in our sample. A shock equal to
1 means no changes from the baseline, while a shock of 2 would imply an increase in the production barrier by a hundred
percent. See equation 2.1 for the precise construction of the shock.




Note: The map for the EU28 shows the size of the shock, which are imputed into the model for the EU28 member states.
A shock equal to 1 means no changes from the baseline, while a shock of 2 would imply an increase in the production
barrier by a hundred percent for an entire year. See equation 2.1 for the precise construction of the shock. The darker the
shade of blue, the higher is the size of the effect. The scale goes from 1, the least restrictive country (Sweden) to 1.12, the
most restrictive country (i.e. Spain).
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100 percentage points in each sector-country.5 For both shocks, the additional increases
in trade costs by 10 percentage points on average decreases the size of the real income
drops by 0.02 for Germany and China, 0.18 for Italy, 0.013 for the USA, and by 0.03
across all countries. Figure A5 shows the real income changes for Italy, Germany, USA,
and China and for an aggregate EU28 and the RoW. At the point 0, the real income
changes are identical to the changes of shock 1 shown in table 1.1. 100 is identical to our
less integrated economy scenario shown in the main body. The black solid lines indicate
the decrease in real income due to the increase in trade costs plus the shock (1) under
different degrees of openness of the economy. The grey dashed line shows the drop in real
income that solely comes from the trade cost increases. The blue bars show the decrease
in real income due to the shock (2). The green bar (at x-axis 0 - no trade costs) shows
the decrease in real income that stems from the shock. It is identical to the decreases
shown in table 1.1.
Table A2: Change in Value Added (in %) - Open Economy
Sector Italy Germany USA China EU28 Rest of World
in % in % in % in % in % in %
Agriculture -17.44 -8.52 -11.07 -3.41 -13.90 -14.76
Food, Beverages, Tabacco -16.94 -9.11 -11.01 -3.76 -13.04 -13.50
Mining, Quarrying -18.26 -6.36 -11.02 -3.45 -11.75 -14.92
Textiles -18.92 -5.92 -10.83 -2.05 -15.08 -13.40
Electrical Equipment -19.47 -7.21 -11.21 -1.52 -11.53 -13.69
Machinery, Equipment -15.77 -9.87 -11.04 -4.97 -12.35 -12.52
Motor Vehicles -15.62 -10.71 -11.10 -5.11 -12.05 -12.89
Intm. Resources Manufacturing -17.65 -8.70 -10.99 -3.57 -12.92 -13.55
Manufacturing, nec. -15.55 -10.06 -11.36 -5.65 -12.49 -12.97
Pharmaceuticals -16.59 -11.33 -11.27 -4.48 -12.92 -13.57
Chemicals -20.01 -6.32 -11.04 -2.93 -11.42 -14.40
Electricity, Water, Gas -17.47 -8.75 -11.04 -3.49 -12.97 -14.23
Construction -17.21 -9.03 -11.05 -3.92 -12.91 -13.75
Wholesale, Retail Trade -17.45 -8.77 -11.02 -2.97 -12.93 -13.85
Transport -17.60 -8.64 -11.08 -3.30 -12.94 -13.79
Accommodation and Food -17.17 -8.95 -11.05 -3.76 -13.89 -13.41
Real Estate -17.25 -9.04 -11.04 -3.75 -12.92 -13.06
Public Services -17.28 -8.96 -11.04 -3.91 -12.52 -13.63
Social Services -17.19 -9.11 -11.05 -3.94 -12.26 -13.04
Services, nec. -17.38 -8.87 -11.03 -3.60 -12.48 -13.73
Note: The table shows the sectoral value added changes, in % for selected countries, Italy, Germany, USA, and
China. Column 6 presents the value added results (in %) for EU28, which are weighted by the initial value
added by country. Column 7 shows the value added weighted results for all remaining countries. Further, sectors
are aggregated into broader categories (see table A3 in the Appendix)).
5 The main body of the text presents the results for a less integrated world with an increase of trade
costs by a hundred percentage points.
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ROW - decrease in openness
Trade costs + shock
Trade costs
Size of shock
Size of the shock in open economy
Note: The 6 sub-figures show the real income changes for the four selected countries, Italy, Germany, USA, and China and
the regions EU28, ROW. The x-axis presents the scenarios with different trade cost increases. At the point 0, the real
income changes are identical to the changes of shock 1 shown in table 1.1. 50 equals the increase in trade costs for every
country by 50 percentage points. 100 is identical to our less integrated economy scenario shown in the main body. The
black solid line indicates the decrease in real income due to the increase in trade costs plus the shock 1 under different
degrees of openness of the economy. The grey dashed line shows the drop in real income that solely comes from the trade
cost increases. The blue bars show the decrease in real income due to the shock 1. The green bar (at x-axis 0 - no trade
costs) shows the decrease in real income that stems from the shock. It is identical to the decreases shown in table 1.1.
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Table A3: WIOD Sector Aggregation
WIOD Sector WIOD Sector
sec-id Description sec-id Description
Agriculture 23 Electricity, Gas
2 Forestry, Logging 24 Water Supply
1 Crops, Animals Construction
3 Fishing, Aquaculture 26 Construction
Food, Beverages, Tobacco Wholesale and Retail Trade
5 Food, Beverages, Tobacco 29 Retail Trade
Mining, Quarrying 28 Wholesale Trade
4 Mining, Quarrying 27 Trade, Repair of Motor Vehicles
Textiles Transport
6 Textiles, Apparel,Leather 30 Land Transport
Electrical Equipment 33 Aux. Transportation Services
18 Electrical Equipment Transport
17 Electronics, Optical Products 32 Air Transport
Machinery, Equipment 31 Water Transport
19 Machinery, Equipment Accommodation and Food
Motor Vehicles 35 Accommodation and Food
20 Motor Vehicles Real Estate
Intm. Resources Manufacturing 42 Real Estate
9 Recorded Media Reproduction Public Services
8 Paper 46 Admin., Support Services
10 Coke, Refined Petroleum 47 Public, Social Services
16 Fabricated Metal Social Services
13 Rubber, Plastics 49 Human Health and Social Work
7 Wood, Cork Services, nec.
15 Basic Metals 37 Media Services
14 Other non-Metallic Mineral 40 Financial Services
Manufacturing, nec. 36 Publishing
22 Furniture, Other Manufacturing 45 Research and Development
21 Other Transport Equipment 50 Other Services, Households
Pharmaceuticals 44 Business Services
12 Pharmaceuticals 48 Education
Chemicals 38 Telecommunications
11 Chemicals 34 Postal and Courier
Electricity, Water, Gas 41 Insurance
25 Sewerage, Waste 43 Legal and Accounting
39 Computer, Information Services
Note: The sectors written in bold indicate the broad categories each WIOD sector belongs to.
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Table A4: Concordance WIOD Sectors - ISIC Rev. 4
WIOD ISIC Rev. 4 WIOD ISIC Rev. 4
ID Description ID Description
1 Crops & Animals A01 26 Construction F
2 Forestry & Logging A02 27 Trade & Repair of Motor Vehicles G45
3 Fishing & Aquaculture A03 28 Wholesale Trade G46
4 Mining & Quarrying B 29 Retail Trade G47
5 Food, Beverages & Tabacco C10-C12 30 Land Transport H49
6 Textiles, Apparel,Leather C13-C15 31 Water Transport H50
7 Wood & Cork C16 32 Air Transport H51
8 Paper C17 33 Aux. Transportation Services H52
9 Recorded Media Reproduction C18 34 Postal and Courier H53
10 Coke, Refined Petroleum C19 35 Accommodation and Food I
11 Chemicals C20 36 Publishing J58
12 Pharmaceuticals C21 37 Media Services J59_J60
13 Rubber & Plastics C22 38 Telecommunications J61
14 Other non-Metallic Mineral C23 39 Computer & Information Services J62_J63
15 Basic Metals C24 40 Financial Services K64
16 Fabricated Metal C25 41 Insurance K65_K66
17 Electronics & Optical Products C26 42 Real Estate L68
18 Electrical Equipment C27 43 Legal and Accounting M69_M70
19 Machinery & Equipment C28,C33 44 Business Services M71,M73-M75
20 Motor Vehicles C29 45 Research and Development M72
21 Other Transport Equipment C30 46 Admin. & Support Services N
22 Furniture & Other Manufacturing C31_C32 47 Public & Social Services O84
23 Electricity & Gas D35 48 Education P85
24 Water Supply E36 49 Human Health and Social Work Q
25 Sewerage & Waste E37-E39 50 Other Services, Households R-U
Appendix B
Appendix to Chapter 2 - COVID-19
Pandemic, Trade and Inequality
B.1 Fit of the Data - WIOD and Interpolated Eurostat
Data
The back of the envelope calculation distributes the sectoral value added changes of the
counterfactual simulation across regions within a country. The exercise requires that
the sum of the regional data from Eurostat matches the sectoral data of WIOD for
each country. Missing Eurostat data for the year 2014, the year of the World input-
output tables, is therefore interpolated with the average growth trend of the previous,
and following years on the most disaggregated sector region country level.1 The following
formula is used to interpolate the missing years: Given time t ∈ [2010, 2018] and i ∈
[2010, 2018], the interpolated value added φ2014 for the missing year 2014 (i.e. t − 1) is






, ∀φi 6= ∅ and φt−1 = ∅.
Figure B1 shows one example of the fit of the sum of regional Eurostat data with the
WIOD data for France. The left figure displays the sum of the French regional value added
across all sectors, while the figure on the right shows the sum of the French regional value
added of the manufacturing sector. The black dots show the original Eurostat data, while
the grey triangles display the interpolated values. The difference between WIOD and the
sum of the regional manufacturing value added is close to zero, hence the both datasets
1 If data for 2014 is missing, information for the years after 2009 are taken, to not capture the trends of
the last great economic shock.
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match perfectly. The total French value added (left side of figure B1) deviates slightly.
The total value added from WIOD is 2% higher than the one from Eurostat.



















Note: The figures display value added (in bn. Euro) for France for the WIOD and Eurostat data. The figure on the left
handside shows the total French value added between 2010 and 2018, while the figure on the right handside displays the
value added of France in the manufacturing sector between 2010 and 2018. The blue square in both graphs shows the size
of the value added shown in WIOD for the year 2014. The black squares show the available data for the value added across
all regions in France. The grey triangles show the interpolated values for the missing years.
Figure B2 shows all differences between the the value added values of WIOD for each
country and the interpolated data of Eurostat. The correlation of the two datasets is
0.998, which shows that the back of the enevelope calculation can be performed properly.
The subfigures, B3a to B3c, show the sectoral differences of the two datasets within the
selected countries. The largest differences in absolute terms can be found in the public
services sectors (i.e. Germany, France, Netherlands).
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Note: The figures show the value added (in bn. Euro) over the number of employees (in thousands) across regions of all
sectors. The figures highlight the region with the highest ratio (max), the region with lowest ratio (min) and the average.
The ratio, value added over employment is a simple measure of productivity.
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B.2 Technical Explanation of the Theory
Production of intermediate products. A continuum of intermediates can be used for
production of each ωj and producers differ in the efficiency zjn(ωj) to produce output.



















with labor ljn (ωj) and composite intermediate goods mk,jn (ωj) from sector k used in the
production of the intermediate good ωj. γk,jn ≥ 0 are the share of materials form sector
k used in the production of the intermediate good ωj. The intermediate goods shares∑J
k=1 γ
k,j
n = 1− γjn and γjn ≥ 0, which is the share of value added vary across sectors and
countries.

















Production Barriers and Trade Costs. Trade can be costly due to tariffs τ̃ jin and non-
tariff barriers djni (i.e. FTA, bureaucratic hurdles, requirements for standards, or other
discriminatory measures). Combined, they can be represented as trade costs κjni when
selling a product of sector j from country i to n










where tjin ≥ 0 denotes ad-valorem tariffs, Din is bilateral distance, and Zin is a vector
collecting trade cost shifters.2
Additionally, intermediate and final goods are now subject to barriers arising from do-
mestic policy interventions, vji that can potentially deter production. As described in
section 1.2, COVID-19 is modeled as a barrier to production in the affected areas. The
2 Iceberg type trade cost in the formulation of Samuelson (1954) are captured by the term Zin
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key difference when compared to trade costs is that the latter one only directly affects
tradable goods, while production barriers can also directly affect non-tradable goods.
Under perfect competition and constant returns to scale, an intermediate or final product
(trade and non-tradable) is provided at unit prices, which are subject to vji , κ
j
ni and
depend on the efficiency parameter zji (ωj).

















Note that vi is independent of the destination country and thus will also have effects on
non-tradeable and domestic sales. In the non-tradable sector, with kjin =∞, the price of
an intermediate good is pjn (ωj) = cjnvjn/z
j
i (ωj).
Composite intermediate product price. The price for a composite intermediate good
is given by















where Aj = Γ [1 + θj(1− ηj)]
1
1−ηj is a constant. Following Eaton and Kortum (2002),
Ricardian motives to trade are introduced in the model and allow productivity to differ
by country and sector.3 Productivity of intermediate goods producers follows a Fréchet
distribution with a location parameter λjn ≥ 0 that varies by country and sector (a
measure of absolute advantage) and shape parameter θj that varies by sector and captures
comparative advantage.4. Equation B.4 also provides the price index of non-tradable
goods and goods confronted with production barriers, which can affect tradable and non-







Firm’s output price. Due to the interrelation of the sectors across countries, the ex-
istence of production barriers vji has also an indirect effect on the other sectors across
3 see Caliendo and Parro (2015) for more details.
4 Convergence requires 1 + θj > ηj .
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Consumption prices. Under Cobb-Douglas preferences, the consumers can purchase
goods at the consumption prices Pn, which are also dependent on production barriers vji .
In fact, with perfect competition and constant-returns to scale, an increase in the costs









Households. In each country the representative households maximize utility over final
goods consumption Cn, which gives rise to the Cobb-Douglas utility function u(Cn) of










Income In is generated through wages wn and lump-sum transfers (i.e. tariffs).
Expenditure Shares. The total expenditure on goods of sector j from country n is





























5 cji is the minimum cost of an input bundle (see equation 1.5), where Υ
j
i is a constant, wi is the wage
rate in country i, pki is the price of a composite intermediate good from sector k, which can be affected
by production barriers. γji ≥ 0 is the value added share in sector j in country i, the same parameter
we use in equation 2.1 when defining the shock vji . γ
k,j
i denotes the cost share of source sector k in
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The bilateral trade shares are affected by the production barriers vji both directly and
indirectly through the input bundle cji from equation B.2, which contains all information
from the IO-tables.
Total expenditure and Trade Balance. Total expenditure on a good j in country n,










(1 + τ kin)
+ αji Ii (B.9)
To close the model, the value of total imports, trade surplus and domestic demand need













(1 + τ jin)
Xji (B.10)
Given the trade surplus Dn, labor ln, the measure of absolute advantage λjn and the trade
costs djni, the equilibirum under the domestic production barriers is a wage vector, as in
Caliendo and Parro (2015).
Equilibrium in relative changes. We follow Caliendo and Parro (2015) and Dekle et al.
(2008a) and define the equilibrium in relative changes, which has the advantage of an
exact mapping of the model to the data, and allows to identify the outcomes from the
change in the above defined policy intervention, the production barrier v̂ji . 7
This provides an equilibrium under the change of policy interventions as inCaliendo and
Parro (2015). ĉjn are the cost changes, which are dependent on the wage changes, ŵn
and the prices changes P̂ kγk,jnn . These changes directly affect the sectoral price index P jn,
and translate into changes of the unit costs (see equation B.12). Xjn are the sectoral




n (1− F j
′
n )− Sn,





. Ln is a country n’s labor force, and Dn depicts the trade surplus.
6 The national income is a function of labor income, tariff rebates Ri and the trade surplus Di, hence








a imports of country n in sector j good from a country i. More details can be found in Caliendo and
Parro (2015).
7 The interested reader can go to the work of Caliendo and Parro (2015), which provide a complete
explanation of the hat algebra.
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The trade shares (see equation B.13) then respond to changes in the production costs,
unit costs, and prices. The productivity dispersion parameter θj determines the intensity
of the reaction. Equation B.14 ensures that the goods’ market is clear and trade is










































(1 + τ k′in)













(1 + τ k′in)
Xj′i (B.15)
(B.16)
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Table B1: Concordance WIOD- Isic4 and NACE
Wiod Wiod Isic4 Nace Nace
sec-id Description sec-id sec-id Description
1 Crops & Animals A01 A Agriculture
2 Forestry & Logging A02 A Agriculture
3 Fishing & Aquaculture A03 A Agriculture
4 Mining & Quarrying B BE-C Industry (except construction and manuf.)
5 Food, Beverages & Tabacco C10-C12 C Manufacturing
6 Textiles, Apparel,Leather C13-C15 C Manufacturing
7 Wood & Cork C16 C Manufacturing
8 Paper C17 C Manufacturing
9 Recorded Media Reproduction C18 C Manufacturing
10 Coke, Refined Petroleum C19 C Manufacturing
11 Chemicals C20 C Manufacturing
12 Pharmaceuticals C21 C Manufacturing
13 Rubber & Plastics C22 C Manufacturing
14 Other non&Metallic Mineral C23 C Manufacturing
15 Basic Metals C24 C Manufacturing
16 Fabricated Metal C25 C Manufacturing
17 Electronics & Optical Products C26 C Manufacturing
18 Electrical Equipment C27 C Manufacturing
19 Machinery & Equipment C28,C33 C Manufacturing
20 Motor Vehicles C29 C Manufacturing
21 Other Transport Equipment C30 C Manufacturing
22 Furniture & Other Manufacturing C31-C32 C Manufacturing
23 Electricity & Gas D35 BE-C Industry (except construction and manuf.)
24 Water Supply E36 BE-C Industry (except construction and manuf.)
25 Sewerage & Waste E37-E39 BE-C Industry (except construction and manuf.)
26 Construction F F Construction
27 Trade & Repair of Motor Vehicles G45 GI Trade and Transport
28 Wholesale Trade G46 GI Trade and Transport
29 Retail Trade G47 GI Trade and Transport
30 Land Transport H49 GI Trade and Transport
31 Water Transport H50 GI Trade and Transport
32 Air Transport H51 GI Trade and Transport
33 Aux. Transportation Services H52 GI Trade and Transport
34 Postal and Courier H53 GI Trade and Transport
35 Accomodation and Food I GI Trade and Transport
36 Publishing J58 J IT
37 Media Services J59-J60 J IT
38 Telecommunications J61 J IT
39 Computer & Information Services J62-J63 J IT
40 Financial Services K64 K Financial Services
41 Insurance K65-K66 K Financial Services
42 Real Estate L68 L Real Estate
43 Legal and Accounting M69-M70 MN R&D
44 Business Services M71,M73-M75 MN R&D
45 Research and Development M72 MN R&D
46 Admin. & Support Services N MN R&D
47 Public & Social Services O84 OQ Public Services
48 Education P85 OQ Public Services
49 Human Health and Social Work Q OQ Public Services
50 Other Serivces, Households R-U RU Other Services
Note: This tables shows the concordances of WIOD, ISIC4 and NACE, which are used in the paper.
It further shows how the sectors are aggregated.
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B.2.1 List of EU Regions in the Sample
The following countries and regions are used in the exercise. AUT, Burgenland (AT),
AT11, Niederoesterreich, AT12, Wien, AT13, Kaernten, AT21, Steiermark, AT22, Oberoes-
terreich, AT31, Salzburg, AT32, Tirol, AT33, Vorarlberg, AT34, BEL, Region de Brux-
ellesCapitale / Brussels Hoofdstedelijk Gewest, BE1, Vlaams Gewest, BE2, Region wal-
lonne, BE3, BGR, Severna i yugoiztochna Bulgaria, BG3, Yugozapadna i yuzhna tsen-
tralna Bulgaria, BG4, CYP, Cyprus, CY, Kypros, CY0, Kypros, CY00, CZE, Praha,
CZ01, Stredni Cechy, CZ02, Jihozápad, CZ03, Severozápad, CZ04, Severovychod, CZ05,
Jihovychod, CZ06, Stredni Morava, CZ07, Moravskoslezsko, CZ08, DEU, BadenWuert-
temberg, DE1, Bayern, DE2, Berlin, DE3, Brandenburg, DE4, Bremen, DE5, Hamburg,
DE6, Hessen, DE7, MecklenburgVorpommern, DE8, Niedersachsen, DE9, Nordrhein-
Westfalen, DEA, RheinlandPfalz, DEB, Saarland, DEC, Sachsen, DED, SachsenAnhalt,
DEE, SchleswigHolstein, DEF, Thueringen, DEG, DNK, Hovedstaden, DK01, Sjael-
land, DK02, Syddanmark, DK03, Midtjylland, DK04, Nordjylland, DK05, ESP, Galicia,
ES11, Principado de Asturias, ES12, Cantabria, ES13, Pais Vasco, ES21, Comunidad
Foral de Navarra, ES22, La Rioja, ES23, Aragon, ES24, Comunidad de Madrid, ES30,
Castilla y Leon, ES41, Castillala Mancha, ES42, Extremadura, ES43, Cataluna, ES51,
Comunidad Valenciana, ES52, Illes Balears, ES53, Andalucia, ES61, Region de Mur-
cia, ES62, Ciudad Autonoma de Ceuta (ES), ES63, Ciudad Autonoma de Melilla (ES),
ES64, EST, Eesti, EE00, FIN, LaensiSuomi, FI19, HelsinkiUusimaa, FI1B, EtelaeSuomi,
FI1C, Pohjois ja ItaeSuomi, FI1D, Aland, FI20, FRA, Ile de France, FR10, Centre Val
de Loire, FR24, Bourgogne, FR26, FrancheComte, FR43, BasseNormandie, FR25, Haut-
eNormandie, FR23, NordPasdeCalais, FR30, Picardie, FR22, Alsace, FR42, Champag-
neArdenne, FR21, Lorraine, FR41, PaysdelaLoire, FR51, Bretagne, FR52, Aquitaine,
FR61, Limousin, FR63, PoitouCharentes, FR53, LanguedocRoussillon, FR81, MidiPyre-
nees, FR62, Auvergne, FR72, RhoneAlpes, FR71, ProvenceAlpesCote d’Azur, FR82,
Corse, FRM0, Guadeloupe, FRY1, Guyane, FRY3, Mayotte, FRY5, GBR, North East
(UK), UKC, North West (UK), UKD, Yorkshire and The Humber, UKE, East Midlands
(UK), UKF, West Midlands (UK), UKG, East of England, UKH, London, UKI, South
East (UK), UKJ, South West (UK), UKK, Wales, UKL, Scotland, UKM, Northern Ire-
land (UK), UKN, GRC, Attiki, EL30, Voreio Aigaio, EL41, Notio Aigaio, EL42, Kriti,
EL43, Anatoliki Makedonia, Thraki, EL51, Kentriki Makedonia, EL52, Dytiki Makedo-
nia, EL53, Ipeiros, EL54, Thessalia, EL61, Ionia Nisia, EL62, Dytiki Ellada, EL63, Sterea
Ellada, EL64, Peloponnisos, EL65, HRV, Jadranska Hrvatska, HR03, Kontinentalna
Hrvatska, HR04, HUN, KoezepMagyarország (NUTS 2013), HU10, Budapest, HU11,
Pest, HU12, KoezepDunántúl, HU21, NyugatDunántúl, HU22, DelDunántúl, HU23, Es-
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zakMagyarország, HU31, EszakAlfoeld, HU32, DelAlfoeld, HU33, IRL, Border, Midland
and Western (NUTS 2013), IE01, Southern and Eastern (NUTS 2013), IE02, Northern
and Western, IE04, Southern, IE05, Eastern and Midland, IE06, ITA, Piemonte, ITC1,
Valle d’Aosta/Vallee d’Aoste, ITC2, Liguria, ITC3, Lombardia, ITC4, Abruzzo, ITF1,
Molise, ITF2, Campania, ITF3, Puglia, ITF4, Basilicata, ITF5, Calabria, ITF6, Sicilia,
ITG1, Sardegna, ITG2, Provincia Autonoma di Bolzano/Bozen, ITH1, Provincia Au-
tonoma di Trento, ITH2, Veneto, ITH3, FriuliVenezia Giulia, ITH4, EmiliaRomagna,
ITH5, Toscana, ITI1, Umbria, ITI2, Marche, ITI3, Lazio, ITI4, LTU, Lietuva (NUTS
2013), LT00, Sostines regionas, LT01, Vidurio ir vakaru Lietuvos regionas, LT02, LUX,
Luxembourg, LU00, LVA, Latvija, LV00, MLT, Malta, MT00, NLD, Groningen, NL11,
Friesland (NL), NL12, Drenthe, NL13, Overijssel, NL21, Gelderland, NL22, Flevoland,
NL23, Utrecht, NL31, NoordHolland, NL32, ZuidHolland, NL33, Zeeland, NL34, Noord-
Brabant, NL41, Limburg (NL), NL42, POL, Makroregion Poludniowy, PL2, Makroregion
PolnocnoZachodni, PL4, Makroregion PoludniowoZachodni, PL5, Makroregion Polnocny,
PL6, Makroregion Centralny, PL7, Makroregion Wschodni, PL8, Makroregion Wojew-
odztwo Mazowieckie, PL9, PRT, Norte, PT11, Algarve, PT15, Centro (PT), PT16, Area
Metropolitana de Lisboa, PT17, Alentejo, PT18, ROU, NordVest, RO11, Centru, RO12,
NordEst, RO21, SudEst, RO22, Sud Muntenia, RO31, Bucuresti Ilfov, RO32, SudVest
Oltenia, RO41, Vest, RO42, SVK, Bratislavsky kraj, SK01, Západne Slovensko, SK02,
Stredne Slovensko, SK03, Vychodne Slovensko, SK04, SVN, Vzhodna Slovenija (NUTS
2010), SI01, Zahodna Slovenija (NUTS 2010), SI02, Vzhodna Slovenija, SI03, Zahodna
Slovenija, SI04, SWE, Oestra Sverige, SE1, Soedra Sverige, SE2, Norra Sverige, SE3,
Appendix C
Appendix to Chapter 3 - Quantifying
Brexit: From Ex Post to Ex Ante Using
Structural Gravity
C.1 The Model in Changes









































































1 See also Caliendo and Parro (2015). Solving for counterfactual changes rather than levels strongly
reduces the set of parameters and moments that have to be estimated or calibrated. In particular, no
information on price levels, iceberg trade costs, or productivity levels is needed.
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n (1− F j
′
n )− Sn, Ln denotes country n’s labor force, and Sn is the
(exogenously given) trade surplus. We fix sn ≡ Sn/B, where B ≡
∑
nwnLn is global
labor income, to make sure that the system is homogenous of degree zero in prices.
The shift in unit costs due to changes in input prices (i.e., wage and intermediate price
changes) is laid out in equation (D.3). Trade cost changes directly affect the sectoral
price index pjn, while changes in unit costs have an indirect effect (see equation (D.4)).
Trade shares change as a reaction to changes in trade costs, unit costs, and prices. The
productivity dispersion θj indicates the intensity of the reaction. Higher θj’s imply bigger
trade changes. Equation (D.6) ensures goods market clearing in the new equilibrium and
the counterfactual income-equals-expenditure or balanced trade condition is given by
equation (D.7).
To solve the system for multiple sectors, we again relate to Caliendo and Parro (2015),
who extend the single-sector solution algorithm proposed by Alvarez and Lucas (2007).
We start with an initial guess about a vector of wage changes. Using (D.3) and (D.4), it
computes changes in prices, trade shares, expenditure levels, evaluates the trade balance
condition (D.7), and updates the change in wages based on deviations in the trade balance.
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C.2 Details on Data and Results













































































































































































































































Note: Averages of sectoral bilateral tariffs across intra-EU country-pairs. Sectoral bilateral tariffs are trade-weighted MFN
averages of the product-level MFN tariffs imposed by the EU in 2014.
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Table C.1: List of WIOD Manufacturing Sectors
Sector ID Sector Name ISIC Rev. 4
1 Crops & Animals A01
2 Forestry & Logging A02
3 Fishing & Aquaculture A03
4 Mining & Quarrying B
5 Food, Beverages & Tobacco C10-C12
6 Textiles, Apparel,Leather C13-C15
7 Wood & Cork C16
8 Paper C17
9 Recorded Media Reproduction C18
10 Coke, Refined Petroleum C19
11 Chemicals C20
12 Pharmaceuticals C21
13 Rubber & Plastics C22
14 Other non-Metallic Mineral C23
15 Basic Metals C24
16 Fabricated Metal C25
17 Electronics & Optical Products C26
18 Electrical Equipment C27
19 Machinery & Equipment C28,C33
20 Motor Vehicles C29
21 Other Transport Equipment C30
22 Furniture & Other Manufacturing C31_C32
23 Electricity & Gas D35
24 Water Supply E36
25 Sewerage & Waste E37-E39
26 Construction F
27 Trade & Repair of Motor Vehicles G45
28 Wholesale Trade G46
29 Retail Trade G47
30 Land Transport H49
31 Water Transport H50
32 Air Transport H51
33 Aux. Transportation Services H52
34 Postal and Courier H53
35 Accommodation and Food I
36 Publishing J58
37 Media Services J59_J60
38 Telecommunications J61
39 Computer & Information Services J62_J63
40 Financial Services K64
41 Insurance K65_K66
42 Real Estate L68
43 Legal and Accounting M69_M70
44 Business Services M71,M73-M75
45 Research and Development M72
46 Admin. & Support Services N
47 Public & Social Services O84
48 Education P85
49 Human Health and Social Work Q
50 Other Services, Households R-U
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Table C.2: Gross National Income and Transfer Redistribution
Gross National Income Fiscal Transfers






























Note: Redistribution calculated based on the operating budgetary balance as stated
by the European Commission for the 2010-2014 UK average, relative to each coun-
try’s gross national income. The value of fiscal transfers that get redistributed make
up 0.06% of EU27 member states’ GNI and 0.30% of UK’s GNI.
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Table C.5: Counterfactual Change in Real Consumption of Welfare Decomposition in Scenario 1, in %
All Sub-Scenarios Transfers Only Agri. Manuf. Agri. Manuf Serv.
Tariffs Only NTBs Only
UK -2.61 0.29 0.01 0.05 0.03 -0.73 -2.31
[-3.21, -2.00] [0.29, 0.29] [0.00, 0.01] [0.04, 0.06] [-0.04, 0.11] [-1.11, -0.36] [-2.79, -1.83]
Austria -0.33 -0.06 0.00 -0.01 0.00 -0.03 -0.23
[-0.38, -0.27] [-0.06, -0.06] [-0.00, 0.00] [-0.02, -0.01] [-0.00, 0.01] [-0.05, -0.02] [-0.28, -0.18]
Belgium -1.36 -0.06 -0.00 -0.07 0.02 -0.20 -1.04
[-1.60, -1.12] [-0.07, -0.06] [-0.00, -0.00] [-0.09, -0.06] [-0.01, 0.04] [-0.27, -0.13] [-1.26, -0.82]
Bulgaria -0.46 -0.04 0.00 -0.00 0.00 -0.07 -0.35
[-0.54, -0.38] [-0.04, -0.04] [-0.00, 0.00] [-0.01, -0.00] [-0.00, 0.01] [-0.11, -0.03] [-0.42, -0.28]
Croatia -0.37 -0.05 0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.03 -0.28
[-0.44, -0.29] [-0.05, -0.05] [-0.00, 0.00] [-0.00, 0.00] [-0.00, 0.00] [-0.05, -0.02] [-0.35, -0.21]
Cyprus -1.45 -0.05 -0.01 0.00 -0.00 -0.19 -1.21
[-1.80, -1.09] [-0.05, -0.05] [-0.01, -0.00] [-0.00, 0.01] [-0.01, 0.01] [-0.33, -0.05] [-1.55, -0.88]
Czech R. -0.54 -0.07 -0.00 -0.04 0.01 -0.06 -0.37
[-0.65, -0.44] [-0.07, -0.07] [-0.00, 0.00] [-0.05, -0.04] [0.00, 0.02] [-0.11, -0.00] [-0.46, -0.28]
Denmark -0.93 -0.07 -0.00 -0.03 -0.00 -0.12 -0.72
[-1.10, -0.77] [-0.07, -0.07] [-0.00, -0.00] [-0.03, -0.02] [-0.03, 0.03] [-0.16, -0.08] [-0.87, -0.57]
Estonia -0.64 -0.06 -0.00 -0.02 0.00 -0.11 -0.46
[-0.79, -0.50] [-0.06, -0.06] [-0.00, -0.00] [-0.03, -0.01] [-0.01, 0.01] [-0.21, -0.01] [-0.57, -0.35]
Finland -0.49 -0.06 -0.00 -0.01 0.01 -0.05 -0.39
[-0.58, -0.41] [-0.06, -0.06] [-0.01, 0.01] [-0.01, 0.00] [-0.00, 0.03] [-0.08, -0.01] [-0.46, -0.31]
France -0.52 -0.06 -0.00 -0.02 0.01 -0.07 -0.38
[-0.63, -0.40] [-0.06, -0.06] [-0.00, 0.00] [-0.02, -0.02] [-0.00, 0.02] [-0.10, -0.04] [-0.50, -0.27]
Germany -0.60 -0.07 -0.00 -0.05 0.02 -0.09 -0.41
[-0.69, -0.50] [-0.07, -0.07] [-0.01, 0.00] [-0.05, -0.04] [-0.00, 0.05] [-0.13, -0.05] [-0.49, -0.33]
Greece -0.38 -0.04 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.04 -0.31
[-0.46, -0.31] [-0.04, -0.04] [0.00, 0.00] [-0.00, 0.00] [-0.00, 0.01] [-0.07, -0.02] [-0.38, -0.23]
Hungary -0.68 -0.06 0.00 -0.04 0.01 -0.05 -0.52
[-0.78, -0.58] [-0.07, -0.06] [-0.00, 0.00] [-0.05, -0.04] [0.00, 0.02] [-0.09, -0.01] [-0.60, -0.43]
Ireland -7.25 -0.09 -0.16 -0.25 -0.21 -1.48 -5.14
[-8.36, -6.14] [-0.10, -0.09] [-0.21, -0.12] [-0.40, -0.09] [-0.38, -0.03] [-1.81, -1.14] [-5.92, -4.36]
Italy -0.40 -0.06 -0.00 -0.02 0.00 -0.04 -0.28
[-0.47, -0.32] [-0.06, -0.06] [-0.00, 0.00] [-0.02, -0.02] [-0.00, 0.01] [-0.06, -0.02] [-0.34, -0.21]
Latvia -0.58 -0.05 -0.00 -0.03 0.00 -0.10 -0.41
[-0.72, -0.43] [-0.05, -0.05] [-0.00, 0.00] [-0.04, -0.02] [-0.00, 0.01] [-0.21, 0.01] [-0.51, -0.30]
Lithuania -0.47 -0.06 0.00 -0.07 -0.01 -0.07 -0.27
[-0.60, -0.33] [-0.06, -0.06] [-0.00, 0.00] [-0.08, -0.06] [-0.01, -0.00] [-0.17, 0.03] [-0.34, -0.19]
Luxembourg -6.36 -0.12 -0.01 -0.06 -0.02 -0.09 -6.05
[-8.79, -3.93] [-0.12, -0.12] [-0.01, -0.00] [-0.07, -0.06] [-0.05, 0.00] [-0.16, -0.02] [-7.69, -4.40]
Malta -4.63 -0.03 0.00 0.02 0.01 -0.32 -4.32
[-5.78, -3.47] [-0.03, -0.03] [0.00, 0.00] [0.02, 0.03] [-0.01, 0.03] [-0.48, -0.15] [-5.50, -3.14]
Netherlands -1.63 -0.09 -0.01 -0.10 -0.05 -0.24 -1.15
[-1.85, -1.41] [-0.09, -0.09] [-0.02, -0.01] [-0.11, -0.09] [-0.11, 0.02] [-0.32, -0.16] [-1.31, -0.99]
Poland -0.63 -0.06 0.00 -0.04 0.01 -0.08 -0.45
[-0.71, -0.54] [-0.06, -0.06] [0.00, 0.00] [-0.05, -0.04] [-0.01, 0.02] [-0.12, -0.04] [-0.52, -0.37]
Note: The baseline year is 2014. Bold characters indicate significance at the 10%-level based on 1,000 replications and an approximate normal
distribution. Confidence intervals in square brackets.
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Table C.6: Counterfactual Change in Real Consumption of Welfare Decomposition in scenario 1, in %, continued
All Sub-Scenarios Transfers Only Agri. Manuf. Agri. Manuf Serv.
Tariffs Only NTBs Only
Portugal -0.45 -0.05 0.00 -0.02 -0.00 -0.05 -0.34
[-0.56, -0.35] [-0.05, -0.05] [0.00, 0.00] [-0.02, -0.02] [-0.01, 0.01] [-0.08, -0.03] [-0.44, -0.23]
Romania -0.37 -0.05 0.00 -0.01 -0.00 -0.05 -0.26
[-0.45, -0.29] [-0.05, -0.05] [0.00, 0.00] [-0.01, -0.00] [-0.00, -0.00] [-0.07, -0.03] [-0.33, -0.18]
Slovakia -0.73 -0.06 -0.00 -0.04 0.00 -0.16 -0.48
[-0.86, -0.60] [-0.06, -0.06] [-0.00, -0.00] [-0.05, -0.04] [-0.01, 0.01] [-0.19, -0.12] [-0.62, -0.35]
Slovenia -0.42 -0.06 -0.00 -0.01 -0.00 -0.07 -0.28
[-0.50, -0.35] [-0.07, -0.06] [-0.00, -0.00] [-0.01, -0.01] [-0.01, 0.00] [-0.09, -0.05] [-0.36, -0.20]
Spain -0.39 -0.06 -0.00 -0.01 -0.00 -0.07 -0.23
[-0.48, -0.30] [-0.06, -0.06] [-0.00, -0.00] [-0.02, -0.01] [-0.02, 0.01] [-0.09, -0.05] [-0.31, -0.14]
Sweden -0.75 -0.07 -0.00 -0.02 0.00 -0.09 -0.58
[-0.91, -0.58] [-0.07, -0.07] [-0.00, -0.00] [-0.02, -0.02] [-0.03, 0.04] [-0.14, -0.04] [-0.75, -0.42]
Australia -0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.00
[-0.01, 0.00] [0.00, 0.00] [-0.00, 0.00] [0.00, 0.00] [0.00, 0.01] [-0.00, 0.01] [-0.00, 0.00]
Brazil -0.01 -0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.00 -0.00 -0.00
[-0.01, -0.01] [-0.00, -0.00] [-0.00, 0.00] [-0.00, -0.00] [0.00, 0.00] [-0.00, 0.00] [-0.01, -0.00]
Canada 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.00 -0.01 0.01 -0.01
[-0.00, 0.01] [-0.00, 0.00] [-0.00, 0.00] [-0.00, -0.00] [-0.01, -0.00] [0.00, 0.02] [-0.01, 0.00]
China 0.05 -0.00 0.00 0.01 -0.00 0.02 0.02
[0.04, 0.05] [-0.00, -0.00] [-0.00, 0.00] [0.01, 0.01] [-0.00, 0.00] [0.01, 0.03] [0.01, 0.03]
India 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01
[0.01, 0.02] [0.00, 0.00] [-0.00, 0.00] [0.00, 0.01] [0.00, 0.00] [0.00, 0.01] [0.00, 0.01]
Indonesia 0.01 -0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.00 0.00
[0.01, 0.01] [-0.00, -0.00] [-0.00, 0.00] [-0.00, 0.00] [-0.00, 0.00] [0.00, 0.00] [0.00, 0.01]
Japan -0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.01
[-0.00, 0.00] [0.00, 0.00] [-0.00, 0.00] [0.00, 0.00] [-0.00, 0.00] [0.00, 0.00] [-0.01, -0.00]
Korea -0.03 0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.00 0.04 0.04
[-0.08, 0.02] [0.00, 0.00] [-0.00, 0.00] [-0.00, 0.00] [0.00, 0.00] [0.02, 0.05] [0.03, 0.06]
Mexico -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.01 0.00
[-0.01, 0.00] [0.00, 0.00] [0.00, 0.00] [0.00, 0.00] [-0.00, -0.00] [0.01, 0.01] [-0.00, 0.00]
Norway 0.52 0.01 0.00 0.01 -0.09 0.02 -0.05
[0.10, 0.94] [0.01, 0.01] [-0.00, 0.00] [0.01, 0.01] [-0.19, 0.01] [-0.05, 0.08] [-0.17, 0.06]
Russia 0.01 -0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.01 0.00 0.01
[-0.02, 0.03] [-0.00, -0.00] [-0.00, 0.00] [-0.00, 0.00] [-0.03, 0.01] [-0.01, 0.02] [-0.01, 0.03]
Switzerland -0.01 -0.00 -0.00 0.01 0.00 0.10 0.06
[-0.16, 0.14] [-0.00, -0.00] [-0.00, -0.00] [0.01, 0.01] [-0.00, 0.00] [0.06, 0.14] [-0.01, 0.14]
Taiwan 0.13 -0.00 0.00 0.02 -0.00 0.05 0.07
[0.11, 0.16] [-0.00, -0.00] [-0.00, 0.00] [0.02, 0.02] [-0.00, 0.00] [0.03, 0.08] [0.04, 0.09]
Turkey -0.04 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.03 -0.01
[-0.07, -0.01] [0.00, 0.00] [0.00, 0.00] [0.02, 0.03] [0.00, 0.00] [0.02, 0.04] [-0.02, 0.00]
USA -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.00 -0.01
[-0.02, -0.01] [0.00, 0.00] [0.00, 0.00] [0.00, 0.00] [0.00, 0.00] [-0.00, 0.00] [-0.02, -0.01]
ROW -0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.01 -0.02
[-0.05, 0.01] [0.00, 0.00] [-0.00, 0.00] [0.00, 0.01] [-0.01, -0.00] [0.00, 0.01] [-0.05, 0.01]
Note: The baseline year is 2014. Bold characters indicate significance at the 10%-level based on 1,000 replications and an approximate normal
distribution. Confidence intervals in square brackets.
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Table C.7: Counterfactual Changes of Bilateral Exports of EU27, in %
Exports to EU27 Exports to UK Exports to ROW
Initial Initial Initial
mn USD ∆ in % mn USD ∆ in % mn USD ∆ in %
Panel A: S1
Agriculture 126230.6 -0.24 13150.26 -22.74 55078.38 0.85
[-0.72, 0.25] [-41.40, -4.09] [0.50, 1.19]
Manufacturing 2185370 -0.14 266238 -30.63 1726202 1.15
[-0.34, 0.07] [-34.45, -26.81] [0.86, 1.44]
Services 839322.2 -0.30 127694 -21.21 1097312 0.44
[-0.53, -0.06] [-24.98, -17.43] [0.25, 0.63]
Total 3150923 -0.18 407082.2 -27.42 2878593 0.87
[-0.36, -0.01] [-30.14, -24.71] [0.67, 1.08]
Panel B: S2
Agriculture 126230.6 -1.34 13150.26 40.06 55078.38 -0.13
[-2.97, 0.30] [-15.79, 95.91] [-0.50, 0.23]
Manufacturing 2185370 -0.31 266238 -4.71 1726202 0.35
[-0.62, 0.00] [-10.75, 1.34] [0.00, 0.69]
Services 839322.2 0.25 127694 -7.55 1097312 0.32
[-0.02, 0.51] [-13.07, -2.03] [0.05, 0.59]
Total 3150923 -0.20 407082.2 -4.15 2878593 0.33
[-0.45, 0.04] [-9.03, 0.72] [0.07, 0.58]
Panel C: S3
Agriculture 126230.6 -0.34 13150.26 -19.87 55078.38 0.95
[-0.84, 0.15] [-39.10, -0.64] [0.54, 1.35]
Manufacturing 2185370 -0.35 266238 -34.35 1726202 1.14
[-0.56, -0.15] [-38.42, -30.29] [0.82, 1.47]
Services 839322.2 -0.48 127694 -19.76 1097312 0.37
[-0.72, -0.24] [-23.72, -15.81] [0.18, 0.56]
Total 3150923 -0.39 407082.2 -29.31 2878593 0.84
[-0.56, -0.21] [-32.21, -26.41] [0.62, 1.07]
Panel D: S4
Agriculture 126230.6 -0.28 13150.26 -10.90 55078.38 -0.12
[-0.75, 0.19] [-14.53, -7.27] [-0.39, 0.14]
Manufacturing 2185370 -0.22 266238 -11.52 1726202 -0.51
[-0.44, -0.00] [-12.98, -10.06] [-0.70, -0.33]
Services 839322.2 0.28 127694 -4.29 1097312 0.21
[0.03, 0.52] [-5.12, -3.46] [0.02, 0.40]
Total 3150923 -0.09 407082.2 -9.23 2878593 -0.23
[-0.28, 0.09] [-10.37, -8.09] [-0.36, -0.09]
Note: The baseline year is 2014. Bold characters indicate significance at the 10%-level based on
1,000 replications and an approximate normal distribution. Confidence intervals in square brackets.
Domestic trade is not taken into account.
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Table C.8: Counterfactual Changes of Bilateral Exports of UK, in %
Exports to EU27 Exports to ROW
Initial Initial
mn USD ∆ in % in mn USD ∆ in %
Panel A: S1
Agriculture 12761.92 -4.46 17163.94 -6.31
[-37.27, 28.35] [-8.11, -4.52]
Manufacturing 116610.8 -32.19 187800.8 -10.00
[-38.09, -26.28] [-11.98, -8.02]
Services 160391.2 -20.85 253204.4 -0.43
[-26.24, -15.45] [-0.80, -0.06]
Total 289763.9 -24.69 458169.1 -4.57
[-28.29, -21.08] [-5.49, -3.65]
Panel B: S2
Agriculture 12761.92 96.05 17163.94 -7.20
[-14.14, 206.25] [-9.57, -4.82]
Manufacturing 116610.8 7.16 187800.8 -7.58
[-6.68, 21.00] [-10.24, -4.93]
Services 160391.2 -7.16 253204.4 -0.76
[-14.19, -0.13] [-1.33, -0.20]
Total 289763.9 3.15 458169.1 -3.80
[-4.83, 11.12] [-5.15, -2.45]
Panel C: S3
Agriculture 12761.92 -6.70 17163.94 7.11
[-38.26, 24.86] [-5.83, 20.04]
Manufacturing 116610.8 -32.33 187800.8 14.80
[-38.11, -26.55] [8.30, 21.31]
Services 160391.2 -21.33 253204.4 4.49
[-26.50, -16.16] [2.94, 6.03]
Total 289763.9 -25.11 458169.1 8.81
[-28.70, -21.53] [6.07, 11.56]
Panel D: S4
Agriculture 12761.92 2.50 17163.94 7.61
[-32.46, 37.46] [3.75, 11.46]
Manufacturing 116610.8 -17.84 187800.8 9.93
[-24.12, -11.56] [7.92, 11.94]
Services 160391.2 -18.79 253204.4 1.44
[-24.25, -13.33] [1.10, 1.77]
Total 289763.9 -17.47 458169.1 5.15
[-21.12, -13.82] [4.20, 6.10]
Note: The baseline year is 2014. Bold characters indicate significance
at the 10%-level based on 1,000 replications and an approximate normal
distribution. Confidence intervals in square brackets. Domestic trade is
not taken into account.
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Table C.9: Counterfactual Changes of Bilateral Exports of RoW, in %
Exports to EU27 Exports to UK Exports to ROW
Initial Initial Initial
mn USD ∆ in % mn USD ∆ in % mn USD ∆ in %
Panel A: S1
Agriculture 323832.4 -1.19 37293.41 10.05 1678540 0.25
[-2.13, -0.25] [1.73, 18.37] [0.17, 0.33]
Manufacturing 1172862 -0.91 223334.2 9.80 6719728 0.24
[-1.18, -0.65] [7.46, 12.14] [0.19, 0.29]
Services 721619.4 -0.96 98251.83 0.07 2389414 0.20
[-1.27, -0.65] [-0.89, 1.03] [0.16, 0.23]
Total 2218314 -0.97 358879.5 7.16 1.08e+07 0.23
[-1.23, -0.71] [5.24, 9.08] [0.19, 0.28]
Panel B: S2
Agriculture 323832.4 -1.96 37293.41 9.62 1678540 -0.04
[-4.55, 0.62] [-3.23, 22.47] [-0.20, 0.12]
Manufacturing 1172862 -0.68 223334.2 1.80 6719728 0.06
[-1.12, -0.24] [-1.35, 4.94] [-0.02, 0.14]
Services 721619.4 -0.33 98251.83 1.04 2389414 0.01
[-0.67, 0.02] [-0.37, 2.46] [-0.05, 0.07]
Total 2218314 -0.75 358879.5 2.40 1.08e+07 0.03
[-1.22, -0.28] [-0.29, 5.09] [-0.05, 0.11]
Panel C: S3
Agriculture 323832.4 -1.49 37293.41 22.05 1678540 0.27
[-2.42, -0.55] [11.28, 32.81] [0.14, 0.39]
Manufacturing 1172862 -1.35 223334.2 34.19 6719728 0.03
[-1.64, -1.06] [28.66, 39.73] [-0.05, 0.10]
Services 721619.4 -1.13 98251.83 9.04 2389414 0.11
[-1.42, -0.83] [6.21, 11.87] [0.07, 0.14]
Total 2218314 -1.30 358879.5 26.05 1.08e+07 0.08
[-1.58, -1.02] [21.96, 30.13] [0.02, 0.15]
Panel D: S4
Agriculture 323832.4 -0.57 37293.41 -2.51 1678540 0.25
[-1.38, 0.23] [-5.76, 0.74] [0.21, 0.29]
Manufacturing 1172862 0.19 223334.2 9.96 6719728 0.16
[-0.10, 0.48] [8.06, 11.87] [0.12, 0.20]
Services 721619.4 -0.07 98251.83 -4.28 2389414 0.19
[-0.40, 0.26] [-5.07, -3.50] [0.16, 0.21]
Total 2218314 -0.01 358879.5 4.77 1.08e+07 0.18
[-0.25, 0.24] [3.35, 6.18] [0.15, 0.21]
Note: The baseline year is 2014. Bold characters indicate significance at the 10%-level based on
1,000 replications and an approximate normal distribution. Confidence intervals in square brackets.
Domestic trade is not taken into account.
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Table C.10: Counterfactual Changes of Gross Trade Flows, in %
Initial Exports Changes in Exports in % Initial Imports Changes in Imports in %
bn USD S1 S2 S3 S4 bn USD S1 S2 S3 S4
Panel A: UK
Agriculture 29.93 -5.52 36.83 1.22 5.43 50.44 1.50 17.56 11.12 -4.70
[-19.64, 8.59] [-9.66, 83.33] [-14.70, 17.13] [-9.96, 20.81] [-7.01, 10.02] [0.76, 34.35] [1.00, 21.24] [-7.32, -2.08]
Manufacturing 304.41 -18.50 -1.94 -3.25 -0.71 489.57 -12.19 -1.74 -3.08 -1.72
[-21.23, -15.76] [-7.27, 3.40] [-7.57, 1.06] [-3.11, 1.70] [-13.65, -10.72] [-4.25, 0.77] [-5.17, -1.00] [-2.70, -0.74]
Services 413.60 -8.35 -3.24 -5.52 -6.41 225.95 -11.96 -3.81 -7.24 -4.29
[-10.44, -6.26] [-5.93, -0.56] [-7.62, -3.43] [-8.39, -4.42] [-14.09, -9.82] [-7.05, -0.58] [-9.64, -4.83] [-5.09, -3.48]
Total 747.93 -12.36 -1.11 -4.33 -3.61 765.96 -11.22 -1.08 -3.37 -2.67
[-24.80, 0.07] [-42.83, 40.62] [-15.28, 6.63] [-15.91, 8.69] [-22.82, 0.38] [-20.09, 17.93] [-17.67, 10.93] [-5.37, 0.02]
Panel B: EU27
Agriculture 194.46 -1.45 1.80 -1.30 -0.96 462.82 -1.02 0.91 -1.32 -0.41
[-2.80, -0.11] [-1.23, 4.84] [-2.67, 0.07] [-1.40, -0.51] [-1.49, -0.54] [-0.30, 2.12] [-1.77, -0.86] [-0.81, -0.01]
Manufacturing 4177.81 -1.55 -0.32 -1.90 -1.06 3474.84 -1.48 -0.18 -1.76 -0.67
[-1.80, -1.30] [-0.70, 0.06] [-2.16, -1.64] [-1.26, -0.87] [-1.63, -1.32] [-0.46, 0.09] [-1.92, -1.60] [-0.80, -0.55]
Services 2064.33 -1.20 -0.20 -1.22 -0.04 1721.33 -2.49 -0.68 -2.69 -1.64
[-1.46, -0.94] [-0.60, 0.20] [-1.49, -0.95] [-0.22, 0.13] [-2.91, -2.07] [-1.30, -0.06] [-3.11, -2.28] [-2.07, -1.22]
Total 6,436.60 -1.43 -0.22 -1.67 -0.73 5,659.00 -1.75 -0.25 -2.01 -0.95
[-2.27, -0.59] [-2.66, 2.22] [-2.62, -0.71] [-1.54, 0.07] [-2.79, -0.71] [-1.59, 1.10] [-2.99, -1.03] [-1.85, -0.05]
Panel C: RoW
Agriculture 2039.67 0.20 -0.17 0.39 0.07 1750.78 0.21 -0.11 0.35 0.31
[0.11, 0.29] [-0.58, 0.24] [0.29, 0.49] [-0.05, 0.19] [0.12, 0.29] [-0.27, 0.04] [0.20, 0.51] [0.25, 0.37]
Manufacturing 8115.92 0.34 0.00 0.77 0.43 8633.73 0.20 -0.05 0.57 0.24
[0.27, 0.41] [-0.12, 0.12] [0.66, 0.88] [0.38, 0.49] [0.17, 0.23] [-0.13, 0.03] [0.47, 0.67] [0.20, 0.27]
Services 3209.29 -0.07 -0.03 0.10 -0.01 3739.93 0.23 0.05 0.48 0.28
[-0.12, -0.01] [-0.10, 0.03] [0.01, 0.19] [-0.06, 0.05] [0.17, 0.28] [-0.05, 0.15] [0.37, 0.59] [0.23, 0.33]
Total 13,364.88 0.22 -0.03 0.55 0.27 14,124.44 0.21 -0.03 0.52 0.26
[-0.06, 0.50] [-0.32, 0.25] [0.10, 1.00] [-0.06, 0.60] [0.14, 0.27] [-0.20, 0.14] [0.33, 0.71] [0.19, 0.33]
Note: The baseline year is 2014. Bold characters indicate significance at the 10%-level based on 1,000 replications and an approximate
normal distribution.
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Table C.11: Counterfactual Changes of Real Wages, in %
Change of Real Wages, in % Change of Real Wages, in %
S1 S2 S3 S4 S1 S2 S3 S4
UK -3.37 -0.95 -1.78 -0.36 Portugal -0.45 -0.13 -0.47 -0.38
[-3.38, -3.37] [-0.96, -0.94] [-1.79, -1.77] [-0.37, -0.36] [-0.46, -0.45] [-0.13, -0.13] [-0.47, -0.47] [-0.38, -0.38]
Austria -0.28 -0.08 -0.29 -0.25 Romania -0.33 -0.16 -0.35 -0.29
[-0.28, -0.28] [-0.08, -0.08] [-0.29, -0.29] [-0.25, -0.25] [-0.33, -0.33] [-0.16, -0.16] [-0.35, -0.35] [-0.29, -0.29]
Belgium -1.27 -0.27 -1.31 -0.94 Slovakia -0.58 -0.28 -0.59 -0.35
[-1.28, -1.27] [-0.27, -0.27] [-1.31, -1.30] [-0.94, -0.94] [-0.58, -0.58] [-0.28, -0.28] [-0.60, -0.59] [-0.35, -0.34]
Bulgaria -0.51 -0.25 -0.51 -0.44 Slovenia -0.35 -0.15 -0.35 -0.30
[-0.51, -0.51] [-0.25, -0.24] [-0.52, -0.51] [-0.44, -0.44] [-0.35, -0.34] [-0.15, -0.15] [-0.36, -0.35] [-0.30, -0.30]
Croatia -0.30 -0.04 -0.30 -0.26 Spain -0.35 -0.13 -0.37 -0.26
[-0.30, -0.30] [-0.04, -0.04] [-0.30, -0.30] [-0.26, -0.26] [-0.35, -0.35] [-0.14, -0.13] [-0.37, -0.37] [-0.27, -0.26]
Cyprus -1.49 -0.37 -1.48 -1.09 Sweden -0.68 -0.14 -0.69 -0.60
[-1.49, -1.48] [-0.37, -0.36] [-1.49, -1.48] [-1.10, -1.09] [-0.68, -0.67] [-0.15, -0.14] [-0.70, -0.69] [-0.60, -0.60]
Czech R. -0.57 -0.28 -0.61 -0.45 Australia -0.00 -0.00 0.14 0.01
[-0.57, -0.57] [-0.28, -0.28] [-0.61, -0.60] [-0.46, -0.45] [-0.00, -0.00] [-0.00, -0.00] [0.14, 0.14] [0.01, 0.01]
Denmark -0.75 -0.15 -0.75 -0.65 Brasil -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 0.01
[-0.75, -0.75] [-0.15, -0.14] [-0.76, -0.75] [-0.65, -0.65] [-0.00, -0.00] [-0.00, -0.00] [-0.00, -0.00] [0.01, 0.01]
Estonia -0.67 -0.26 -0.67 -0.60 Canada -0.00 -0.01 0.28 0.01
[-0.67, -0.66] [-0.27, -0.26] [-0.67, -0.67] [-0.60, -0.60] [-0.00, -0.00] [-0.01, -0.01] [0.28, 0.28] [0.01, 0.01]
Finland -0.46 -0.08 -0.47 -0.42 China 0.00 0.00 0.08 0.02
[-0.46, -0.46] [-0.08, -0.08] [-0.47, -0.47] [-0.42, -0.42] [0.00, 0.00] [0.00, 0.00] [0.08, 0.08] [0.02, 0.02]
France -0.50 -0.10 -0.52 -0.38 India 0.00 0.00 0.18 0.05
[-0.50, -0.50] [-0.10, -0.10] [-0.52, -0.52] [-0.38, -0.37] [0.00, 0.00] [-0.00, 0.00] [0.18, 0.18] [0.05, 0.05]
Germany -0.53 -0.14 -0.55 -0.42 Indonesia 0.00 -0.00 -0.00 0.01
[-0.53, -0.53] [-0.14, -0.14] [-0.55, -0.55] [-0.42, -0.42] [0.00, 0.00] [-0.00, 0.00] [-0.00, 0.00] [0.01, 0.01]
Greece -0.40 -0.13 -0.40 -0.35 Japan 0.00 0.01 0.07 0.01
[-0.40, -0.39] [-0.13, -0.13] [-0.40, -0.40] [-0.35, -0.35] [0.00, 0.01] [0.01, 0.01] [0.07, 0.07] [0.01, 0.01]
Hungary -0.69 -0.27 -0.71 -0.54 Korea -0.08 -0.09 0.09 0.01
[-0.69, -0.69] [-0.27, -0.27] [-0.71, -0.71] [-0.54, -0.54] [-0.08, -0.08] [-0.09, -0.09] [0.09, 0.09] [0.01, 0.01]
Ireland -5.13 -1.59 -5.13 -4.01 Mexico -0.01 -0.02 0.04 -0.00
[-5.13, -5.12] [-1.60, -1.59] [-5.14, -5.12] [-4.02, -4.01] [-0.01, -0.01] [-0.02, -0.02] [0.04, 0.04] [-0.00, -0.00]
Italy -0.34 -0.08 -0.36 -0.28 Norway 0.04 -0.03 0.08 -0.08
[-0.34, -0.34] [-0.08, -0.08] [-0.36, -0.36] [-0.28, -0.28] [0.03, 0.04] [-0.04, -0.02] [0.08, 0.09] [-0.08, -0.08]
Latvia -0.58 -0.16 -0.58 -0.50 Russia -0.02 -0.06 -0.02 0.01
[-0.58, -0.58] [-0.16, -0.16] [-0.59, -0.58] [-0.50, -0.50] [-0.02, -0.02] [-0.06, -0.05] [-0.02, -0.02] [0.01, 0.01]
Lithuania -0.42 -0.10 -0.44 -0.38 Switzerland -0.05 0.00 -0.05 0.04
[-0.43, -0.42] [-0.10, -0.10] [-0.44, -0.44] [-0.38, -0.38] [-0.05, -0.05] [0.00, 0.00] [-0.05, -0.05] [0.04, 0.04]
Luxembourg -3.61 0.70 -3.66 -2.85 Taiwan 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02
[-3.62, -3.60] [0.69, 0.71] [-3.67, -3.66] [-2.85, -2.84] [0.02, 0.03] [0.02, 0.02] [0.02, 0.02] [0.02, 0.02]
Malta -5.54 -0.81 -5.51 -3.48 Turkey -0.06 -0.08 -0.09 0.01
[-5.55, -5.53] [-0.83, -0.80] [-5.52, -5.50] [-3.49, -3.48] [-0.06, -0.06] [-0.08, -0.08] [-0.10, -0.09] [0.01, 0.01]
Netherlands -1.14 -0.33 -1.15 -0.89 USA -0.00 -0.00 0.12 0.01
[-1.14, -1.14] [-0.34, -0.33] [-1.15, -1.15] [-0.89, -0.89] [-0.00, -0.00] [-0.00, -0.00] [0.12, 0.12] [0.01, 0.01]
Poland -0.61 -0.23 -0.63 -0.45 ROW -0.00 0.01 -0.01 0.04
[-0.61, -0.60] [-0.23, -0.23] [-0.63, -0.63] [-0.45, -0.44] [-0.00, -0.00] [0.01, 0.01] [-0.01, -0.01] [0.04, 0.04]
Note: The baseline year is 2014. Bold characters indicate significance at the 10%-level based on 1,000 replications and an approximate normal
distribution. Confidence intervals in square brackets.
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Table C.12: Counterfactual Changes of Sectoral Value Added of Agricultural and Manufacturing Goods in UK, in %
initial VA Change of Sectoral Value Added in %
in mn USD S1 S2 S3 S4
Crops & Animals 18168 7.87 6.71 8.30 -2.22
[3.63, 12.11] [0.91, 12.50] [4.14, 12.46] [-3.24, -1.20]
Forestry & Logging 300 -1.96 -1.28 -1.22 -0.10
[-7.28, 3.35] [-7.47, 4.90] [-6.59, 4.15] [-1.87, 1.67]
Fishing & Aquaculture 1099 -15.83 -7.68 -10.36 -15.11
[-27.09, -4.56] [-27.12, 11.76] [-22.42, 1.71] [-26.85, -3.36]
Mining & Quarrying 43315 -7.93 8.22 -3.60 6.77
[-14.07, -1.79] [-9.03, 25.48] [-10.54, 3.33] [-0.59, 14.12]
Food, Beverages & Tobacco 47220 1.86 2.39 3.50 -3.06
[-0.84, 4.55] [0.21, 4.57] [0.95, 6.04] [-4.35, -1.77]
Textiles, Apparel,Leather 10096 -6.82 -2.97 -10.62 -4.02
[-10.17, -3.47] [-7.70, 1.76] [-15.84, -5.39] [-7.70, -0.33]
Wood & Cork 4056 0.43 -3.86 -1.78 0.45
[-5.22, 6.08] [-12.01, 4.29] [-7.91, 4.34] [-0.46, 1.37]
Paper 7484 0.81 0.36 1.00 0.46
[-5.49, 7.12] [-6.77, 7.48] [-5.37, 7.36] [-1.25, 2.18]
Recorded Media Reproduction 8128 -1.13 1.10 0.55 0.40
[-1.94, -0.31] [-0.38, 2.59] [-0.37, 1.47] [-0.48, 1.28]
Coke, Refined Petroleum 7602 4.13 18.84 19.89 0.75
[-10.10, 18.35] [-14.06, 51.75] [0.11, 39.66] [-8.71, 10.20]
Chemicals 16774 -5.71 0.34 -4.12 -3.74
[-8.85, -2.58] [-4.15, 4.84] [-7.67, -0.58] [-6.65, -0.83]
Pharmaceuticals 22050 -3.08 -5.82 -11.94 8.75
[-10.73, 4.57] [-14.87, 3.23] [-21.46, -2.41] [-2.04, 19.53]
Rubber & Plastics 16810 -0.68 0.93 0.66 -3.25
[-2.26, 0.90] [-1.03, 2.89] [-1.28, 2.61] [-4.68, -1.82]
Other non-Metallic Mineral 8577 -1.01 0.94 0.71 -0.93
[-2.24, 0.22] [-0.51, 2.40] [-0.53, 1.96] [-1.55, -0.30]
Basic Metals 7651 -16.95 -9.73 -6.11 -2.13
[-23.43, -10.47] [-16.10, -3.36] [-13.20, 0.98] [-5.85, 1.59]
Fabricated Metal 28099 -0.49 1.44 2.63 1.21
[-2.14, 1.17] [-0.28, 3.17] [0.83, 4.43] [0.35, 2.06]
Electronics & Optical Products 19366 -3.05 -2.15 -6.60 13.07
[-10.83, 4.72] [-11.46, 7.17] [-15.11, 1.92] [2.23, 23.90]
Electrical Equipment 8910 -8.48 -0.35 -8.93 3.67
[-12.88, -4.07] [-6.79, 6.09] [-13.93, -3.93] [-0.40, 7.73]
Machinery & Equipment 32117 -6.86 -3.93 -4.11 8.38
[-11.18, -2.54] [-8.87, 1.01] [-8.63, 0.41] [4.42, 12.34]
Motor Vehicles 20517 -2.52 -1.49 5.13 -3.33
[-7.15, 2.11] [-8.46, 5.49] [0.17, 10.10] [-6.94, 0.28]
Other Transport Equipment 17066 -2.80 11.80 23.45 10.01
[-7.70, 2.11] [-0.21, 23.81] [4.48, 42.43] [2.53, 17.48]
Furniture & Other Manufacturing 16106 -3.10 -1.29 -2.29 4.39
[-6.72, 0.53] [-4.46, 1.87] [-6.45, 1.87] [-0.54, 9.31]
Note: The baseline year is 2014. Bold characters indicate significance at the 10%-level based on 1,000 replications
and an approximate normal distribution. Confidence intervals in square brackets.
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Table C.13: Changes of UK’s Sectoral Value Added of Services, in %
initial VA Change of Sectoral Value Added in %
in mn USD S1 S2 S3 S4
Electricity & Gas 43740 -1.08 0.67 0.99 -0.53
[-1.74, -0.42] [-0.49, 1.84] [0.14, 1.85] [-1.03, -0.03]
Water Supply 8828 -0.67 0.46 0.91 -0.35
[-1.29, -0.05] [-0.63, 1.54] [0.14, 1.68] [-0.87, 0.18]
Sewerage & Waste 21167 -1.72 -0.79 -0.84 -2.45
[-3.15, -0.30] [-2.70, 1.11] [-3.24, 1.56] [-4.11, -0.79]
Construction 179017 -0.46 0.87 1.15 -0.70
[-1.10, 0.19] [-0.24, 1.98] [0.34, 1.95] [-1.27, -0.12]
Trade & Repair of Motor Vehicles 52638 -2.14 -0.74 0.38 -2.62
[-3.23, -1.04] [-2.25, 0.78] [-0.79, 1.56] [-3.64, -1.61]
Wholesale Trade 87853 -7.91 -6.50 -5.40 -9.32
[-11.18, -4.65] [-10.11, -2.89] [-8.60, -2.20] [-12.92, -5.71]
Retail Trade 151457 -0.60 0.49 1.01 -1.02
[-1.23, 0.03] [-0.52, 1.51] [0.25, 1.77] [-1.60, -0.43]
Land Transport 52683 -1.86 -0.58 -0.30 -1.87
[-2.68, -1.04] [-1.77, 0.62] [-1.24, 0.64] [-2.68, -1.06]
Water Transport 11472 0.78 -1.00 0.97 1.45
[-0.63, 2.20] [-3.90, 1.90] [-0.47, 2.40] [0.99, 1.91]
Air Transport 14985 -0.84 -0.25 0.49 -0.18
[-2.59, 0.90] [-2.37, 1.87] [-1.35, 2.33] [-0.81, 0.45]
Aux. Transportation Services 30772 -3.28 -2.08 -1.76 -3.15
[-4.45, -2.12] [-3.45, -0.70] [-2.99, -0.52] [-4.40, -1.90]
Postal and Courier 19150 0.03 1.71 1.41 -0.31
[-0.93, 1.00] [0.41, 3.02] [0.40, 2.41] [-1.22, 0.61]
Accommodation & Food 85664 -0.76 0.47 0.53 0.16
[-1.37, -0.16] [-0.42, 1.35] [-0.18, 1.24] [-0.33, 0.66]
Publishing 17750 -1.59 -0.73 -0.64 -0.18
[-2.58, -0.60] [-2.02, 0.56] [-1.66, 0.39] [-1.13, 0.77]
Media Services 23527 -1.77 -0.54 -0.67 -0.78
[-2.77, -0.76] [-2.14, 1.06] [-1.76, 0.43] [-1.70, 0.14]
Telecommunications 46927 -0.65 0.62 0.64 -0.83
[-2.46, 1.15] [-1.58, 2.82] [-1.20, 2.47] [-1.88, 0.23]
Computer & Information Services 78127 -0.64 1.02 0.89 -0.22
[-1.27, -0.01] [0.00, 2.04] [0.14, 1.64] [-0.82, 0.38]
Financial Services 125534 0.38 1.78 1.43 0.16
[-0.51, 1.27] [0.39, 3.17] [0.50, 2.35] [-0.52, 0.85]
Insurance 109604 1.17 3.17 2.29 2.73
[-1.15, 3.49] [0.07, 6.27] [-0.07, 4.65] [0.33, 5.13]
Real Estate 303820 -0.35 0.73 1.09 -0.58
[-0.97, 0.28] [-0.33, 1.78] [0.32, 1.87] [-1.14, -0.02]
Legal and Accounting 96495 -1.51 0.66 0.74 -0.87
[-2.57, -0.44] [-0.86, 2.18] [-0.44, 1.92] [-1.85, 0.11]
Business Services 87560 -2.57 0.51 0.78 -2.05
[-3.69, -1.45] [-0.92, 1.95] [-0.50, 2.06] [-3.17, -0.93]
Research and Development 15230 -0.68 0.41 0.52 0.38
[-1.66, 0.30] [-0.77, 1.60] [-0.55, 1.60] [-0.38, 1.13]
Admin. & Support Services 128914 -0.17 1.47 1.16 0.90
[-2.35, 2.00] [-1.10, 4.04] [-1.10, 3.41] [-0.77, 2.56]
Public & Social Services 154785 -0.59 0.61 0.93 -0.56
[-1.18, -0.01] [-0.39, 1.62] [0.19, 1.66] [-1.10, -0.03]
Education 171370 -0.66 0.49 0.84 -0.56
[-1.23, -0.10] [-0.47, 1.45] [0.12, 1.56] [-1.08, -0.04]
Human Health and Social Work 199282 -0.52 0.60 0.94 -0.51
[-1.11, 0.06] [-0.41, 1.61] [0.21, 1.67] [-1.05, 0.03]
Other Services, Households 120406 -0.22 0.89 0.80 -0.37
[-1.19, 0.74] [-0.42, 2.20] [-0.33, 1.94] [-1.10, 0.37]
Note: The baseline year is 2014. Bold characters indicate significance at the 10%-level based on 1,000 replications
and an approximate normal distribution. Confidence intervals in square brackets.
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Table C.14: Changes of EU27’s Sectoral Value Added of Agricultural and Manufacturing Goods, in %
initial VA Change of Sectoral Value Added in %
in mn USD S1 S2 S3 S4
Crops & Animals 221514 -1.36 -0.70 -1.46 -0.54
[-1.65, -1.08] [-1.14, -0.25] [-1.75, -1.18] [-0.68, -0.41]
Forestry & Logging 29863 -0.52 0.04 -0.63 -0.70
[-0.85, -0.20] [-0.38, 0.47] [-0.97, -0.29] [-0.80, -0.60]
Fishing & Aquaculture 7486 1.08 0.91 1.00 0.71
[-0.29, 2.45] [-1.21, 3.04] [-0.35, 2.36] [-0.59, 2.01]
Mining & Quarrying 78597 2.51 5.86 2.75 -1.07
[0.46, 4.56] [1.48, 10.24] [0.60, 4.89] [-1.94, -0.20]
Food, Beverages & Tobacco 311327 -1.55 -0.53 -1.67 -0.63
[-1.94, -1.15] [-0.90, -0.16] [-2.07, -1.28] [-0.81, -0.45]
Textiles, Apparel,Leather 83953 -0.38 0.93 -0.83 -1.15
[-1.05, 0.29] [-0.22, 2.08] [-1.53, -0.14] [-1.61, -0.69]
Wood & Cork 44213 -0.72 0.16 -0.88 -0.84
[-1.19, -0.26] [-0.54, 0.87] [-1.36, -0.41] [-1.03, -0.65]
Paper 55968 -0.83 -0.29 -0.88 -0.85
[-1.57, -0.08] [-1.15, 0.56] [-1.64, -0.12] [-1.11, -0.59]
Recorded Media Reproduction 40974 -0.47 -0.23 -0.62 -0.49
[-0.61, -0.33] [-0.46, -0.01] [-0.77, -0.47] [-0.64, -0.33]
Coke, Refined Petroleum 60143 -0.44 2.02 -0.82 -1.02
[-1.52, 0.64] [-0.25, 4.29] [-1.87, 0.23] [-1.74, -0.29]
Chemicals 178271 -1.10 -0.64 -1.33 -0.80
[-1.42, -0.79] [-1.05, -0.24] [-1.66, -1.01] [-1.06, -0.54]
Pharmaceuticals 121944 -0.67 -2.16 -0.02 -1.92
[-2.38, 1.04] [-3.70, -0.61] [-1.93, 1.89] [-3.06, -0.77]
Rubber & Plastics 113713 -1.16 -0.49 -1.37 -0.51
[-1.39, -0.93] [-0.81, -0.17] [-1.62, -1.12] [-0.68, -0.34]
Other non-Metallic Mineral 84895 -0.70 -0.23 -0.84 -0.54
[-0.85, -0.54] [-0.42, -0.04] [-0.99, -0.69] [-0.64, -0.44]
Basic Metals 91464 -0.43 -0.14 -0.74 -0.43
[-0.79, -0.07] [-0.60, 0.32] [-1.12, -0.37] [-0.69, -0.16]
Fabricated Metal 220110 -0.79 -0.26 -1.00 -0.61
[-0.97, -0.61] [-0.47, -0.05] [-1.20, -0.81] [-0.71, -0.52]
Electronics & Optical Products 126896 -1.73 -2.69 -1.48 -2.43
[-2.54, -0.92] [-3.58, -1.80] [-2.33, -0.63] [-3.29, -1.58]
Electrical Equipment 124261 -0.60 -0.25 -1.18 -1.10
[-1.09, -0.10] [-0.88, 0.38] [-1.66, -0.71] [-1.42, -0.78]
Machinery & Equipment 381086 -0.12 -0.24 -0.16 -1.04
[-0.55, 0.30] [-0.67, 0.19] [-0.61, 0.28] [-1.36, -0.72]
Motor Vehicles 249064 -1.57 -0.21 -2.24 -0.81
[-2.03, -1.10] [-0.84, 0.42] [-2.74, -1.73] [-1.23, -0.38]
Other Transport Equipment 68303 -0.77 1.22 -3.86 -1.40
[-1.87, 0.33] [-0.69, 3.14] [-5.85, -1.87] [-2.32, -0.49]
Furniture & Other Manufacturing 103874 -0.27 -0.58 -0.05 -1.34
[-0.88, 0.34] [-1.14, -0.01] [-0.76, 0.67] [-1.96, -0.72]
Note: The baseline year is 2014. Bold characters indicate significance at the 10%-level based on 1,000 replications
and an approximate normal distribution. Confidence intervals in square brackets.
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Table C.15: Changes of EU27’s Sectoral Value Added of Services, in %
initial VA Change of Sectoral Value Added in %
in mn USD S1 S2 S3 S4
Electricity & Gas 284959 -0.67 -0.12 -0.86 -0.52
[-0.77, -0.57] [-0.27, 0.02] [-0.96, -0.75] [-0.62, -0.43]
Water Supply 37499 -0.61 -0.07 -0.80 -0.48
[-0.71, -0.51] [-0.21, 0.08] [-0.90, -0.70] [-0.57, -0.39]
Sewerage & Waste 99891 -0.62 -0.14 -0.79 -0.16
[-0.84, -0.41] [-0.38, 0.10] [-1.00, -0.58] [-0.41, 0.09]
Construction 751630 -0.70 -0.18 -0.89 -0.50
[-0.80, -0.60] [-0.31, -0.04] [-1.00, -0.79] [-0.59, -0.40]
Trade & Repair of Motor Vehicles 209725 -0.45 0.09 -0.69 -0.07
[-0.70, -0.20] [-0.22, 0.41] [-0.94, -0.44] [-0.31, 0.17]
Wholesale Trade 762831 0.05 0.51 -0.10 0.52
[-0.31, 0.42] [0.11, 0.90] [-0.46, 0.26] [0.09, 0.95]
Retail Trade 600221 -0.65 -0.14 -0.83 -0.39
[-0.77, -0.53] [-0.29, 0.01] [-0.96, -0.71] [-0.51, -0.27]
Land Transport 357195 -0.51 -0.01 -0.68 -0.40
[-0.61, -0.41] [-0.15, 0.13] [-0.78, -0.57] [-0.49, -0.31]
Water Transport 42166 -0.41 0.33 -0.52 -0.37
[-0.71, -0.12] [-0.37, 1.03] [-0.83, -0.21] [-0.42, -0.31]
Air Transport 43027 -0.62 0.06 -0.68 -0.76
[-1.20, -0.04] [-0.67, 0.78] [-1.28, -0.08] [-0.87, -0.65]
Aux. Transportation Services 266620 -0.39 0.06 -0.55 -0.29
[-0.49, -0.28] [-0.07, 0.19] [-0.66, -0.43] [-0.40, -0.19]
Postal and Courier 60266 -0.86 -0.48 -1.01 -0.43
[-1.09, -0.64] [-0.77, -0.19] [-1.23, -0.78] [-0.63, -0.23]
Accommodation & Food 407634 -0.57 -0.15 -0.75 -0.46
[-0.67, -0.47] [-0.28, -0.03] [-0.86, -0.64] [-0.56, -0.37]
Publishing 79566 -0.82 -0.18 -0.96 -0.77
[-1.02, -0.63] [-0.42, 0.06] [-1.16, -0.76] [-0.95, -0.59]
Media Services 73756 -0.17 0.15 -0.34 -0.08
[-0.44, 0.09] [-0.26, 0.55] [-0.60, -0.09] [-0.33, 0.17]
Telecommunications 185217 -0.68 -0.17 -0.82 -0.45
[-1.09, -0.27] [-0.68, 0.34] [-1.23, -0.40] [-0.66, -0.23]
Computer & Information Services 315976 -0.43 -0.23 -0.56 -0.35
[-0.53, -0.32] [-0.38, -0.07] [-0.67, -0.45] [-0.46, -0.24]
Financial Services 498840 -0.78 -0.43 -0.94 -0.48
[-0.95, -0.60] [-0.69, -0.16] [-1.11, -0.76] [-0.63, -0.33]
Insurance 249245 -0.94 -0.61 -1.09 -0.94
[-1.35, -0.52] [-1.17, -0.06] [-1.50, -0.69] [-1.39, -0.49]
Real Estate 1574061 -0.67 -0.17 -0.85 -0.45
[-0.77, -0.57] [-0.30, -0.04] [-0.96, -0.75] [-0.55, -0.35]
Legal and Accounting 439618 -0.46 -0.05 -0.62 -0.34
[-0.63, -0.28] [-0.27, 0.17] [-0.79, -0.44] [-0.50, -0.19]
Business Services 328994 -0.39 -0.12 -0.58 -0.06
[-0.60, -0.18] [-0.36, 0.12] [-0.79, -0.38] [-0.29, 0.16]
Research and Development 121236 -0.56 -0.12 -0.73 -0.52
[-0.69, -0.43] [-0.28, 0.05] [-0.87, -0.60] [-0.62, -0.42]
Admin. & Support Services 581599 -0.77 -0.37 -0.90 -0.69
[-1.19, -0.35] [-0.84, 0.11] [-1.33, -0.47] [-0.97, -0.41]
Public & Social Services 993571 -0.67 -0.15 -0.87 -0.50
[-0.78, -0.57] [-0.28, -0.02] [-0.97, -0.76] [-0.60, -0.40]
Education 731363 -0.68 -0.14 -0.87 -0.50
[-0.79, -0.58] [-0.27, 0.00] [-0.98, -0.76] [-0.61, -0.39]
Human Health and Social Work 1096971 -0.71 -0.14 -0.91 -0.54
[-0.82, -0.61] [-0.28, 0.00] [-1.02, -0.80] [-0.64, -0.43]
Other Services, Households 504146 -0.70 -0.21 -0.89 -0.45
[-0.88, -0.52] [-0.43, 0.00] [-1.07, -0.70] [-0.60, -0.30]
Note: The baseline year is 2014. Bold characters indicate significance at the 10%-level based on
1,000 replications and an approximate normal distribution. Confidence intervals in square brackets.
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Table C.16: Sectoral Trade Cost Elasticities from Caliendo & Parro (2015)
Sector Sector Name Trade Cost
id Elasticity
1 Crops & Animals 8.11
2 Forestry & Logging 8.11
3 Fishing & Aquaculture 8.11
4 Mining & Quarrying 15.72
5 Food, Beverages & Tobacco 2.55
6 Textiles, Apparel,Leather 5.56
7 Wood & Cork 10.83
8 Paper 9.07
9 Recorded Media Reproduction 9.07
10 Coke, Refined Petroleum 51.08
11 Chemicals 4.75
12 Pharmaceuticals 4.75
13 Rubber & Plastics 1.66
14 Other Non-Metallic Mineral 2.76
15 Basic Metals 7.99
16 Fabricated Metal 4.3
17 Electronics & Optical Products 10.60
18 Electrical Equipment 10.60
19 Machinery & Equipment 1.52
20 Motor Vehicles 1.01
21 Other Transport Equipment 0.37
22 Furniture & Other Manufacturing 5.00
23 Electricity & Gas 5.00
24 Water Supply 5.00
25 Sewerage & Waste 5.00
26 Construction 5.00
27 Trade & Repair of Motor Vehicles 5.00
28 Wholesale Trade 5.00
29 Retail Trade 5.00
30 Land Transport 5.00
31 Water Transport 5.00
32 Air Transport 5.00
33 Aux. Transportation Services 5.00
34 Postal and Courier 5.00
35 Accommodation & Food 5.00
36 Publishing 5.00
37 Media Services 5.00
38 Telecommunications 5.00
39 Computer & Information Services 5.00
40 Financial Services 5.00
41 Insurance 5.00
42 Real Estate 5.00
43 Legal and Accounting 5.00
44 Business Services 5.00
45 Research and Development 5.00
46 Admin. & Support Services 5.00
47 Public & Social Services 5.00
48 Education 5.00
49 Human Health and Social Work 5.00
50 Other Services, Households 5.00
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Table C.17: Change in Real Consumption, in %
Elasticities: Services = 5 Caliendo & Parro (2015) Services = 5 Caliendo & Parro (2015)
UK -1.17 -3.27 Portugal -0.16 -0.24
[-1.65, -0.68] [-3.95, -2.59] [-0.18, -0.13] [-0.27, -0.20]
Austria -0.15 -0.20 Romania -0.14 -0.19
[-0.16, -0.13] [-0.24, -0.17] [-0.16, -0.12] [-0.22, -0.17]
Belgium -0.49 -0.72 Slovakia -0.48 -0.46
[-0.55, -0.42] [-0.82, -0.62] [-0.58, -0.39] [-0.54, -0.39]
Bulgaria -0.17 -0.25 Slovenia -0.17 -0.22
[-0.21, -0.14] [-0.28, -0.22] [-0.19, -0.15] [-0.25, -0.19]
Croatia -0.13 -0.15 Spain -0.17 -0.22
[-0.16, -0.10] [-0.21, -0.09] [-0.19, -0.14] [-0.27, -0.18]
Cyprus -0.48 -0.82 Sweden -0.23 -0.40
[-0.63, -0.34] [-1.01, -0.63] [-0.28, -0.19] [-0.47, -0.34]
Czech R. -0.33 -0.40 Australia -0.01 -0.02
[-0.37, -0.30] [-0.44, -0.36] [-0.01, -0.00] [-0.02, -0.01]
Denmark -0.30 -0.40 Brazil -0.00 -0.01
[-0.35, -0.26] [-0.45, -0.35] [-0.00, -0.00] [-0.01, -0.00]
Estonia -0.25 -0.39 Canada 0.00 -0.02
[-0.34, -0.17] [-0.47, -0.32] [-0.00, 0.01] [-0.03, -0.01]
Finland -0.16 -0.29 China 0.03 0.02
[-0.19, -0.13] [-0.35, -0.23] [0.02, 0.03] [0.02, 0.03]
France -0.21 -0.27 India 0.01 -0.00
[-0.24, -0.18] [-0.31, -0.22] [0.01, 0.01] [-0.01, 0.01]
Germany -0.32 -0.36 Indonesia 0.01 0.00
[-0.35, -0.29] [-0.44, -0.28] [0.00, 0.01] [0.00, 0.01]
Greece -0.13 -0.19 Japan 0.00 -0.00
[-0.16, -0.10] [-0.23, -0.16] [0.00, 0.01] [-0.01, -0.00]
Hungary -0.35 -0.42 Korea 0.00 -0.06
[-0.38, -0.32] [-0.46, -0.38] [-0.03, 0.04] [-0.29, 0.16]
Ireland -2.94 -4.40 Mexico 0.00 -0.01
[-3.22, -2.66] [-4.70, -4.10] [-0.00, 0.00] [-0.02, -0.01]
Italy -0.17 -0.22 Norway 0.47 0.08
[-0.19, -0.15] [-0.26, -0.18] [0.27, 0.67] [-0.06, 0.23]
Latvia -0.23 -0.30 Russia 0.00 -0.03
[-0.32, -0.13] [-0.37, -0.23] [-0.01, 0.02] [-0.05, -0.02]
Lithuania -0.17 -0.36 Switzerland 0.03 -0.08
[-0.22, -0.12] [-0.42, -0.29] [-0.01, 0.07] [-0.15, -0.00]
Luxembourg -0.97 -0.96 Taiwan 0.07 0.08
[-2.64, 0.70] [-2.60, 0.68] [0.06, 0.08] [0.08, 0.09]
Malta -2.55 -2.77 Turkey 0.01 -0.08
[-3.52, -1.58] [-3.65, -1.89] [-0.01, 0.03] [-0.10, -0.05]
Netherlands -0.67 -0.86 USA -0.01 -0.02
[-0.74, -0.60] [-0.94, -0.77] [-0.01, -0.01] [-0.02, -0.01]
Poland -0.31 -0.39 ROW -0.00 -0.01
[-0.34, -0.28] [-0.43, -0.35] [-0.01, 0.00] [-0.03, 0.00]
EU27 -0.31 -0.41
[-0.35, -0.28] [-0.46, -0.35]
ROW 0.01 -0.01
[0.00, 0.01] [-0.02, -0.00]
Note: The baseline year is 2014. Mean effects and [p5,p95] intervals. Bold characters indicate significance at the 10%-level based
on 1,000 bootstrap replications. Confidence intervals in square brackets. The results for EU27 and ROW are calculated as GDP
weighted averages. Caliendo & Parro (2015) results use elasticities from Table C.16 and tariff adjusted imports in all goods sectors
in the underlying gravity estimations to back out NTB changes.
Appendix D
Appendix to Chapter 4 - Revisiting the
Euro’s trade cost and welfare effects
D.1 Model Closure
Let Y jn denote the value of gross production of varieties in each sector j. For each country
n and sector j, Y jn has to equal the value of demand for sectoral varieties from all countries











γj,ki (1− βki )Y ki + α
j
i Ii, (D.1)
National income consists of labor income, tariff rebates Ri and the trade surplus, which
is exogenous Si, i.e. Ii = wiLi + Ri − Si and Xji is country i’s expenditure on sector j
goods.- 1 Demand of sectors k in all countries i for intermediate usage of sector j varieties
produced in country n is given in the first term on the right hand side. The second term









The second equilibrium condition requires that, for each country n, the value of total
imports, domestic demand and the trade surplus has to equal the value of total exports
1 Aggregate trade deficits in each country are exogenous in the model, which follows the theoretical
framework of Caliendo and Parro (2015). All counterfactuals are calculated by holding the countries’
aggregate trade deficits constant, as a share of world GDP.
2 Instead of the goods market clearing condition, one can also use the expenditure equation Xji =(∑J
k=1 γ
j,k




as in Caliendo and Parro (2015).
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Y jn ≡ Yn (D.2)
Conditions (D.1) and (D.2) close the model.
D.2 Comparative Statics in General Equilibrium
The following system of equations is required to solve the counterfactual changes. One
advantage of solving the model in changes is that certain constant parameters such as
the absolute advantage or the elasticity of substitution between input varieties ω drop


















































































n (1− F j
′
n )− Sn, Ln are a country n’s labor force, and Sn is the
trade surplus, which is exogenous. sn ≡ Sn/B, is fixed, with B ≡
∑
nwnLn denoting
the global labor income. This ensures that the system is homogeneous of degree zero in
prices. Equation (D.3) shows the shift in unit costs, which arise due to changes in input
prices (i.e., wage and intermediate price changes).
These changes in unit costs have an indirect effect on the sectoral price index pjn, while
trade cost changes directly affect it (see equation (D.4)). Trade shares change as a
3 See also Caliendo and Parro (2015)
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reaction to changes in trade costs, unit costs, and prices. The productivity dispersion θj
indicates the intensity of the reaction. The higher θj, the bigger trade changes. Goods
market clearing is ensured in equation (D.6). Equation (D.7) provides the new equilibrium
and the counterfactual income-equals-expenditure, thus balanced trade condition. The
framework of Caliendo and Parro (2015) is exploited to solve the system for multiple
sectors, which is an extension of the single-sector solution algorithm proposed by Alvarez
and Lucas (2007). The initial guess is made about a vector of wage changes. Using (D.3)
and (D.4), it then computes changes in prices, trade shares, expenditure levels, evaluates
the trade balance condition (D.7), and updates the change in wages based on deviations
in the trade balance.
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D.3 Detailed Gravity Results
Table D.1: The Impact of EMU on Sectoral Bilateral Imports of Goods
Dep. var.: Bilateral Imports
Broad Agriculture Mining and Food, Beverages Textiles and Leather, Leather
Goods Fishing, etc. Quarrying and Tobacco Textile Products and Footwear
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
both Euro 0.0753*** 0.08516*** 0.00194 0.16106*** -0.15815*** 0.04468
(0.03) (0.03) (0.07) (0.03) (0.04) (0.06)
both EU 0.4416*** 0.45333*** 0.35228*** 0.45942*** 0.35127*** 0.35557***
(0.02) (0.03) (0.08) (0.03) (0.04) (0.05)
RTA 0.2327*** 0.11932 0.06353 0.13315** -0.13970 -0.07319
(0.06) (0.08) (0.09) (0.06) (0.16) (0.12)
Schengen 0.0336*** 0.03247*** 0.08363*** 0.02642*** -0.04749*** 0.01994
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02)
Tariffs -3.4673*** -2.18310*** -3.03081** -0.89716**α -2.50476*** -0.84339α
(0.83) (0.50) (1.25) (0.44) (0.49) (0.63)
Wood and Products Pulp and Coke, Refined Petroleum Chemicals and Rubber and Other Non-Metallic
of Wood and Cork Paper , etc. and Nuclear Fuel Chemical Products Plastics Mineral
(6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
both Euro 0.22584*** 0.07960** 0.85288*** 0.08157** 0.00675 0.06857**
(0.03) (0.03) (0.14) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03)
both EU 0.23180*** 0.29140*** 0.43283*** 0.38557*** 0.39130*** 0.27754***
(0.03) (0.03) (0.10) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03)
RTA -0.05563 0.05293 -0.14462 0.18313** 0.18302*** 0.18548**
(0.10) (0.09) (0.16) (0.07) (0.06) (0.08)
Schengen -0.01980** 0.00285 -0.05153 0.02213** 0.01722** -0.00853
(0.01) (0.01) (0.06) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Tariffs -1.67668** -1.43138* -1.19203 -2.04158** -2.37919*** 0.14617α
(0.74) (0.79) (1.67) (0.83) (0.72) (0.78)
Basic Metals and Machinery, Nec Electrical and Transport Equipment Manufacturing
Fabricated Metal Optical Equipment Nec; Recycling
(12) (13) (14) (15) (16)
both Euro 0.04256 0.03305 0.00180 0.01186 0.03578
(0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.02)
both EU 0.37835*** 0.46156*** 0.51414*** 0.36217*** 0.31368***
(0.03) (0.03) (0.06) (0.04) (0.02)
RTA 0.27069** 0.32786*** 0.36537*** 0.17377* 0.39739**
(0.12) (0.09) (0.11) (0.09) (0.19)
Schengen 0.06006*** 0.01149 0.01727 0.03751*** 0.00203
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Tariffs -1.39787* -4.99101*** -4.67259*** -4.77642*** -2.2145
(0.74) (1.54) (1.17) (1.07) (1.43)
Note: ***, **, * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% levels, respectively. All models estimated use PPML methods. Robust
standard errors (in parentheses) allow for clustering at the country-pair level. Pair as well as year specific importer and exporter
fixed effects included but not reported. α Theory inconsistent trade cost elasticites get replaced by the trade cost elasticity of the
broad goods sector (-3.4673***); Number of observations: 27,200.
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Table D.2: The Impact of EMU on Sectoral Bilateral Imports of Services
Dep. var.: Bilateral Imports
Broad Electricity, Gas Construction Sale, Repair Wholesale Trade Retail Trade, Hotels and
Services and Water of Vehicles Except of Except of Restaurants
Supply Vehicles Vehicles
(17) (18) (19) (20) (21) (22)
both Euro 0.0104 0.26883*** 0.00239 0.11129*** 0.01043 0.02799 0.13393***
(0.03) (0.06) (0.02) (0.03) (0.06) (0.03) (0.04)
both EU 0.2241*** 0.25402*** 0.22359*** 0.39919*** 0.27699*** 0.18707*** 0.19428***
(0.02) (0.05) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
RTA 0.1999*** 0.07528 0.21308** 0.07640 0.12669 0.11608 0.19347***
(0.07) (0.13) (0.09) (0.05) (0.09) (0.09) (0.07)
Schengen 0.0195* 0.02360 -0.02957*** 0.01203 0.01752 -0.00859 0.00790
(0.01) (0.03) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Inland Water Air Auxiliary Post and Financial Real Estate
Transport Transport Transport Transport Telecom. Intermediation Activities
Activities
(23) (24) (25) (26) (27) (28) (29)
both Euro 0.04196 -0.10906 0.02897 0.01410 -0.00197 -0.06000 0.00166
(0.04) (0.11) (0.07) (0.06) (0.04) (0.09) (0.07)
both EU 0.28864*** 0.08626 0.25163*** 0.09940 0.29172*** 0.04751 0.01792
(0.05) (0.09) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (0.06)
RTA 0.07877 0.36742** 0.01276 0.35035*** 0.16693 0.02770 0.15499
(0.07) (0.18) (0.10) (0.11) (0.11) (0.09) (0.11)
Schengen 0.06731*** 0.00887 0.08209*** 0.04689* 0.01641 -0.01054 0.07514***
(0.02) (0.04) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.03) (0.03)
Other Business Public Admin Education Health and Community,
Activities and Defence Social Work Social and
Personal Services
(30) (31) (32) (33) (34)
both Euro 0.00839 0.11808** 0.03826 0.07489** 0.01217
(0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.03) (0.04)
both EU 0.21323*** 0.37947*** 0.27733*** 0.38639*** 0.24880***
(0.03) (0.06) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04)
RTA 0.20742*** 0.08753 0.14450 0.21507*** 0.16458
(0.08) (0.09) (0.10) (0.07) (0.10)
Schengen 0.00568 0.01390 -0.01932* 0.02277** 0.01784
(0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02)
Note: ***, **, * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% levels, respectively. All models estimated use PPML methods. Robust
standard errors (in parentheses) allow for clustering at the country-pair level. Pair as well as year specific importer and exporter
fixed effects included but not reported. Number of observations: 27,200.
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Table D.3: The Impact of EMU on sectoral Bilateral Imports of Goods
Dep. var.: Bilateral Imports
Broad Agriculture Mining and Food, Beverages Textiles and Leather, Leather
Goods Fishing, etc. Quarrying and Tobacco Textile Products and Footwear
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
eDeu,old 0.1922*** 0.1775* 0.3782*** 0.3172*** -0.3612*** -0.2373
(0.07) (0.10) (0.13) (0.09) (0.10) (0.16)
eold,DEU -0.1191* 0.0901 -0.2119 0.1923*** 0.0389 0.1017
(0.07) (0.06) (0.16) (0.07) (0.08) (0.12)
eDeu,new -0.1191* -0.3042*** -0.1306 0.0104 -0.0467 0.2037
(0.07) (0.09) (0.10) (0.19) (0.10) (0.15)
enew,DEU -0.1263** 0.0198 -0.1870 0.0652 -0.2175 -0.2390
(0.06) (0.05) (0.12) (0.07) (0.13) (0.15)
eRest 0.0212 0.0552** -0.1081* 0.0863** -0.1600*** 0.1122
(0.03) (0.03) (0.06) (0.04) (0.06) (0.07)
both EU 0.4496*** 0.4560*** 0.3559*** 0.4605*** 0.3541*** 0.3536***
(0.02) (0.03) (0.08) (0.03) (0.04) (0.05)
RTA 0.2325*** 0.1192 0.0639 0.1329** -0.1394 -0.0725
(0.06) (0.08) (0.09) (0.06) (0.16) (0.12)
Schengen 0.0336*** 0.0333*** 0.0857*** 0.0291*** -0.0487*** 0.0196
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02)
Tariffs -3.4666*** -2.1784*** -3.0051** -0.8911** -2.5149*** -0.8413
(0.83) (0.50) (1.24) (0.44) (0.49) (0.64)
Wood and Products Pulp and Coke, Refined Petroleum Rubber and Other Non-Metallic
of Wood and Cork Paper , etc. and Nuclear Fuel Chemical Products Plastics Mineral
(6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
eDeu,old 0.3861*** 0.2743** 1.0338*** 0.1858* 0.0844 0.2446**
(0.10) (0.11) (0.35) (0.10) (0.08) (0.12)
eold,DEU 0.3228*** 0.0881 0.4842 0.1456** 0.0963 0.1065
(0.08) (0.08) (0.36) (0.07) (0.06) (0.10)
eDeu,new -0.1535 0.0731 0.0986 -0.2245** -0.1444* -0.0496
(0.17) (0.07) (0.28) (0.10) (0.09) (0.08)
enew,DEU -0.0450 0.0015 0.2097 -0.1022 -0.1156 -0.0250
(0.10) (0.06) (0.29) (0.09) (0.09) (0.07)
eRest 0.1245*** -0.0252 0.9409*** -0.0074 -0.0970*** -0.0323
(0.03) (0.04) (0.17) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04)
both EU 0.2427*** 0.2944*** 0.4415*** 0.3925*** 0.3973*** 0.2819***
(0.03) (0.03) (0.10) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03)
RTA -0.0556 0.0529 -0.1460 0.1832** 0.1831*** 0.1855**
(0.10) (0.09) (0.16) (0.07) (0.06) (0.08)
Schengen -0.0193** 0.0053 -0.0550 0.0251** 0.0193** -0.0065
(0.01) (0.01) (0.06) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Tariffs -1.6800** -1.4059* -1.2981 -2.0410** -2.3817*** 0.1448
(0.73) (0.78) (1.67) (0.83) (0.72) (0.78)
Basic Metals and Machinery, Nec Electrical and Transport Equipment Manufacturing
Fabricated Metal Optical Equipment Nec; Recycling
(12) (13) (14) (15) (16)
eDeu,old 0.2572*** 0.1325* 0.1293 0.0626 0.0032
(0.08) (0.07) (0.09) (0.06) (0.07)
eold,DEU 0.0297 0.0325 0.0356 0.0566 0.1389**
(0.08) (0.08) (0.09) (0.08) (0.06)
eDeu,new -0.2437*** -0.0178 -0.0475 -0.3067*** -0.1079
(0.07) (0.07) (0.10) (0.09) (0.10)
enew,DEU -0.1669** -0.1023* -0.1838** -0.2244** -0.1679***
(0.08) (0.06) (0.07) (0.09) (0.04)
eRest -0.0628* -0.0438 -0.0843* -0.0127 0.0120
(0.03) (0.03) (0.05) (0.04) (0.03)
both EU 0.3909*** 0.4680*** 0.5202*** 0.3764*** 0.3193***
(0.03) (0.03) (0.06) (0.04) (0.02)
RTA 0.2709** 0.3279*** 0.3652*** 0.1738* 0.3978**
(0.12) (0.09) (0.11) (0.09) (0.19)
Schengen 0.0608*** 0.0122* 0.0175 0.0350*** 0.0018
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Tariffs -1.3897* -4.9916*** -4.6810*** -4.7859*** -2.2154
(0.73) (1.54) (1.17) (1.07) (1.43)
Note: ***, **, * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% levels, respectively. All models estimated use PPML methods. Robust
standard errors (in parentheses) allow for clustering at the country-pair level. Pair as well as year specific importer and exporter
fixed effects included but not reported. The gravity specification further controls for EU membership, RTAs, FTA, Schengen and
also tariffs to retrieve the trade cost elasticities, but are also not reported here. Number of observations: 27,200.
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Table D.4: The Impact of EMU on German Sectoral Bilateral Trade of Services with Old and New EMU member states
Dep. var.: Bilateral Imports
Broad Electricity, Gas Construction Sale, Repair Wholesale Trade Retail Trade, Hotels and
Services and Water of Vehicles Except of Except of Restaurants
Supply Vehicles Vehicles
(17) (18) (19) (20) (21) (22)
eDeu,old 0.5398*** 0.1903** 0.1218 0.3898*** 0.1761* 0.2570**
(0.16) (0.08) (0.10) (0.14) (0.10) (0.12)
eold,DEU 0.2966** -0.0125 0.1427 0.0085 -0.0377 0.1132
(0.14) (0.08) (0.11) (0.11) (0.09) (0.12)
eDeu,new -0.0388 -0.0224 -0.2197*** -0.1911 -0.0867 -0.1166
(0.15) (0.07) (0.07) (0.13) (0.12) (0.20)
enew,DEU 0.1221 -0.0991* -0.2171** 0.2126** -0.1150 0.1267
(0.20) (0.06) (0.10) (0.09) (0.11) (0.09)
eRest 0.1798*** -0.0838*** 0.1079*** -0.1029 0.0060 0.1010*
(0.06) (0.02) (0.04) (0.09) (0.04) (0.05)
both EU 0.2633*** 0.2287*** 0.4061*** 0.2773*** 0.1893*** 0.1961***
(0.05) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04)
RTA 0.0749 0.2129** 0.0768 0.1264 0.1157 0.1933***
(0.13) (0.09) (0.05) (0.09) (0.09) (0.07)
Schengen 0.0232 -0.0284*** 0.0113 0.0200 -0.0082 0.0092
Inland Water Air Auxiliary Post and Financial Real Estate
Transport Transport Transport Transport Telecom. Intermediation Activities
Activities
(23) (24) (25) (26) (27) (28) (29)
eDeu,old 0.2171** 0.4966** 0.3845** -0.2000 0.0759 0.4427** 0.1223
(0.11) (0.22) (0.15) (0.18) (0.13) (0.17) (0.20)
eold,DEU -0.0628 -0.5947*** -0.0456 0.1951** -0.0883 -0.3384** -0.0492
(0.09) (0.20) (0.13) (0.10) (0.12) (0.15) (0.20)
eDeu,new -0.5063*** -0.2404 -0.6180*** -0.3187* -0.0073 -0.3628** -0.0900
(0.16) (0.26) (0.13) (0.18) (0.15) (0.17) (0.12)
enew,DEU -0.2403 -0.0083 -0.0083 -0.1452 -0.2057 -0.1437 -0.0259
(0.23) (0.29) (0.21) (0.28) (0.13) (0.16) (0.09)
eRest 0.0362 -0.0690 -0.0881 0.0417 0.0093 -0.0974 -0.0240
(0.05) (0.12) (0.08) (0.06) (0.05) (0.12) (0.08)
both EU 0.2929*** 0.0778 0.2600*** 0.1043* 0.2923*** 0.0478 0.0181
(0.05) (0.09) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (0.07)
RTA 0.0782 0.3671** 0.0123 0.3491*** 0.1670 0.0263 0.1548
(0.07) (0.18) (0.10) (0.11) (0.11) (0.09) (0.11)
Schengen 0.0673*** 0.0124 0.0853*** 0.0455* 0.0164 -0.0081 0.0759***
Other Business Public Admin Education Health and Community,
Activities and Defence Social Work Social and
Personal Services
(30) (31) (32) (33) (34)
eDeu,old 0.1800 0.3648*** 0.0611 0.2125** 0.0273
(0.14) (0.14) (0.15) (0.09) (0.15)
eold,DEU -0.1078 0.0521 -0.0088 0.1420** 0.1128
(0.11) (0.10) (0.14) (0.07) (0.13)
eDeu,new -0.1410 -0.1906 -0.2806* -0.2594** -0.1240
(0.11) (0.12) (0.15) (0.11) (0.25)
enew,DEU -0.1905** -0.1978*** -0.1118 -0.0596 0.0116
(0.09) (0.07) (0.07) (0.06) (0.16)
eRest 0.0102 0.0372 0.0600 -0.0326 -0.0327
(0.05) (0.04) (0.05) (0.03) (0.04)
both EU 0.2150*** 0.3884*** 0.2816*** 0.3936*** 0.2507***
(0.03) (0.05) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04)
RTA 0.2070*** 0.0877 0.1446 0.2151*** 0.1646
(0.08) (0.09) (0.10) (0.07) (0.10)
Schengen 0.0053 0.0151 -0.0198* 0.0253*** 0.0184
Note: ***, **, * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% levels, respectively. All models estimated use PPML methods. Robust
standard errors (in parentheses) allow for clustering at the country-pair level. Pair as well as year specific importer and exporter
fixed effects included but not reported. Number of observations: 27,200.
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Table E.1: Sectoral Trade Creation Effects (%) of the EU-Korea FTA
GTAP-ID Sector Description EU (%) p-value KOR (%) p-value
1 Crop and animal production 28.0** 0.002 33.8** 0.001
2 Forestry and logging 88.5** 0 55.0** 0.009
3 Fishing and aquaculture 102.4** 0 -6.3 0.718
4 Mining and quarrying 76.3** 0 44.8** 0.001
5 Manufacture of food beverages, tobacco 29.3* 0.04 18.4+ 0.088
6 Manufacture of textiles, apparel, leather 8 0.643 16.8 0.109
7 Manufacture of wood and cork; 40.9* 0.02 35.7* 0.022
8 Manufacture of paper and paper products 9.3 0.299 31.1** 0.007
9 Printing and reproduction of recorded media 23.0* 0.022 26.0* 0.028
10 Manufacture of coke and refined petroleum 547** 0 130** 0
11 Manufacture of chemicals and chemical products 21.2+ 0.074 39.4** 0
12 Manufacture of basic pharmaceutical products 73.8** 0 0.3 0.975
13 Manufacture of rubber and plastic products 23.7* 0.022 37.4** 0
14 Manufacture of other non-metallic minerals 53.6** 0.003 30.6* 0.021
15 Manufacture of basic metals 19.2+ 0.054 32.4+ 0.053
16 Manufacture of fabricated metal products 31.0** 0.001 24.2* 0.014
17 Manufacture of computer, electronic and optical 81.1** 0 -1.5 0.922
18 Manufacture of electrical equipment 60.5** 0 15.4 0.17
19 Manufacture of machinery and equipment nec. 50.4** 0 0.8 0.942
20 Manufacture of motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers 41.2** 0 47.0* 0.04
21 Manufacture of other transport equipment 79.3** 0 2.2 0.823
22 Manufacture of furniture; other manufacturing 10.3 0.265 -12.9 0.144
23 Repair and installation of machinery and equipment - - -10 0.251
24 Electricity, gas, steam and air conditioning supply 238** 0.001 32.6* 0.035
25 Water collection, treatment and supply 385** 0.001 -54.5* 0.027
26 Sewerage; waste collection, disposal; 48.6** 0 3 0.882
27 Construction 39.4** 0 26.1** 0.002
28 Wholesale, repair of vehicles and motorcycles 72.5** 0 25.1 0.252
29 Wholesale trade, except of vehicles and motorcycles 59.5** 0 20.9+ 0.092
30 Retail trade, except of motor vehicles and motorcycles 53.6** 0.001 26.7* 0.056
31 Land transport and transport via pipelines 73.0** 0 15.4 0.458
32 Water transport 22.5 0.261 28 0.112
33 Air transport 84.2* 0.033 32.6+ 0.079
34 Warehousing and support activities for transportation 45.6** 0.001 1.9 0.862
35 Postal and courier activities 10.6 0.452 -5.2 0.835
36 Accommodation and food service activities 26.2* 0.013 17.9+ 0.081
37 Publishing activities 31.4* 0.029 -9.3 0.646
38 Motion picture, video and television, sound 15.7 0.342 -17.6 0.295
39 Telecommunications 78.6** 0 -17.9 0.331
40 Computer programming, consultancy; information 74.9** 0.001 -5.2 0.841
41 Financial services, except insurance and pension 55.9+ 0.082 10.4 0.537
42 Insurance, reinsurance and pension funding 106.3** 0 30.2+ 0.083
43 Auxiliary to financial and insurance activities 13.2 0.744 -8.2 0.727
44 Real estate activities -15.5 0.523 40.4* 0.032
45 Legal and accounting, management, consultancy -27.7* 0.044 26.9* 0.022
46 Architectural, engineering, technical testing 53.3** 0.01 8.4 0.662
47 Scientific research and development 26.0* 0.029 5.2 0.594
48 Advertising and market research -47.7+ 0.061 -18.9 0.214
49 Other professional, scientific, veterinary activities 49.6** 0.024 9.2 0.271
50 Administrative and support service activities 30.9* 0.035 15.6 0.217
51 Public administration and defense -0.2 0.988 -14.4+ 0.054
52 Education 10.4 0.363 -3.3 0.772
53 Human health and social work activities 117** 0 6 0.658
54 Other service activities 42** 0.001 4.9 0.66
55 Undifferentiated goods- and services activities 0
56 Activities of extraterritorial organizations
Note: Own estimates, based on WIOD (2014) data. The coefficients are translated into percentage trade creation effects. P-values below 0.10 denote
statistical significance at least at the 10 percent level. If cell is blank it means that no sectoral estimate could be provided due to the lack of sufficient
transactions in this area. + p < 0.10, * p < .05, ** p < .01.
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Table E.2: Trade Cost Elasticities
GTAP ID Description Trade Elasticities
1 Paddy rice -5.8230
2 Wheat -1.3217
3 Cereal grains nec -1.2893
4 Vegetables, fruit, nuts -1.4956
5 Oil seeds -1.3217
6 Sugar cane, sugar beet -1.3217
7 Plant-based fibers -14.4952
8 Crops nec -1.8446
9 Cattle, sheep, goats, horses -2.5031
10 Animal products nec -3.5222
11 Raw milk -2.5486






18 Minerals nec -4.1475
19 Meat: cattle, sheep, goats, horses -2.5486
20 Meat products nec -2.5486
21 Vegetable oils and fats -3.7847
22 Dairy products -2.8907
23 Processed rice -9.8984
24 Sugar -2.5073
25 Food products nec -3.2790
26 Beverages and tobacco products -1.3169
27 Textiles -5.2618
28 Wearing apparel -2.1010
29 Leather products -3.7073
30 Wood products -3.3775
31 Paper products, publishing -4.6448
32 Petroleum, coal products -8.6460
33 Chemical, rubber, plastic prods -4.4832
34 Mineral products nec -3.3516
35 Ferrous metals -1.5660
36 Metals nec -4.8543
37 Metal products -2.5564
38 Motor vehicles and parts -4.0680
39 Transport equipment nec -4.0118
40 Electronic equipment -2.0006
41 Machinery and equipment nec -3.3853
42 Manufactures nec -2.5133
43-57 All Services -5.9591
Note: The trade cost elasticities for the goods stem from Aichele et al. (2016). The trade cost
elasticities for services stem from (Egger et al., 2015).
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Table E.3: List of GTAP Sectors
GTAP sector ID GTAP Sector GTAP sector ID GTAP Sector
Agrifood Energy
1 Paddy rice 15 Coal
2 Wheat 16 Oil
3 Cereal grains nec 17 Gas
4 Vegetables, fruit, nuts
5 Oil seeds Metals
6 Sugar cane, sugar beet 35 Ferrous metals
7 Plant-based fibers 36 Metals nec
8 Crops nec 37 Metal products
9 Cattle, sheep, goats, horses
10 Animal products nec Raw Materials
11 Raw milk 13 Forestry
14 Fishing 18 Minerals nec
19 Meat: cattle, sheep, goats, horses 30 Wood products
20 Meat products nec 31 Paper products, publishing
21 Vegetable oils and fats 32 Petroleum, coal products
22 Dairy products 34 Mineral products nec
23 Processed rice
24 Sugar Other Services
25 Food products nec 43 Electricity
26 Beverages and tobacco products 44 Gas manufacture, distribution
45 Water
38 Automotive 46 Construction
51 Communication
33 Chemicals 55 Recreation and other services
56 Pub. Admin/Defense/Health/Education
40 Electronic Equipment 57 Dwellings
Finance & Business Services Textiles & Apparel
52 Financial services nec 12 Wool, silk-worm cocoons
53 Insurance 27 Textiles
54 Business services nec 28 Wearing apparel
29 Leather products
Machinery and Equipment
39 Transport equipment nec Trade and Transportation
41 Machinery and equipment nec 47 Trade
48 Transport nec
42 Other Manufacturing 49 Sea transport
50 Air transport
Note: The list depicts all sector,s available in the GTAP 9.0 data. The aggregated sectors used in the above analyses are underlined and bold. Individual
underlined and bold sectors, such as the automotive industry are separately illustrated, which is why they are not categorized into another sector.
200
Table E.4: List of GTAP Regions and Countries
Africa Japan Israel Ukraine
Ghana Rest of EFTA
Mozambique Latin America Oceania Croatia
Kenya Brazil New Zealand Albania
Cameroon Argentina Australia Norway
Uganda Uruguay Rest of Oceania Switzerland
Rest of Eastern Africa Puerto Rico Turkey
South Central Africa Rest of South America Philippines Rest of Europe
Namibia Colombia
Burkina Faso Dominican Republic ASEAN, n.e.c. Rest of World
Rest of South African Customs Union El Salvador Rest of Southeast Asia Kazakhstan
Nigeria Chile Brunei Darussalam Belarus
South Africa Panama Cambodia Sri Lanka
Benin Trinidad and Tobago Lao PDR Rest of South Asia
Mauritius Guatemala Nepal
Ethiopia Nicaragua Rest of European Union (RoEU) Rest of former Soviet Union
Zambia Paraguay Hungary Mongolia
Zimbabwe Venezuela, RB Spain Pakistan
Rwanda Costa Rica Sweden Rest of East Asia
Senegal Honduras Lithuania Bangladesh
Cote dIvoire Ecuador Slovak Republic Georgia
Malawi Mexico Luxembourg Azerbaijan
Central Africa Peru Finland Armenia
Togo Jamaica Malta Rest of World
Botswana Belize Netherlands Russian Federation
Guinea Bolivia Belgium Kyrgyz Republic
Rest of Western Africa Latvia
Tanzania Malaysia Poland Singapore
Madagascar Greece
Middle East Cyprus South Korea
China Rest of North Africa Austria
Hong Kong SAR, China Bahrain Portugal Taiwan
China Qatar Czech Republic
United Arab Emirates Bulgaria Thailand
France Jordan Denmark
Oman Ireland USA& Canada
Germany Saudi Arabia Romania Rest of North America
Morocco Slovenia Canada
India Rest of Western Asia Estonia United States
Tunisia
Indonesia Kuwait Europe, n.e.c. United Kingdom (UK)
Iran, Islamic Rep.
Italy Egypt, Arab Rep. Moldova Vietnam
Note: The list depicts all countries available in the GTAP 9.0 data. The aggregated regions used in the above analyses are underlined and bold. Individual
underlined and bold countries, such as Japan are separately illustrated, which is why they are not categorized into another region.
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Table E.5: Change in Sectoral Value added, EU28 and Japan
EU28 Japan
Value Added Value Added
Initital Change Initital Change
in bn USD in % in bn USD in %
Agri-Food 848 0.82 206 -1.50
Automotive 289 -1.59 93 6.55
Chemicals 602 -0.54 134 3.73
Electronic Equipment 143 1.07 98 -0.22
Energy 82 -1.41 0 -2.07
Financial & Business Services 3148 0.03 925 0.20
Machinery and Equipment 808 0.41 193 0.10
Metals 463 -0.22 146 1.64
Other Manufacturing 133 0.05 29 0.40
Other Services 6817 0.11 2478 0.26
Raw Materials 856 0.17 191 0.76
Textiles & Apparel 230 0.37 21 0.51
Trade and Transportation 1751 0.29 1139 0.08
Total 16172 0.11 5654 0.38
Note: The list depicts the aggregated sector categories. A detailed sector list can be found in the Appendix, table
E.3.
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Table E.6: Change of Sectoral Value Added of Agri-Food in EU28 and Japan, in bn USD & %
EU28 Japan
Value Added Value Added
Change
in bn USD in % in bn USD in %
Animal products nec 1.04 2.79 -0.30 -13.35
Beverages and tobacco products 1.01 0.63 -0.85 -1.22
Cattle, sheep, goats, horses 0.10 0.75 -0.01 -0.62
Cereal grains nec 0.17 0.80 -0.00 -0.79
Crops nec 0.20 0.39 -0.17 -1.36
Dairy products 1.00 1.48 -0.74 -11.92
Fishing 0.10 0.63 -0.05 -0.49
Food products nec. 1.13 0.49 -0.40 -0.68
Meat products nec. 1.00 1.81 -0.24 -17.70
Meat: cattle, sheep, goats, horses 0.04 0.16 -0.00 -0.05
Oil seeds 0.03 0.25 0.00 0.11
Paddy rice 0.00 0.05 -0.02 -0.15
Plant-based fibers -0.01 -1.00 0.00 0.71
Processed rice -0.00 -0.10 0.00 0.01
Raw milk 0.84 2.08 -0.27 -8.83
Sugar 0.05 0.29 -0.03 -1.95
Sugar cane, sugar beet 0.01 0.25 -0.00 -1.67
Vegetable oils and fats 0.03 0.19 -0.00 -0.00
Vegetables, fruit, nuts 0.10 0.18 -0.02 -0.10
Wheat 0.13 0.61 -0.00 -0.86
Agri-Food Total 6.98 0.82 -3.09 -1.50
Note: The list depicts the all sectors of the aggregated sector category Agrifood. A detailed sector
list can be found in the Appendix, table E.3.
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